MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE'S MONITORING COMMITTEE



Final Report - 2003

- Land Force Reserve Restructure
- Professional Development, Education and Leadership

Minister of
National Defence's
Monitoring Committee

Comité de surveillance
du ministre de la
Défense nationale

November 2003

The Honourable John McCallum
Minister of National Defence
101 Colonel By Drive
National Defence Headquarter
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2

Dear Minister:

Your Monitoring Committee is pleased to present its Final Report 2003 on Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) and Professional Development, Education and Leadership. This report is submitted in accordance with our mandate to monitor progress with respect to the implementation of change within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

The members thank you for the honour to have served on this and its predecessor monitoring committees. Over a period of more than five years in total, in a series of reports, we have studied progress regarding change and consulted regularly with the senior bureaucrats and military officials charged with modernizing the Department of National Defence and its legislative framework.

The Committee wishes to express its particular appreciation for your recent efforts to obtain and direct funding for at least the next two years of Reserve restructure.

In the context of our current mandate and those preceding it, we have observed and reported sustained progress in a variety of areas, and we have conveyed our views to you and your predecessor, The Honourable Art Eggleton. At the same time, we have not been reticent to express concern where our members have observed deficiencies, and our recommendations for remedial action have been front and centre. In this, our final report to you, we continue to note areas where, in our opinion, the renewal process is not complete. We leave the balance of our proposed changes in the capable hands of the CF and DND.

Individually and collectively we extend our sincere appreciation for the opportunity to have served in this capacity.

Yours sincerely,

John A. Fraser
Chairman

Dr. David J. Bercuson
Member

Mr. Daniel (Bev) Dewar
Member

BGen (Ret'd) Sheila A. Hellstrom
Member

MGen (Ret'd) Reginald W. Lewis
Member

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the final report of the Minister' Monitoring Committee on Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) and Professional Development, Education, and Leadership. It contains the Committee's final observations regarding the implementation of Government-approved recommendations in the areas within its mandate.

The Committee is pleased to report steady progress on many fronts. At the same time, however, advances in several important areas are going to need constant attention in order to meet objectives. The report presents our detailed analysis that underlies these conclusions.

This Executive Summary highlights our major observations. For ease of reference, page numbers are provided to enable the reader to turn to any particular discussion.

LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE (LFRR)

The Committee continues to applaud the strong efforts of the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and the Project Management Office (PMO) LFRR to effect progressive change for the Army Reserve. The Committee deemed the production of a first draft Army mobilization plan capable of generating forces up to the Stage 3 level of the four stages of mobilization outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper to be particularly commendable. Among their other laudable accomplishments were: promoting the role of the Army Reserves in maintaining a federal as well as military "footprint in the community" as a matter of public policy; establishing the Army Reserve as a credible force and value for money by increasing support to operations with the deployment of Composite Reserve Companies (CRCs) on "Operation Palladium" Rotations to Bosnia (pages16,20); and supporting the introduction of a number of new capabilities that cater to Army Reserve service (pages 24-25).

The Committee is satisfied that serious efforts are being made to improve conditions of service for Reserves. Recent initiatives include: the integration of the Reserve Force pay system into the Regular Force pay system; the CF Pension Modernization project that will provide coverage for both full and part-time members of the CF; and the provision of Regular force compensation and benefits to all Reservists on operations (pages 23-24).

There are, nonetheless, some problem areas. Foremost among these is an enrolment process that generally appears to be more risk averse than is natural for a fighting force. In the Committee view, the CF should be more inclined to manage risk rather than attempting to avoid it. A recruiting and enrolment system for the military must be able to operate expeditiously.

The Committee stands by its statement in *Progress Report II* that enrolment constitutes the greatest challenge in Army Reserve recruitment. Recruiting has always been and remains the lifeblood of the Militia. The problem is that students seeking summer employment make up the bulk of those wishing to join the Reserves and they can be attracted away by quicker job offers from other summer employers. The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) claim that CF recruiting compares favourably with other government departments is thus not entirely relevant, even if accurate. Part of the problem is that the CFRG's primary focus is on attracting and training full-time long service Regular soldiers. This is not the fault of the CFRG as it is so mandated by its mission statement (pages 11-14). In any case, as the head of the Army has no authority to institute change in this area alone, the Committee feels that this matter should be pursued further as a collective CF issue.

In the area of mobilization, the Committee remains concerned that the CF, after almost a decade, still lacks a "no cost" plan for national mobilization as called for by the *1994 White Paper*. Quite apart from the fact that it was directed by policy, there are sound military reasons for undertaking conceptual work on this stage of mobilization. The drafters of the *White Paper* obviously considered it "prudent" to have such a plan. Given the current threat of catastrophic terrorism, it would also seem wise to possess a "surge capacity" to induct large numbers of Reservists in emergency. Further study to address the broader implications of home defence is additionally necessary. Responsibility for the development of such a concept, in a rational and viable way that will stand the test of time, also lies with DND as the lead Government agency (pages 15-19).

The inadequacy of the current system for training Reservists is of additional concern to the Committee. The human raw material is there, and it is as willing as the Canadian volunteer citizen-soldier ever was, but it has to be moulded through better-organized training delivery and more efficient administration. This is not an impossible task. Armies have always been in the business of training civilians to be short-term soldiers. As the DCDS target for Reserve participation is 10-20 percent of deployed forces, this is an area in need of thorough investigation with a view to streamlining administrative procedures and training approaches. The Committee suspects that time could be better utilized in the organization and conduct of training. This could be corrected by running standardized training courses for CRCs at induction/training centres. In this regard the Committee is heartened by news of the Army Total Fleet Management concept advocated by the CLS (pages 20-22, 25).

The Committee is greatly concerned that LFRR personnel growth targets set by the Minister for Phase I have not been sustained and that, consequently, targets for Phase II will not be met. The definition of "performance metrics" set forth in the CDS/DM letter of 10 July 2003 is especially worrisome as it suggests downplaying the importance of personnel growth (e.g., "LFRR Phase 2 is not a "head count" exercise but rather one of capacity and capability enhancement"). In fact, the number of Reservists is a policy issue, and how they are counted remains a critical consideration. The devil is also in the details (pages 28-32). Simply put, including in the count most Reservists on full-time service in addition to those on part-time service substantially lowers the bar for the attainment of the Minister's ultimate personnel growth target of 18,500 part-time soldiers.

Even then, the Army only attained its target growth of 15,500 personnel for LFRR Phase I in May 2003, two months after its own set deadline. Since that time, the target has not been sustained for any series of months. Further sustained effort will be necessary, not just to meet the objective, but to maintain it. This is a corporate (total Armed Forces and Department) and not just Army responsibility, given the clear original Ministerial directive in this area. The "intent" of the Minister's announced policy of 6 October 2000 was to rejuvenate the Army Reserve in communities across the country so that they would provide a stronger presence and framework for both mobilization and augmentation. This meant increasing the number of local part-time Reservists and "developing a citizen soldiery ready for the challenges of the 21st Century." Clearly, the implementation of this policy called for parading more part-time citizen soldiers in unit armouries on weeknights and weekends. To quote the CDS himself, "The Reserve Force is composed of members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service."

The fact that full-time Reserve service in support of the Regular force may also absorb up to 39% of the Reserve pay budget is also of major concern from the perspective of monies specifically allocated to the Reserves (pages 31-32).

The bottom line is that the implementation of LFRR Phase II will continue to be a critical issue as the Militia community expects the Army Reserve to expand to at least 18,500 part-time soldiers while taking on increased unit missions, tasks, and capabilities. Growth in Personnel achieved to date, however, suggests that the corporate centre has not fully accepted Reserve revitalization as a strategic necessity for the well-being of Canada's armed forces. This is in spite of significant efforts on the part of the Army.

It is the considered opinion of this Committee that monitoring of some sort will continue to be necessary in respect of LFRR.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION, AND LEADERSHIP

The Committee remains hopeful about the prospects of advancing Professional Development, Education and Leadership, but some past and continuing concerns need to be addressed.

While the Committee acknowledged in *Progress Report II* that a "culture change in respect of the promotion of education within the CF appears to be taking place," it warned of the potential tendency to take the easy road in this regard. There should be no short cuts to education, which, if it is to be given the credit it warrants, should also be appropriately weighted on promotion boards according to actual academic achievement. Intellectual capacity, in short, must be made to count.

The Committee expressed satisfaction with the statement in *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* that "members of the CF must acquire a balance of the humanities/social science, natural and technological sciences and leadership knowledge," but would have preferred a much stronger declaration in support of the merits of a broad liberal education. The Committee also stands by its observation that greater emphasis could have been placed on the part Canadian civilian universities should play in the process of educating the Canadian officer and NCM corps (pages 38-40).

The Committee again notes its earlier reservations about the academic quality of the Master of Defence Studies (MDS) degree offered on the Canadian Forces College (CFC) Command and Staff Course (CSC) under the aegis of the Royal Military College. The Committee believes that the pursuit of advanced degrees will raise the intellectual level of the officer corps by encouraging substantial study over and above what had previously been the norm. Further, Canadian officers must end up as well "armed," intellectually and academically, as their American counterparts. In any case, the serious quest for academic excellence in order to improve military performance can only be to the benefit of the CF (page 38).

The Committee has observed that the practice of hiring retired generals and flag officers as Senior Directing Staff (SDS) for the Advanced Military Studies Course and National Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto enables students to benefit from their long experience. At the same time, however, Senior Directing Staff should be chosen primarily from academically qualified serving officers (pages 38-39).

It is the Committee's hope that the Armed Forces will indeed be able to champion lifelong learning and professional development for all members of the CF. To be successful, this will require diligent leadership and confidence in the value of first-class scholarship.

Final Report – 2003

INTRODUCTION

This is the Final Report of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change.

In a perfect world there would have never been a need for a monitoring committee outside the Canadian military chain of command. The Somalia Crisis of 1992-1993 revealed serious shortcomings within the chain of command, however, and raised numerous questions about the functioning and the operations of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defence (DND). To address these and certain other concerns, the military establishment and the Canadian Government created several commissions, inquiries and panels. Among these were the (Major-General T.F.) *de Faye Board of Inquiry* into the Somalia affair, the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Defence Minister Doug Young's *'Blue Ribbon' Panel on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces* (which contributed to his *Report to the Prime Minister* in March 1997), former Chief Justice Brian Dickson's review of various military justice issues and his *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves* (SCRR). These led, in turn, to a comprehensive program of change initiatives within the CF and DND (see copy of Press Release "Highlights of National Defence Change Initiatives" dated 14 October 1997 attached as Annex A).

To that end, the Minister of National Defence (MND) at that time, the Honourable Art Eggleton, directed that progress in effecting change would be monitored by an external group, the reports of which were to be made public. The *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces* " was accordingly established on 14 October 1997 to oversee Ministerial reforms. The Minister also announced the appointment of eight committee members: the Chairman, the Honourable Willard Z. Estey, and seven members including the Honourable John A. Fraser, Dr. David J. Bercuson, Brigadier-General (retired) Sheila Hellstrom, Dr. Laurier L. LaPierre, Mr. D. Bevis Dewar, Ms. Carole Lafrance, and Mr. John Rankin. As constituted, the Committee was specifically called upon to "observe, verify, and assess the success of the implementation process and the effectiveness of the results against the Minister's own stated objectives and to advise the Minister on improvements (if any) to the plan or the process."[1] (see copy of Press Release dated 14 October 1997 in Annex B).

In addition to the recommendations contained in the reports of the commissions, inquiries, and panels, the Minister directed the Committee to monitor the implementation of certain programs and objectives initiated internally by the CF and DND. Altogether, the following reports formed the essential context of the Minister's change initiatives and the Committee's work:

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[1] Preliminary Report of the Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence, 31 March 1998.

- *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces by the Honourable M. Douglas Young, PC, MP, Minister of National Defence*, March 25, 1997;

- The *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services* (Dickson 1 Report);

- *Report on the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence (Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services)* (Dickson 2 Report);

- The *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* (Somalia Report);

- *Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves* (SCRR Report);

- *Report of the Military Police Services Review Group* (Belzile Report).

The foregoing documents generated some 336 recommendations in aggregate. Of these 24 were not accepted by the Minister and a further 60 touched on issues excluded from the purview of the Committee. In all, the Committee ended up monitoring some 252 recommendations accepted by the Minister[2] that, with the passage of time, were often split into more or subsumed under others.

As described by the Minister, the Monitoring Committee served as a "window" through which the Canadian public could follow progress in implementing accepted recommendations. During its original two-year mandate, the Committee produced four semi-annual reports for the Minister, who then made them public. The first report, essentially a plan of work, was presented in March 1998 by the Honourable Willard Estey who requested that he be relieved of his chairmanship owing to pressing personal commitments. On 7 April the Honourable John Fraser took over as Chairman and delivered *Interim Report – 1998* in November of that year. This was followed by *Interim Report – 1999* published in June 1999 and the *Final Report – 1999* published in December 1999.

In its Interim Reports the Committee adopted the practice of reporting the status of implementation and making observations under eight thematic groupings:

- Openness and Disclosure;
- Accountability;
- Human Resources Management;
- Leadership;

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[2] Ibid.

- Military Justice;
- Operations;
- Reserves and Cadets;
- Other Issues.

From a Committee perspective this appeared to be the most appropriate way of coping with the inevitable overlapping of decisions and the reality that some were more pivotal to the achievement of the overall objectives of the change program. This reporting structure also facilitated the Committee's strategic approach to assessing the successes and shortcomings of the implementation process and thus provided more useful observations to the Minister about progress within the overall program of reform.

Under the rubric of "Openness" the Committee monitored 10 recommendations related to public affairs policy, advertising, access to information, keeping Parliament informed, the establishment of a military journal, and transparency in general. Under "Accountability" the Committee addressed 20 recommendations. These dealt with the separation of responsibility between the Deputy Minister (DM) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), complaint resolution, career review, redress means and the establishment of an ombudsman, and individual freedom of expression consistent with good order and discipline. Within the "Human Resources" category the Committee considered 32 recommendations concerning the central importance of discipline, personnel appraisal, performance evaluation report content, recruiting standards, ethos and values, the selection and promotion process, officer and non-commissioned member (NCM) contractual arrangements, screening for deployment, and racial diversity.

The Committee also monitored 19 recommendations under "Leadership" pertaining to standards and core qualities, the selection, training, and assessment of leaders, officer education, values and ethics, and the professional development of officers and NCMs. The Committee recommended further monitoring in this area, for, although progress had been made, it was not in a position to provide a final assessment because a number of activities related to professional development had not yet been completed.

Having expressed special interest in military justice issues in both its 1998 and 1999 interim reports, the Committee noted with satisfaction the proclamation into force of the amended *National Defence Act* (*NDA*) on 1 September 1999. In all, the Committee considered 129 recommendations under "Military Justice" dealing with military police powers, investigation, interrogation, and management, the military justice system and Code of Service Discipline, *NDA* amendment, the National Investigation Service, the role of legal officers, courts martial and the administration of justice, and punishments for offences.

In addition, the Committee monitored 84 recommendations grouped under "Operational Issues." These focused on doctrine, chain of command, mission analysis, the operational planning process, orders giving, pre-deployment training for peace support operations, operational readiness, rules of engagement, the law of armed conflict, joint training, handling of prisoners, and the maintenance of operational records. The Committee concluded "the great majority of the operational recommendations flowing from the Young and Somalia reports which fall under the purview of the Canadian Forces have been fully implemented." The Committee did venture, however, that pre-deployment training had become too lengthy because of "strict adherence to the letter of the recommendations." It accordingly suggested taking a closer look at repetition in training and the tendency to concentrate too much on "check list" activity at the expense of more relevant tasks.[3] This observation still has validity.

Under the "Reserves and Cadets" the Committee monitored 36 recommendations dealing with militia sub-units serving overseas, Militia officers commanding overseas, national mobilization planning, restructuring the Militia, administration and equipment, and pay and benefits, including revising the reserve pay system. In the "Other" category the Committee reported on 16 recommendations covering defence policy, force levels, rank structure, pay and allowances, quality of life, and the regimental system.

In *Final Report – 1999* the Committee did not feel the need to revisit many areas of the reform program commented on in its Interim Reports. It was satisfied that these comments, now a matter of public record, had been taken into account by the Department on several important issues, such as the Committee's call for a better definition of the concept of accountability and the need for improved internal communications. The Committee felt that senior leadership within the Department and the CF was pursuing the reform program in good faith and that progress had been made in almost all the subject areas covered by the reports from the Somalia Inquiry, the Dickson studies on military justice and former Defence Minister Doug Young's report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the CF. The Committee specifically cited the following achievements:

- The military justice system had been overhauled through a massive regulatory amendment package to be more in line with current legislation and institutional requirements;
- Summary trials, essential to the maintenance of good order and discipline within the military, were maintained, but with more stringent standards of accountability and due process;
- Under the direction of the CF Provost Marshal, military policing and investigative services were vastly improved;
- An organizational ombudsman was appointed and given ministerial directives to guide his operation;
- A Military Police Complaints Commission was appointed, highlighting the Department's efforts to buttress its public accountability;
- A concept of accountability was developed and promulgated, stressing the value of identifying both failures and successes so that the CF and DND can learn from their experiences and continuously improve;

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[3] *Final Report – 1999*, p. 142.

- A Grievance Review Board slated to begin operations in the year 2000 promised a renewal in the DND/CF complaint resolution system;
- A new public affairs policy was implemented in an attempt to improve the ability of CF members and departmental employees to communicate with the public and the media;
- The CF and DND were grappling with the concepts of ethics and ethos and how they fitted into contemporary social, behavioural and military patterns;
- Training to prevent harassment and racism was implemented for all personnel;
- Personnel appraisals, including those for executive level positions, were overhauled, featuring a better differentiation between a member's performance and potential;
- Training, courses and professional development were all affected by numerous initiatives;
- Myriad recommendations made by the Somalia Inquiry concerning operational doctrine and procedures, such as pre-deployment training, mission acceptance and training in law of armed conflict, were addressed and adopted as standard practice before the Somalia Inquiry reported its findings;
- Processes related to promotion and selection boards, screening for deployment, and other human resource management issues were amended to meet ministerial direction;
- Quality of Life initiatives were implemented, including the opening of the Centre for the Support of Injured and Retired Members and their Families, reflecting a more coordinated approach to the care of CF members and employees; DND also received additional funding for increases in pay, benefits and housing; and
- A CF Professional Journal, to commence publication in 2000, offered a professional forum for the debate of defence and security matters adhering to rigorous academic standards.

In spite of these positive changes, the Committee observed certain deficiencies in how the Department and the CF tackled reform. It attributed this to the absence of an overall strategic agenda to ensure the cohesive implementation of very broad-ranging changes. The Committee's first substantive report, *Interim Report – 1998*, cautioned the Minister that Departmental activity in respect of Reserves was moving away from Government direction. In the Committee view, achieving reform program goals required an overarching philosophical shift in the way of doing business. What they sensed, however, and noted in *Interim Report – 1999*, was a "tendency to re-interpret the meaning and intent of accepted recommendations so as to fit within the pattern of current activities or accommodate some assumed constraints on achieving change."[4] There were also troubling signs that while the change program was widely accepted as good and deserving of support, it was still regarded by some, even among the DND/CF leadership, to be secondary to perceived core concerns. It was a job to be done rather than new values to be lived. In the Committee view, successful cultural change called for attitude adjustment and constant reinforcement, but sometimes it heard the "new culture" described mostly in terms of learning to cope with fewer resources. The connection between the idea of a self-improving "learning" institution and the need to change the content of courses was not immediately recognized by those responsible for officer education.[5]

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[4] *Interim Report* – 1999, p. 1.

Comments expressed in its Interim Reports about the challenge of effecting cultural change and the need for mechanisms to be put in place to do this reflected the Committee conclusion that the DND/CF had not been sufficiently "strategic" in managing the reform program. The Committee likened this to putting the activity "cart" before the conceptual "horse," which, though it led to the implementation of a good many recommendations, did not produce a clear vision of what the reform program was intended to achieve. The Committee observed that the Department's approach to reform might have resulted from the way in which the Government directed change. The Department and the CF were charged with implementing hundreds of recommendations derived from various sources over a span of two years. They, in turn, tackled individual recommendations as a series of tactical jobs, dealing with each as a specific objective, developing an action plan and schedule to implement the recommendation, and "ticking off the box." Public communication of the reform program in various DND/CF publications reflected this approach. Charts, percentages, and bar graphs traced the status of recommendations, with the percentage recorded as complete becoming the gauge of reform. Many Ministerial decisions represented an opportunity and a challenge to identify and describe the strategic vision behind them and to formulate a coherent implementation plan to realize that intention. Simply put, the defence team applied tactical solutions to what it considered to be tactical problems. What the Committee stressed over its tenure was that the reform program was a strategic challenge that required strategic solutions.

The two most glaring examples of how a tactical approach to reform, no matter how vigorously pursued, lacked the breadth of vision to capture the profound consequences of the original direction were deemed to be Reserve restructure and the pursuit of a degreed officer corps. The one major area in which the Committee was unable to report satisfactory progress was the restructuring of the Reserves. In its 1998 and 1999 Interim Reports the Committee was especially critical of the implementation of reforms related to mobilization and the restructuring of the Militia or Land Force Reserve. It charged that most of the Ministerial decisions that were to have shaped that restructure had not been implemented. Indeed, many of the fundamental tenets of the restructure appeared to have been abandoned. The link between policy and implementation activity that had begun to unravel in the fall of 1997 had by 1999 consequently produced a Militia *in extremis* (for a brief historical recounting of the decline of the Militia see Annex C).

As pointed out by Professor Jack Granatstein, the refusal of NDHQ to give the Militia a clearly defined mobilization role precipitated the "worst Regular-Reserve relations in Canadian military history."[6] Of central concern was the fact that by the mid-1990s Militia personnel constituted roughly 20%, on average, of contingents deployed to the former Yugoslavia. In the 1993 Medak Pocket confrontation Militia personnel made up almost half of 2 PPCLI. Although such individual augmentation activity provided the Militia with a worthwhile role, it had the adverse effect of siphoning off money and equipment from the unit armoury floors that were the very source of the augmentees themselves. Many clear-eyed observers, while very impressed with the performance of Reservist augmentees serving with Regular units, correctly pointed out that with the ongoing decline in numbers of Militia soldiers in their home units the augmentee stream would simply dry up. This would have a serious impact not just on the Militia, but also on the capacity of the Regular Army to meet deployment demands abroad. It was also obvious that augmentation was but the reverse side of the reserve force generation coin – the obverse was mobilization, which role had been specifically prescribed for the Militia in the *1994 Defence White Paper*.[7]

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[5] *Final Report – 1999*, p. 7.

By 1995 the situation had become so intolerable that Defence Minister David Collenette appointed the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) under the leadership of The Right Honourable Brian Dickson, former Chief Justice of Canada. The publication of the SCRR Report, which recommended that the Militia's role in mobilization be recognized, did not abate the acrimony. The Regular military establishment continued to argue that there was one army with two components, Regular and Reserve, and that the Militia's primary role was augmentation to fill the gaps in regular units. Reservists, on the other hand, countered that the main Militia role was to provide a framework for mobilization, a base upon which a larger army could be formed. The SCRR Report considered the augmentation role to be vital but was shocked to find that there was no detailed planning for Stages 3 or 4 of mobilization as prescribed by the *1994 Defence White Paper*. While observing that not having a plan for national mobilization for a major global war "seems very imprudent," it added that Stages 3 and 4 had to "reflect clearly defined roles for the Militia as the basis for recruitment, training, and the provision of formed units." At the same time, the SCRR recommended that the Militia be tasked to provide formed sub-units for overseas deployment.[8]

The government adopted the vast majority of the recommendations of the SCRR (36 out of 41), but Land Force Headquarters failed to do any serious mobilization planning. It instead began to test Militia units for their viability, which, while well intentioned, was not helpful because the reasons for non-viability were often a direct result of factors beyond the control of units.[9] By the spring of 1999, as Militia strength fell to around 11,000, the Army Commander also in the name of Total Force moved to re-role Militia units into combat service support, public affairs, and intelligence categories. It was even postulated that 70% of the Militia would fulfill non-traditional roles and only 30% traditional roles such as infantry, armour, and artillery.[10] These structure proposals, strongly opposed by many in the Reserve community, triggered an intensely rancorous controversy in which trust between the Reserves and Regulars was severely diminished. By April 1999 consultation between the Army and the broader Reserve community had broken down.

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[6] Dr. J.L. Granatstein, "The Search for an Efficient, Effective Land Force Reserve," *Canadian Military Journal*, 2 (Summer, 2002), p. 7.

[7] See J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University Press, 2002), pp. 388-389.

[8] Granatstein, *Canada's Army*, p. 390 and "*The Search*," p. 7.

[9] See *In the Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century – A Report to the Minister of National Defence The Honourable Art Eggleton*, dated 19 May 2000 (also called the *Fraser Report)*, specifically Recommendation #1 covering recruiting, enrolment, training, administration, and pay.

In November 1999 the new Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton, requested the Chairman of the Monitoring Committee, which had already reported on the restructuring of the Reserves as part of its mandate, to provide advice on how to resolve the impasse in the LFRR process. This appeared to be a logical step as the Committee had already commented in its June *Interim Report – 1999* that:

> *"The Reserves have three fundamental roles within the Canadian Forces: to serve as the basis of national mobilization; to augment the Regular Force; and to act as the military's link to the community. These roles are not mutually exclusive. Maintaining a link to the community, for example, facilitates the ability of the Reserves to prepare for their ultimate purpose of national mobilization by recruiting, training and maintaining a level of operational readiness. ...*
>
> *While the three roles of the reserves may not be separable, it must be noted that, without proper emphasis on their national mobilization role, the Army reserves in particular will continue to be at the mercy of Regular Force priorities, and the operational base from which they would expand will continue to decline."*[11]

Accordingly, a reconstituted Monitoring Committee comprising Mr. Bev Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson under the chairmanship of the Honourable John Fraser was charged to "continue to monitor the implementation of reforms primarily in the areas of leadership and the Reserves."[12] The Chairman was also asked to "personally arrange to have the Committee review the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) process and provide [the MND] with advice on this matter."[13]

In response to this Ministerial direction, the Committee submitted an interim report in letter form on 30 March 2000 (see Annex D). After consultations at the national and area level with both Regular and Reserve officers and NCMs, honourary appointments, and other interested parties in the Reserve community, this was followed on 19 May 2000 with a formal report entitled *In the Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century – A Report to the Minister*

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[10] The Army Commander may have been attempting to imitate the US Army Reserve (USAR), which was comprised of roughly 54% combat service support, 18% combat support, 27% mobilization base expansion, and only 1% combat units. The USAR provides 97% of army civil affairs units, 89% of psychological operations (PSYOPS), 72% of public affairs units, and 70% of hospitals. What he may not have understood was that US Army authorities intentionally placed their non-combat units in the USAR so that the Regular army could not be deployed without the President calling up Reserves, which meant he had to have the people behind him. The application of such subtle political as opposed to military reasoning was only possible, of course, because the US Army had another Reserve in the National Guard. The National Guard provides the US Army with 44% of its combat divisions, 56% of its armored battalions, 70% of its field artillery, 49% of its air defence artillery, and 41% of its combat engineers. In Canada there is only one Reserve Army.

[11] *Interim Report – 1999*, p. 104.

[12] Letter from the Honourable Arthur C. Eggleton to the Honourable John A. Fraser, dated 17 November 1999.

[13] Ibid.

of National Defence The Honourable Art Eggleton. The *Fraser Report*, as it came to be called, offered ten recommendations to address the lack of progress in solving the chronic problems of the Militia. All were accepted by the Minister who then appointed Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery as a Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in order to find common ground for "Reserve stakeholders" to move the LFRR process forward.[14] Jeffery immediately re-established the Command Consultative Working Group to assist him in developing the LFRR Strategic Plan, which provided direction for Departmental and CF action in support of the Fraser Recommendations. Jeffery was subsequently appointed Chief of the Land Staff (CLS).

In his announcement of 6 October 2000, the MND re-affirmed government policy to implement LFRR. Stating that "the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise," he added that, "This is the *raison d'être* of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a 'footprint' in communities across the country." He further stipulated that the *Fraser Report* and Jeffery's Land Forces [sic] Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan published in September 2000 were the "key ingredients to the success of the process". The ten recommendations of the *Fraser Report* were to serve as the "Government's blueprint for LFRR" and Jeffery's plan was to be the "first step in their implementation." Specifically, the strategic plan was to fix "some of the problems plaguing the Militia identified in the *Fraser Report*." It was also to "lay the groundwork for developing future policies to fit the lives of [Canada's] part-time citizen soldiers." In the Minister's words:

> *"We need them more now that at any time since the Second World War. They provide the framework for expansion should we require mobilization of forces; for individual and unit augmentation on peace support operations; and, to represent the military footprint in communities across the country. The Strategic Plan, combined with some additional actions I am taking, will ensure the CF Reserves will continue to be both operationally sound, while contributing to the development of citizenship and to local emergency preparedness."*[15]

The Minister also announced the appointment of the Honourable John Fraser and Major-General (Ret'd) Reginald Lewis to monitor LFRR.

Implementation of LFRR under the Strategic Plan called for two phases. Phase I, to be funded from existing resources, aimed at attaining stabilization and a strength of 15,500 by the end of March 2003, while Phase II, to be funded from additional resources, aimed at reaching 18,500 by March 2006.

Subsequently, the Committee was directed to monitor the implementation of the *Fraser Report* recommendations and the two phases of the Strategic Plan, with Major-General Lewis appointed to the Committee.

In accordance with its new mandate to continue monitoring LFRR the Committee presented its First Quarterly Report on the implementation of the Ministers' 6 October 2000 Policy Statement on 17 January 2001. A second Quarterly Report on LFRR followed on 11 May 2001. After conducting extensive field consultations in Calgary, Toronto, Gagetown, and Montreal between March and October 2001 the Committee produced a more comprehensive *Progress Report I* on LFRR in February 2002.

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[14] Jeffery was appointed on 4 May 2000. *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan*, September 2000.

[15] See full Statement attached as Annex E.

Meanwhile, in keeping with its mandate to monitor CF professional development, leadership, and education, the Committee also conducted 14 formal meetings with DND officials throughout 2001 and early 2002. In six separate letters to the Minister it additionally offered comments on officer professional development, the Enhanced Leadership Model, and the Canadian Defence Academy.

In June 2003, after further consultations with Militia Brigade Groups in Ottawa, Toronto, London, Winnipeg, and Calgary and an education conference with the CDS and his staff, the Committee presented *Progress Report II* on LFRR[16] and Professional Development, Education, and Leadership.

This Final Report will similarly address, in turn, the two issues of LFRR and Professional Development, Education and Leadership.

LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE

In this section the Committee makes it's final observations on implementation of the Fraser Recommendations as accepted by the Minister as the "blueprint for LFRR." For the most part they reflect the uninhibited dialogue and associated candor that characterized numerous consultations between Committee members and field officers and NCMs of Militia brigades and units located across Canada. In this respect, the Committee offers a unique perspective and one that can only emanate from outside the chain of command. The approach taken by the Committee additionally adhered to the philosophy espoused by the Chairman in September 1998 that:

> The Army should not be threatened by the Monitoring Committee. We want the military to succeed. The Army could use the Monitoring Committee, and other such avenues to show the Government and the Canadian people that it is doing fine work. If this is done, it will facilitate the Ministerial-Public-Army triad. Indeed, this sort of independent monitoring is the sort of mechanism that the Army can use to add credibility to its claim that is, in fact, changing.[17]

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[16] For a detailed chronology of LFRR see Annex F.

[17] Notes of Talk by the Honourable John A. Fraser, September 1998.

As to be expected, the devil is often in the details and the Committee has persistently endeavoured to uncover these in its search for the truth. In so doing, it also feels that it has gained a sound understanding of the problems, great and small, that continue to challenge the revitalization of the Army Reserve.

ADMINISTRATION

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #1: Steps should be taken and announced to fix chronic problems in the way the reserves system is administered.

- Recruiting: more flexibility and authority to local reserve authorities to design advertising to suit local conditions and needs, and to appeal to local target groups.
- Enrolment: simplify and shorten the enrolment process. Permit conditional enrolment.
- Training: establish standards to be achieved for qualification levels, and hold local Commanders responsible for administering them. Permit civil equivalency to be accepted in place of DND courses where possible. Allow more training at unit level and support it with training aids and equipment (including computer-based training). Where centralized training is essential, it should be scheduled in alignment with Reservists' availability; courses once set must not be cancelled.
- Administration: relieve the excess administrative paper burden on local units and their commanding officers.
- Pay: remove remaining irritants in the pay process.

STATUS

In *Progress Report II* of June 2003 the Committee identified the enrolment process as constituting the greatest problem affecting Reserve recruitment. As revealed in consultation after consultation, the Militia has no problem in attracting Canadian citizens to serve their nation on a part-time basis with periods of this service devoted to overseas deployment. The problem of sustaining reserve strength is not one of attracting recruits, many of whom are turned away, but mainly one of enrolment. The Committee concluded that, to a large extent, this problem boiled down to a question of attitude and will – if the will were truly there, the problem could be fixed.

The Committee further determined the major choke point in the enrolment process to be centralized medical screening. A communication from the JAG Branch indicated that in order to ensure every Canadian citizen applying to be a member of the Reserves is "treated equitably across the country"[18] each medical file has to be finally reviewed and approved centrally. The Committee ventured that this practice, which could hardly be sustained in either emergency or war, could be overcome through decentralized contracting out to civilian doctors or medical centres. The Committee also noted that the Army Commander's 19 November 2001 recommendation[19] to streamline the medical evaluation step in the enrolment process had not been accepted. ADM (HR-Mil) refused to sanction conditional enrolment on the grounds that it "brings an unnecessary risk to the Public" for lack of "a reasonable level of screening."[20]The Committee nonetheless feels that this matter should be pursued further. In both of these issues, medical and conditional enrolment, the head of the Army has no authority to institute change on his own.

The Committee noted that plans have been made for the integration of the Reserve Force pay system into the Regular Force pay system and that work is to begin in 2003-04 on a review of how personnel administration and pay services will be provided to the Reserves. Once this analysis is completed, milestones and target dates for completion will be set.

The Committee also felt compelled to emphasize in *Progress Report II*, and it bears repeating again, that the only real difference between a Regular and Reservist is training time. And time in service is not so critical as time in training for operations and war. Just because a person is in the Regular force does not necessarily make him or her an expert in the profession of arms. In fact, many would say that far too much Regular service is devoted to matters entirely unrelated to the employment of force of arms in strategic, operational, and tactical scenarios. The great strength of the Army Reserves is that they are sharp-end orientated, that is to say the majority join up not to push paper in offices, but to practice the profession of arms in outdoor range practices, field exercises, and operations if possible. They desire and should receive this type of "hard core" army training on the unit armoury floor or as near to their home unit as possible on parade nights and weekends. The result, which is attainable, would be a sharp-end orientated Militia capable of fielding substantial home defence formations and expeditionary forces. Surely there can be no more powerful and compelling vision of an Army than one that sees it springing from the people – and that when the people see it, they see themselves. There is thus very good reason to market and promote part-time Militia service as an honourable and desirable vocation in and of itself.

On 3 April 2003 the Minister of National Defence (MND), the Honourable John McCallum, announced the start of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) Phase II as per the Government

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[18] Judge Advocate General 1000-23 (JAG), 6 May 2003.

[19] On 19 November 2001 the Army Commander sent a letter to the organization in charge of CF personnel administration, ADM (HR-Mil), making specific recommendations as to how the enrolment process might be streamlined to "take the 21 day timeframe CFRG attempts to achieve for enrolments and reduce it to as little as three (3) days."

[20] 5671 (DMHRR) letter ADM (HR-Mil) to CLS, dated 8 February 2002.

Policy Statement of 6 October 2000.[21] LFRR Phase II will provide funding for an immediate increase of 750 Army Reservists in fiscal year 2003/2004 and another 750 in 2004/2005. The overall goal, within constraints on resources, remains to increase the Army Reserve (Militia) to 18,500, and additional monies will be set aside to address the equipment needs associated with the new capabilities of the Army Reserve. On 13 May 2003 the Minister re-emphasized that "LFRR is a critical project, and I am determined that Phase 2 will preserve the Army Reserve as a national institution and transform its operational potential to meet Canada's needs in the 21st Century."[22] After assuring the Monitoring Committee on 9 June that he did not wish *Progress Report II* to gather dust on some shelf, the Minister issued a tasking order to the Department in the full realization that a corporate DND/CF response was required.

OBSERVATIONS

The Committee was heartened by the Minister's desire to see that positive corporate action would be taken within the Department and CF to address the shortcomings pointed out in *Progress Report II*.

PMO/LFRR is in the process of producing a directive on the execution of LFRR Phase II. It was issued in draft form to Land Force Areas for their comments and was to be presented at the Army Reserve Working Group 16-17 September 2003. After that, it was to go to the Army Reserve Advisory Group on 4 October prior to its presentation and formal approval and signature at the Command Consultative Advisory Group (CCAG) on 5 October 2003.

The Committee stands by its statement in *Progress Report II* that enrolment constitutes the greatest challenge in Army Reserve recruitment. Recruiting has always been and remains the lifeblood of the Militia. In a 3 May 2002 letter to ADM (HR-Mil) on the subject of Army Reserve recruiting the CLS urged "improving the recruiting process to minimize pre-enrolment attrition," while warning that "unless the enrolment process for those seeking to join the Army Reserve compares favourably with speedier staffing processes of other part-time employers, we will not be able to achieve the LFRR Phase 2 growth targets." The problem is that students seeking summer employment make up the bulk of those wishing to join the Reserves and they can be attracted away by quicker job offers from other summer employers. The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) claim that CF recruiting compares favourably with other government departments is thus not entirely relevant, even if accurate. Stating that he believed it was "still possible to speed up the enrolment process for the Army Reserve," the CLS made several specific recommendations including: opening recruiting centres on weekends and evenings to cater to clients; devolving medical approving authority; speeding up testing and verification of former service; and instituting one-stop processing. He added that although "much effort is being made to process 'clean' candidates in 21 days, I am led to believe that very few Canadian youths meet this standard." His bottom line was that "without significant improvements in recruiting output, the Army Reserve will wither and the Army as a whole will suffer the consequences."[23]

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[21] *Hansard*, Number 084, 2003-04-03. On 9 April 2003 before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) he further stated that he was serious about the Reserves and that LFRR Phase II would be funded from the additional monies he obtained. He also remarked that while there had been a "lot of talk for quite a long time about … Phase two, … it had not been funded, despite expressions of wishes by the government that it would be." In the same forum the MND went on to say that the government was committed to increasing the role of reserves in home defence and safeguarding the country against terrorist threats. As he said: "I think that's a natural role for the reserves because they're spread out across the country and they're in many small towns across the country. So we are committed to that." SCONDVA, Evidence Number 21, Wednesday April 9, 2003.

[22] Letter from the Honourable John McCallum to the Honourable John A. Fraser, 13 May 2003.

Part of the problem is that the CFRG's primary focus is on attracting and training full-time long service Regular soldiers. This is not the fault of the CFRG as its mission statement indicates:

> In support of ADM (HR-Mil) assigned defence and change objectives, the mission of the CFRG is to support the operational capability of the CF through the recruitment and basic training of personnel of the Regular Force, and the processing of personnel for the primary Reserve and the Cadet Instructors Cadre.

Thus, although the Army Reserves constitute 42% of CFRG clients, as compared to 40% for the Regular force, they are not served in the same way as the latter. The Reserve enrolment process makes it a Reserve responsibility to assemble applications for the potential recruit. The CFRG assumes responsibility only for receiving applications and then administering interviews, aptitude tests, medical screening, enhanced reliability checks, and physical fitness testing. The CFRG says that this can be done in 15 to 21 days. If this is the case, it is encouraging, but we are receiving consistent reports from serving officers and NCMs that contradict this contention. As might be expected within such a split process, problems can and do arise.[24] The Reserves are clearly no more satisfied customers than the CLS. Whereas the Reserves count time from "intent to join" to "swearing into service," the CFRG counts time in terms of "working days." Neither does the CFRG apparently keep detailed track of the number of applicants who simply give up waiting to join the Reserves (the pre-enrolment attrition referred to by the CLS). Aptitude tests and perhaps even enhanced reliability checks also seem to be largely geared to the placement of long-service Regular soldiers rather than part-time Militia. The enrolment process in general, moreover, appears to be more risk averse than seems natural for a fighting force. In the Committee view, especially in the light of the potential requirement for mobilization, the CF should be more inclined toward learning to manage risk rather than attempting to avoid it altogether. After all, the object of the exercise is to get soldiers enrolled, not to put obstacles in their way. Further, a recruiting and enrolment system for the military must be able to operate expeditiously. In any national emergency the time presently taken to recruit and enroll a soldier would neither be in the public interest nor tolerated.

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[23] Letter from CLS to ADM (HR-Mil), dated 3 May 2002. This was the second letter on recruiting sent by the CLS to ADM (HR-Mil); the first was sent on 19 November 2001.

[24] Suggestions have been made to make the Reserves responsible for all aspects of their recruiting, but this would only be feasible if they were given all the necessary administrative, financial, and decision-making tools to do so. The alternative, to make the CFRG responsible for the whole process, may not be the best interests of the Reserves. Whatever action is taken to fix the system will require serious staff study.

MOBILIZATION, HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND FOOTPRINT IN THE COMMUNITY

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #2: Acknowledge the legitimacy of Stages 3 and 4 mobilization as a part of the planning process, and the need for the Reserves structure to be able to support it. Prepare a national mobilization plan as the basis for restructuring. This is consistent with the 1994 *White Paper* and SCRR, and would assure reservists they have a role beyond augmentation for current operations.

Fraser Recommendation #3: Outline proposed roles for the reserves in general terms, including some introduction of non-traditional roles. Explain in common-sense terms why these changes are necessary under present and foreseeable conditions. Give assurance that most combat units will be retained even if some changes may be needed to ensure they are of viable size (e.g., "tactical groupings" of some units while retaining their traditional insignia).

STATUS

The Army Reserve role has been clearly and most satisfactorily enunciated as:

> *"Within the Army, the Reserves (Militia) provide the framework for mobilization, the Army's connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces ["augmentation" referring to the provision of supplementary (depth) and complementary (breadth) capabilities]."*[25]

Again, as in *Progress Report II*, the Committee wishes to express its appreciation and respect for the PMO/LFRR initiative in producing a detailed first draft Army mobilization plan. This sets out the prime and secondary missions of every Reserve Army unit in Canada up to the third stage of the four stages of mobilization outlined in the *1994 Defence White Paper* (see page 17). Described as a "foundation upon which to build," it represents concrete progress toward fulfilling the 1995 SCRR recommendations that the "definition of stages 3 and 4 of mobilization be amended immediately to clearly define Reserve Force roles especially the Militia, as a basis for recruitment, training, and provision of formed units." In assigning specific missions and tasks for the mobilization of around 40,000 citizen-soldiers in emergency, it also goes some ways towards meeting the potential requirements of post-9/11 home defence. The Army has also made substantial progress toward revitalizing the Reserve Army in respect of defence and deployment abroad. On 4 November 2002 Colonel P.J. Atkinson, Commander of Task Force Bosnia and Herzegovina, reported favourably on the performance of the first Composite Reserve Company (CRC) to be deployed as part of a Regular army battlegroup.[26] In assessing this CRC, designated D Company of the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, he remarked that "D Company is delivering the goods. They are no weak sister within the BG." He added that the Commander MND (SW) had commented "very favourably" on their work. On the basis of three separate visits to the CRC Atkinson observed that, "Were it not for unit titles on their slip-ons I would not be able to distinguish them from the remainder of the BG."[27]

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[25] 1901-6-1 (CLS) Staff Planning Directive 010/02 *Army Reserve Mission and Tasks*, 15 August 2002. This role statement was approved in CDS 11 Jun 02 – *Army Reserve Role*. This role is consistent with the Government of Canada Policy Statement of 6 October 2000.

At any given time there are thousands of personnel who for whatever reason have left the armed forces. These men and women make up an invaluable military-trained and experienced number of citizens who are situated in every part of Canada and who could be called upon in an emergency or war. The CF have long recognized their value and have referred to them as a Supplementary Reserve in distinction to part-time Primary Reserve soldiers. Members of the Supplementary Reserve do not parade or take part in military exercises. Nonetheless, there is a new-found appreciation of their worth. As set out in the *Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003*, "The Supplementary Reserve is composed of personnel with previous military service who could be recalled for military service in an emergency."[28]In VCDS Force Structure Guidance: "Sustaining the Total Force: Realigning the Supplementary Reserve for the 21st Century," the role of the Supplementary Reserve (Supp Res) was defined as:

> The Supplementary Reserve, as an essential part of the order of battle, will provide individual augmentation, on a voluntary basis, in order to enable the Canadian Forces to mount and sustain operations in all stages of mobilization.[29]

On 19 January 2001 the VCDS promulgated an Action Plan on CF Supplementary Reserve Restructure intended to "initiate a number of research and reorganization activities, with a view to making the Supplementary Reserve more flexible, open to easy access by Environmental Commands and Group Principals and relevant to current and future operational requirements." This was translated into a work plan by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources-Military) (ADM (HR-Mil)) between March and November 2001 (see page 22).

The Army Support Review (ASR) intended to define Combat Service Support (CSS)[30] organization for Regulars and Reserves is ongoing. The ASR will define CSS force structure,

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[26] The rotation of formed sub-units began with Rotation (ROTO) 9 "Operation Palladium" to Bosnia (October 2001-March 2002) when a number of Reserve rifle sections were integrated into and deployed with the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (R22eR) Battle Group. ROTO 10 (March - October 2002) saw the deployment of formed composite reserve platoons as part of the 2 R22eR Battle Group. In October 2002 a Composite Reserve Company (CRC) deployed with the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) Battle Group on ROTO 11. A second CRC, serving with 2 PPCLI Battle Group on ROTO 12, deployed in March 2003 and a third CRC will deploy with the Royal Canadian Dragoons Battle Group on ROTO 13 in September 2003.

[27] Letter 5323-1 (Comd) Colonel P.J. Atkinson to the CLS, dated 4 November 2002.

[28] *Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003*, p. 62.

[29] "Sustaining the Total Force: Realigning the Supplementary Reserve for the 21st Century" under VCDS Force Structure Guidance: Future of the Supplementary Reserve, December 2000, p. 3/6.

Regular and Reserve, for the Interim Army Model and optimize the management of garrison support services within the Army.

OBSERVATIONS

While the Committee in *Progress Report II* complimented the CLS and PMO/LFRR on the above Army initiative, it also expressed reservations about the DND/CF state of mobilization planning. The *1994 Defence White Paper* called for four stages of mobilization:

- The first stage of a response to any crisis or emergency would involve "force generation"; that is, all measures needed to prepare elements of the Canadian Forces to undertake new operational tasks, and to sustain and support them. These functions will be undertaken within the existing resource framework of the Canadian Forces. They will include the training and preparation of reservists to augment the Regular Force.
- The next stage, "force enhancement", would involve the improvement of the operational capabilities of the existing forces through the allocation of more resources. It would be undertaken without permanent change in the posture or roles of the Canadian Forces, although the formation of temporary units or specialist elements could prove necessary. This level of mobilization is similar to actions taken in response to the 1990 war in the Persian Gulf and all current peacekeeping commitments.
- "Force expansion", the third stage, would involve the enlargement of the Canadian Forces - and perhaps selected elements of the Department of National Defence - to meet a major crisis or emergency. It will involve permanent changes in the roles, structures, and taskings of the Canadian Forces - and could call for the formation of new units, the enhancement of existing facilities, and the procurement of additional equipment. This stage is similar to the structural and role changes undergone by all elements of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence in 1950-1952, when Canada provided armed forces to the United Nations' multinational force in Korea, and to the newly formed NATO in Europe.
- Finally, while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready "no-cost" plans for total "national mobilization". This fourth step could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a "war emergency" under the *Emergencies Act.* [31]

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[30] Combat Service Support (CSS) means the necessary logistical support for the fighting or combat arms and includes supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, and personnel administration. This support is vital, for without it the Combat Arms (infantry, armoured, artillery, and field engineers) cannot function.

[31] *1994 Defence White Paper*, pp. 44-45.

The 1995 SCRR report further recommended that "a national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch," but eight years later nothing of the sort has been done. Incredibly, a "no cost" plan was called for by policy (see bullet four above), but there is no such plan in practice. As pointed out in *Progress Report II* and referred to again in this report on page 19, the PMO/LFRR draft mobilization plan, while a commendable and highly desirable work in progress, is essentially an Army plan and does not go beyond Stage 3.

VCDS Force Structure Guidance is strong on listing mobilization principles[32] and espousing generalities,[33] but weaker on the details required of a mobilization plan. In fact, one gets the distinct impression from reading material on the VCDS web site that Reserves should still be reorganized as combat support and combat service support for purposes of augmenting the Regular force.[34] Yet, the 1999 Military Occupation Structure Review as much as confirmed the need for an enhanced mobilization capability by revealing that the Regular force would have to be augmented by Reserves providing up to 20% of the "vanguard" and "main contingency force (MCF)" requirements of Stage 2. The vanguard commitment required from Stage 1 was quantified at about 4,400 and the MCF, to be deployed in Stage 2, at about 11,900.[35] The thrust of the VCDS Force Structure Guidance on Strategic Warning for National Mobilization nonetheless discredited the idea of Stage 4 mobilization on the grounds that "there is at present no conceivable near- [1-2 years] or mid-term [3-5 years] threat to Canadian security that might necessitate Stage Four mobilization."[36] (This was before 9/11, before Afghanistan, and before the Iraq War) The conclusion that "there is no scope within defence policy for national mobilization"[37] (Stage 4) essentially explains why there has been no movement on this front. It also amounts to a rejection of government policy direction that it would be "prudent" to have a plan just in case national mobilization was required (as clearly stated in the *1994 White Paper*).

The school of thought that we are living in a post-mobilization world has many adherents. History has shown, however, that such preconceptions can be imprudent. The British between 1919-32 based their defence planning on the continuing assumption that there would be no great war for ten years. In 1935 the Italians attacked Ethiopia; in 1936 the Germans marched into the Rhineland. When the latter seized the rump of Czechoslovakia in 1939, the British doubled the size of the reserve army from 13 to 26 divisions, a step they should have taken long before. Fortunately for Canada, Defence Scheme No. 3, approved in January 1932, provided an effective mobilization plan for the dispatch of an expeditionary force overseas. Put into action on 1 September 1939, it also served as the basis for the 1941-42 "Army [Expansion] Programme." The Canadian General Staff can thus be said to have done its job reasonably well, that is to say, it had a workable high-level war plan available for the military contingency at hand. Correctly anticipating that the Canadian public would so demand, it had for two decades planned to dispatch an expeditionary force. Ironically, in the end the General Staff proved to be more in step with the Canadian people than was their government.

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[32] VCDS Force Structure Guidance, "Manning Principles for Mobilization," 28 March 2000.

[33] VCDS Force Structure Guidance, "Strategic Warning for National Mobilization," 2 November 2000 and "Sustaining the Total Force (draft)," 8 February 2000.

[34] See VCDS Force Structure: "Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century," 26 November 1999.

[35] VCDS Force Structure Guidance, "Manning Principles for Mobilization," 28 March 2000, p. 2/5.

[36] VCDS Force Structure Guidance, "Strategic Warning for National Mobilization," 2 November 2000, p.5/5.

[37] Ibid., p. 2/5.

All of this is hindsight, of course, but hindsight often provides insight. The plain fact is, regardless of how many scenarios are postulated,[38] nobody knows how the future will actually unfold any more than how to predict the fluctuations of the stock market. Track records in foreseeing events have not been good. Despite the existence of sophisticated intelligence gathering tools, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the collapse of Warsaw Pact satellites in 1989, and the implosion of the Soviet Union itself in 1990 surprised everyone. Who would have foreseen war being waged in the Falklands, in the Gulf, in Afghanistan, and in the Gulf again? The world, it seems, is able to turn itself upside down in very short order.

To make the case that it would be "prudent" to have a "no-cost" plan for national mobilization is not difficult. Indeed, the very concept of having a "reserve" at any level is predicated on the axiom that the only thing that can be expected in war is the unexpected. Reserves exist to deal with the unexpected and unforeseen. The current threat of catastrophic terrorism is alone likely to require an expanded home defence in that eventuality, which is going to mean connecting more closely with the people. The Militia appears to be a natural framework around which to construct such a defence for Canada, in addition to its traditional and any newly accepted functions. The terror war is additionally likely to produce more inter-state conflicts in the future, whether to defeat, disarm, or replace regimes. As the recent war in Iraq has amply demonstrated, the requirement for "old-fashioned" heavy armour and other so-called "legacy" weapons systems has not gone away. Neither has the need for greater numbers of troops on the ground disappeared. In such circumstances the Militia will almost certainly be required as a mobilization base for the fielding of larger expeditionary forces.

Quite apart from the fact that it was directed by policy, there are sound military reasons for undertaking conceptual work on the fourth stage of mobilization. Responsibility for the development of such a concept in a rational and viable way that will stand the test of time, also lies with DND as the lead government agency.

Given that the current Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff target for Reserve participation is 10-20% of deployed forces,[39] the Committee remains concerned, as it voiced in *Progress Report II*, by reports that the CF possesses no capacity for a "surge" induction of Reservists. This problem has been described as having been "festering for years"[40] and should be addressed in order to provide an expanded capability to support mobilization. Good ideas bear repeating, and one imaginative solution proposed would be to establish mobilization and rotation centres for the induction and deployment of citizen-soldier volunteers. The establishment of such centres would not only sensibly address the eventuality of mobilization before the fact, but go some way toward resolving current enrolment problems as well. The seamless crossover from individual augmentation through to the fielding of formed units in any run up to mobilization would also be desirable, for augmentation and mobilization are complementary, not competitive, activities.

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[38] VCDS Strategic Guidance, "Strategic Warning for National Mobilization" posits eleven.

[39] *Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003*, p.60.

[40] 1901-1 (Comd) LFWA Reserve Roles, Missions and Tasks (RMAT) Report, March 2003, p. 7/27.

As the remarks of Colonel Atkinson included in our discussion above regarding status indicate, Reserve service in the former Yugoslavia continues to be regarded as highly satisfactory.[41] The Committee has also continued to scrutinize Composite Reserve Company (CRC) Operation "Palladium" rotation (ROTO) to the former Yugoslavia. It is now able to confirm that there was substance to the Reservist perception that the 90-day pre-deployment training period had become a competition between individuals rather than a confirmation of their fitness for pre-deployment training under the original unit and area training and selection process. In a post-exercise report the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry commented as follows: "The majority of [Reserve] soldiers that arrived for training were surprised to learn that they would undergo a competitive selection process." This was because they "were tasked against existing Rotation 11 positions by their parent brigades, with a number of soldiers placed into a training pool. This left the perception in many soldier's minds that they had already been selected for employment on Rotation 11."[42] The PPCLI recommended that they should be assigned permanent positions only when they have successfully completed training. As the Monitoring Committee pointed out, however, Reservists often give up jobs, school, and housing leases in order to take pre-deployment training. [43]Regular candidates never have to make such sacrifices, and, if they have to be removed from training because of health, injury, or inadequate prior training, they do not lose their pay, housing, or another chance for deployment.[44] The Committee recognizes that a certain personnel margin has to be allowed, but still insists that Reservists should not be sent unduly in excess of available positions. As recommended by 1 PPCLI, it is also important that Reservists understand the details of selection at the time they apply.

This matter also points to the broader issues of training delivery on the unit armoury floor and the possible need for a standardized pre-deployment training regime not entirely determined by the individual Regular force unit being reinforced. If Reservists are not adequately trained to the required standard it is surely the system that is at fault, not the individual who too often is made to suffer. According to the 1 PPCLI after-action report, although "screening conducted by parent units and Reserve CBGs was generally good," some Reserve soldiers arrived at the unit with serious heart, asthma, and foot problems and were unable to complete training. Others arrived without the qualifications that were directed in the "LFWA CRIC[45] Mounting Guidance." A number had yet to complete the C7 Personal Weapon Test[46] and a total of 48 soldiers from across LFWA CBGs lacked the required Iltis (jeep) driver qualification. Too many soldiers also arrived without sufficient administrative preparations having been completed.[47]

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[41] In *Progress Report II* the Committee observed that the Bosnia commitment pointed to the general need for a strong and revitalized Class A base within the Army Reserve. As a result of fielding the ROTO 11 CRC, LFWA, with only about 4,000 Class A soldiers, proved incapable of producing more than one platoon for the ROTO 12 CRC, with the consequence that the other two platoons had to come from LFCA and LFAA. The reason that LFWA ended up fielding two consecutive CRCs had more to do with the deployment availability of two Regular force units than the capabilities of the Militia. The sensible suggestion has been made, however, that CRC rotations planned in advance and taken in turn by Land Force Areas would be sustainable to the extent that they could lead to the fielding of a Reserve battle group as hoped for by the CLS.

[42] Post-Exercise Report – 1 PPCLI Exercise Forged Warrior, June 2002.

[43] According to the 1 PPCLI PXR (post-exercise report), "Many soldiers quit their civilian jobs with the belief that they were going overseas – notwithstanding that their contracts only took them to 30 June."

[44] As the Auditor General pointed out, not all Regular force personnel are deployable. *Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, April 2002, Chapter 5, p. 3. To the credit of 1 PPCLI, Reservists denied employment in the CRC were taken on as individual augmentees.

[45]The first composite Reserve company was called Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC); the second CRC included non-infantry.

The Regular force commander of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in his summary of the 1 PPCLI post-operational report charged that the training standards for Theatre Mission Specific Training generally were "poorly defined and open to a variety of interpretations. Moreover, there are many training requirements that are buried within the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO and E) that makes the identification of training requirements difficult to assess."[48] This doubtless compounded problems for Reserve forces.[49] According to a 39 CBG HQ report, "The present system of placing the funding burden on the home unit of the deploying soldier and justifying this action by stating that units are funded to conduct this training is false. Units are not funded to conduct DAG/AAGs, Dvr Wheel (Iltis) or LFCPFS as part of IBTS/MLOC training nor are CBGs funded to concentrate CRIC platoons."[50] The report also mentioned that whereas every senior NCM required the Advanced Small Arms Course (ASAC) qualification for ROTO 11, it was not required of them for ROTO 12. Neither was it apparently required of Regular force NCMs in armoured squadrons and artillery batteries re-rolled to infantry for deployment on Operation Palladium.[51] As pointed out by 41 CBG in another report, although the ASAC qualification was originally required for Platoon Warrant Officers proceeding on ROTO 11, this was not a required course for a Reservist to become an infantry Warrant Officer. The

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[46] It should also be noted, of course, that there were no Battle Task Standards for the grenade launcher or 60mm mortar in the light role.

[47] Post-Exercise Report – 1 PPCLI Exercise Forged Warrior, June 2002

[48] 3350-5/OP PALLADIUM ROTO 11 (Comd) "Executive Summary," dated December 2002.

[49] The Reserve challenge was further complicated by the method of granting service contracts. According to 1 PPCLI, "The issue of which contracts D Company personnel would receive was not determined until within two weeks of deployment from their parent units." The battalion suggested two options: either keep all Reservists on Class B until they are selected for employment, then put them on a Class C one-year contract; or, put all Reservists on Class C from the moment they arrive with a clause that if they fail pre-deployment training they will be returned to unit. The Commander LFWA stated that he remained "particularly concerned about the whole bureaucracy of administering Class C contracts, especially when it causes soldiers to receive less pay overseas than when serving at home." 3000-2/11 (Comd) Operation Palladium Rotation 11 Post Operation Report, February 2003. Such contracts also forced Reservists and Regulars to adhere to different leave schedules, which hurt unit cohesion.

[50] DAG/AAGs are "Departure Assistance Groups" and "Arrival Assistance Groups." IBTS stands for "Individual Battle Task Standard." In addition to the normal MLOC (Minimum Level of Capability) required by Class A Reservists, direction was given to complete the Land Force Command Physical Fitness Standard (LFCPFS), Armoured Fighting Vehicle recognition to Level I, Standard First Aid to include CPR, the Tactical Command and Control Communications System (TCCCS) Basic course, and acquire specialist training in accordance with the TO&E issued at the time. All of this was to be done prior to reporting to the parent regular unit for D[eployment]LOC training. There are two distinct levels of capability (LOC) for Army training: Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC) – Regular Force core competencies based on Qualification Standards (QS) and Battle Task Standards (BTS) that must be maintained if the Regular Force is to sustain its combat capable characteristics; and Essential Level of Capability – Primary Reserve core competencies based on essential components of QS and BTS. In addition, prior to deploying on operations, soldiers must achieve a Deployment Level of Capability (DLOC) in BTS. Seven levels of training further refine the training aspect of operational readiness: Level 1 – individual; Level 2 – section/crew; Level 3 – platoon/troop; level 4 – company /squadron/battery; Level 5 – combat team; Level 6 – unit and battle group; and Level 7 – brigade. B-GL-300-008/FP-001 *Training Canada's Army* and B-GL-383-003/FP-001 *Individual Battle Task (BTS) Standards*.

[51] Formed Reserve Augmentation to Op Palladium, Army Critical Topic List (CTL) Questionnaire, HQ 39 CBG, ROTO 11.

"Train to Need" -imposed priority further ensured "almost no vacancies" ever being "allocated or funded to Reservists to take … courses" necessary to attain qualifications required for deployment.[52] The bottom line appears to be that Reservists can be trained to requisite standards, but this presupposes setting up a "general staff" organization that would eliminate "Catch 22s."

The inadequacy of the current system for training Reservists is of great concern to the Committee. It is also the Committee's considered view that this shortcoming can be overcome. The human raw material is there, and it is as willing as the Canadian volunteer citizen-soldier ever was, but it has to be moulded through better-organized training delivery and more efficient administration. This is not an impossible task. Armies have always been in the business of training civilians to be short-term soldiers. According to what the Committee saw during its visit to Bosnia in February 2003, however, the formed infantry company was restricted to light patrol duties even after months of training. This is an area that needs to be thoroughly investigated, with a view to streamlining administrative procedures and training approaches, as the DCDS target for Reserve participation is 10-20%of deployed forces. The Committee suspects that time could be better utilized in the organization and conduct of training. This could be corrected by running standardized training courses for CRCs at induction/training centres. In this regard the Committee is heartened by news of the new "fleet management" approach of the CLS to have units train on centrally held vehicle (eg. LAV III) and equipment stockpiles in a Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre.

In respect of the Supplementary Reserve (Supp Res), Armed Forces Council was briefed on its new framework on 28 February 2003. On 1 April 2003 a single Supp Res (to be known by the abbreviation SR) was created by combining the former Supplementary Ready Reserve and the Supplementary Holding Reserve. The SR will provide "individual augmentation to the Regular Force and Primary Reserve in order to enable the Canadian Forces to sustain operations in all stages of mobilization." A member will be permitted to remain on the SR list for 10 years or up to a compulsory retirement age of 65, whichever comes first. Honorary appointments have been removed from the SR list and new Class B positions have been established to help with the restructuring of the SR. Information letters will be sent to all members of the SR within the next two months.

The Army Support Review (ASR), intended to define CSS force structure for Regulars and Reserves, has unfortunately already generated some new frictions between Reservists and Regulars. The CLS has stated that CSS capabilities are badly broken, but there is no intention to cut Reserve CSS capacity. At present the ASR is reputedly only conducting analysis, but the Reserve community is anxious to participate in this initial analysis.

The value of the Army Reserves in maintaining a federal as well as military "footprint in the community" as a matter of public policy was touched upon in *Progress Report II*. The

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[52] Formed Reserve Augmentation to Op Palladium, Army Critical Topic List (CTL) Questionnaire, HQ 41 CBG, ROTO 11. This was particularly the case for ROTO 11when the Table of Organization and Equipment was based on a Regular force mechanized company, which called for Driver Track, Armour Defence Gunner, and Rappel Master qualifications in the CRIC Company. Reservists were not, however, given vacancies on courses leading to the attainment of these qualifications. Once the CRIC role was confirmed as a Light Patrol Vehicle Company, some of these requirements (including the dubious Rappel Master) were waived.

Committee also asserted that the increased awareness of Canadians in appreciating what the Militia can do for them in the case of recent natural disasters has led many of them to look to the Reserves as a first line of home defence. It is to be hoped that the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) will plan on the use of a mobilized Militia.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #4: Acknowledge that NDHQ (i.e., the Regular Force) understands the different nature of reserve service (part-time, voluntary, limited commitment) and will design roles, standards and training regimes that take it into account. Consider new terms of engagement for reservists that may be needed to attract persons with developed skills in the civilian economy (e.g., civilian-military co-operation, psychological operations, vehicle maintenance). For this reason, we urge serious and urgent study of alternative terms of service, including those that may require legislative amendment. Revisit those SCRR recommendations which were initially rejected by the Department, such as contractual obligations and job protection legislation.

STATUS

An important initiative relating to terms and conditions of Reserve service (i.e., employment) has been ongoing under the Reserve Force Employment Project (RFEP). As stated in the *Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003*, the objectives of the project include examining current employment policies and the differences between Regular and Reserve components, and, as necessary, making changes in existing policies, orders, and regulations to enhance the ability of the Total Force to achieve its missions in the future.[53]

A comprehensive review of Reserve employment policies was completed in July 2002 and policy development continued into 2003. The RFEP itself finished on 1 April 2003 and responsibility for follow-up action required on outstanding issues passed to NDHQ staffs. Target date for final completion remains spring 2005.

Another important initiative is the CF Pension Modernization Project, which subsumed the Reserve Force Pension Project, and will provide pension coverage for both full and part-time members of the CF. When implemented in 2005, it is expected to enhance recruiting and retention and ease component transfers (i.e., from Regular to Reserve, and vice versa).

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[53] *Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003*, p. 61.

The provision of Regular force compensation and benefits to all Reservists on operations will be in place in 2003-2004 with a national strategy for reaching out to Reservists to ensure that they fully understand the benefits to which there are entitled.

In this respect, the Committee would like to publicly commend the Honourable John McCallum for finally reversing a personnel policy that allowed general and flag officers better life insurance and disability coverage than the troops they were commanding. [54]

Yet another initiative, The Human Resources Management System for the Reserves, commenced in May 2002 and data entry and conversion across the Primary Reserve is about 44% complete. The next version of this system is intended to be web-based and members will eventually be able to access and modify some selected portions of their own data.

Bill C-17: The Public Safety Act, 2002 is expected to receive third reading when Parliament reconvenes. Clause 80 of this bill proposes that "if an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force is called out for service in respect of an emergency, the officer's or member's employer shall reinstate the officer or member in employment at the expiry of that service." However, as pointed out in *Progress Report II*, the definition of emergency does not include natural disasters, which means that in the event of flood, fire, ice storm, or earthquake Reserve personnel will not have legislated job protection.

Observations

The Committee is satisfied that serious efforts are being made to improve conditions of service for Reserves.

After-action reports have also continued to confirm the value of a number of the new capabilities introduced to the Army Reserve. 1 PPCLI reported that its Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) cell not only offered humanitarian assistance, but also proved to be key to the accomplishment of the battalion's information operations campaign. Versed in negotiation, cultural awareness, first aid, project management, building analysis, foreign language, and wireless communication skills acquired from various institutions such as the University of Alberta, the Northern Institute of Technology, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the CIMIC cell participated in a wide range of activities. These included the political, economic, social, cultural, and religious dimensions of

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[54] *Bill C-44, An Act to Compensate Military Members Injured During Service* was tabled by Minister McCallum on 11 June 2003. It received Royal Assent on 19 June 2003. The admirable role played by Major Bruce Henwood in bringing this matter to light should also not be forgotten. Henwood lost both legs when his vehicle hit a land mine in Croatia in 1995. Under the 1972 General Officer's Insurance Plan, a senior officer who suffered the same injuries as Henwood would have been entitled to $250,000 in benefits. In contrast, the military insurance plan covering Henwood and rank-and-file soldiers did not allow lump sum payments for injuries incurred in the line of duty.

"nation building."[55] Not surprisingly, 1 PPCLI called for increasing the cell from 22 to 34 all ranks. Other new capabilities besides CIMIC that proved their worth with 1 PPCLI include Public Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), the activities of both of which were coordinated under the Information Operations Officer.

Recent Army initiatives for LFRR Phase II call for an additional 195 "new capability" positions to be introduced. These would include the 120 positions for CIMIC, 20 positions for PSYOPS, 20 for Geomatics (computer assisted mapping projection), 30 for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) response, and five for Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre planners.[56] As the Reserves begin to field new capabilities such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, and CBRN, however, it should not be forgotten that these are *in addition* to traditional war fighting functions.

In this regard, the Committee continues to stand by its comments in *Progress Report II* – though it has little more to add at this time – that Reservist frustration over bureaucratic paper load, equipment, qualification courses, and training is indeed a reality on armoury floors. From an administrative perspective, Reserve units have to cope with almost exactly the same paper load as Regular units. Equipment, especially Tactical Command and Control Communications System (TCCCS) radios, is also all too often in short supply and Canadian Disruptive Pattern (CADPAT) combat clothing issue is turning out to be slow because it is based on training qualification level rather than time in service. Owing to course qualification requirements, it often takes years for Reservists to attain master corporal and senior warrant officer ranks. Neither are most Reserve units satisfied with training centres. The Committee is nonetheless hopeful that these myriad problem areas are in the process of being addressed.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Forces Liaison Council (CLFC) through its Federal Reserve Force Awareness Campaign continues to strive to enhance the availability of Reservists in the Public Service for training and operations. The intent is to portray the Public Service as a model for employers in the private sector, thereby encouraging recruitment and retention. In this regard, the Committee compliments the Deputy Minister for signing a statement of support on 16 July 2003 encouraging DND approving authorities to give time off for military duty to Reservists who are also public servants. Earlier in May the Defence Minister and the President of the Treasury Board jointly signed a similar commitment to the Reserves on behalf of the Government of Canada. Military leave from public sector jobs is available. The CFLC has also instituted several programs to inform employers of the value of part-time military service.

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[55] CIMIC detachments capable of generating CIMIC cells for both overseas and domestic operations have been established at each Land Force Area. *Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre* (SQFT) set up its CIMIC detachment in August 2000 and deployed on "Operation Palladium" (Bosnia) ROTOs 9 and 10 in 2002. LFWA set up its detachment in September 2000 and provided CIMIC personnel for ROTOs 11 and 12 in 2002-2003. The LFCA and LFAA CIMIC detachments were both set up in April 2001, with the former assigned to deploy in support of ROTO 13 in September 2003.

[56] New capabilities have been sub-divided into Information Operations (such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, Public Affairs, and Geomatic Support) and Force Protection (such as CBRN Defence, Security Operations, Urban Search and Rescue, and Protective Construction). A trial Movement Control Platoon established in Montreal in 2000 has been instrumental in facilitating the flow of CF equipment and personnel to both "Operation Apollo" (Afghanistan) and "Operation Palladium," (Bosnia) as well as to numerous domestic exercises and activities.

With respect to *Bill C-17*, the definition of emergency does not cover the real experience, or the anticipated experience, of Reserve personnel on deployment in support of flood, fire, ice storm, or earthquake. This, perhaps, is an unintentional oversight, but if deliberate it does not appear to be in the public interest. In either case, this matter should receive further attention.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #5: Provide reliable guarantees that the funding and equipment will be forthcoming on a continuing basis to support the new structure, including both "traditional" and "non-traditional" roles. It is important there be no "tricks" in this commitment, which is bound to be scrutinized very closely.

Fraser Recommendation #6: Bring the strength of the Reserves up to the 30,000 level (18,500-20,500 for the Army Reserves) as established in Government policy. Measures taken by implementing the above recommendations should achieve the results-oriented command and control required to attract and retain sufficient numbers of people.

Fraser Recommendation #7: A level One position should be established in the Department and the CF to act as a leader of change in carrying out the above recommendations, to keep the Minister and the CDS advised on progress, and generally to represent the needs, concerns and interests of the Reserves at the highest levels in the Department and the CF.

Fraser Recommendation #8: The Chief of the Defence Staff should include a separate section on the Reserves in his annual report on the State of the CF.

STATUS

In response to the Minister's announcement on 3 April 2003 of the start of LFRR Phase II, the CDS and DM jointly promulgated a letter entitled *Implementation of Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase 2* on 10 July 2003 (see Annex G). As the Minister called for increasing Army Reserve strength by 750 persons in each of fiscal year (FY) 2003-04 and FY 2004-05, they noted that "This represents an increase of 1,500 persons over the Phase I levels and represents a midway point to the achievement of the overall Phase 2 goal of 18,500 Army Reservists." Their letter accordingly provided guidance in support of the implementation of this "next increment" in the achievement of LFRR Phase II.

As LFRR Phase II long-term growth occurs, both equipment and funding must be forthcoming to accommodate increasing numbers of Reserve soldiers who must be given sufficient and challenging training to be retained. The draft "Land Force Reserve Restructure Implementation Directive Phase 2" circulated by the Project Management Office LFRR on 22 July 2003 is expected to address the problems of Reserve funding and equipment.

In respect of Recommendation # 8, the CDS included an Annex E entitled the "State of the Reserve Force" in his 2002-2003 Annual Report, *A Time for Transformation.* Whereas the CDS Annual Report, 2001-2002, *At a Crossroads*, included but a 1.5 page section on Reserves entitled "Reserve initiatives," Annex E runs to three pages.

OBSERVATIONS

The development of Army Reserve Field Equipment Tables (ARFETs) is proceeding, but determining the Reserve self-support and training requirement, to quote an NDHQ response, "has proven to be difficult." The Director of Land Reserve Management has generated draft ARFETs for each of the mission type units within the Army Reserve. In late 2003 these drafts will be presented to branch and trade advisors and the Land Force Areas for their advice and input. Meanwhile "higher priorities on the Army change agenda must be addressed before a concrete Army Reserve equipment plan can be finalized and institutionalized." Among these higher priorities are: the Army Total Fleet Management concept; the Army Support Review; the introduction of primarily commercially-supported vehicle fleets in the Reserve; the revision and refinement of training missions; and the introduction of standing domestic operations tasks and new capabilities. The Reserves, it appears, will have to continue to wait, regardless of solemn promises made.

The Committee welcomes the issuance of a joint action directive by the CDS and DM, especially as it emphasizes the "identification" of their "expectations of various L1s [Level One authorities] with respect to the implementation of this first step towards the LFRR Phase 2 goals." It also notes that "while the CLS is the lead for this initiative, its successful execution will require support across the organization."

The Committee remains concerned, nonetheless, about certain facets of the direction given. In the first place, that it focuses on a so-called "first step" representing a "midway point," after two years of a three-year projection, leaves one to wonder whether there is truly any intent, let alone will, to go beyond – as called for in *auftragstaktik* – to achieve the planned end-state. In other words, when additional growth of 1,500 is required in one year, FY 2005-06, will any further action be taken in the absence of specific Ministerial direction? In this respect it is worth recalling that the LFRR Strategic Plan, which lacked Level One support "across the organization," was also co-signed by the CDS and DM. In fact, as the Committee pointed out in *Progress Report II*, the LFRR Strategic Plan called for issuance of a Level One "action directive" assigning responsibility to each action item in the LFRR Strategic Plan. This commitment, set out in the Executive Summary of this plan, reads as follows: "A VCDS Action

Directive will later assign Level 1 responsibility to each action item."[57] This was never done because, as explained by the Office of the VCDS, "It was never the intent of the VCDS to do so, as all actions items were the responsibility of the CLS alone."[58]

A second Committee concern centres on LFRR performance objectives set forth in the joint CDS/DM letter of 10 July 2003. Specifically, in referring to the need to "streamline and improve force generation" the letter states that, "For the Army Reserve, this will represent a significant increase in its force generation responsibilities, both in terms of depth, by providing *reinforcement* [italics added], and in breadth, by providing unique capabilities not available in the Regular component." Given the clear and agreed statement of the Army Reserve Role, it is simply incredible that the word *reinforcement* would now be introduced without any reference to *mobilization* or, for that matter, *augmentation*. The last two words have been painstakingly defined in the statement of the Army Reserve role. Although technically all-inclusive, the word *reinforcement* in this case appears to be but a synonym for *augmentation*, as the use of the associated terms "depth" and "breadth" indicate.[59] Given that "force generation" also corresponds mainly to Stage 1 mobilization (which only requires augmentation), there is surely room for concern here.

Also of serious import is the definition of "performance metrics" described in the CDS/DM 10 July letter. Again, we see the downplaying of personnel growth, e.g., "LFRR Phase 2 is not a "head count" exercise but rather one of capacity and capability enhancement." The letter goes on to say that "one of the performance metrics that is likely to be used, *particularly by external stakeholders* [italics added], will be the Army Reserve strength." This, of course, begs the question of whether the Minister, who actually decreed what the strength of the Army Reserve was to be in a policy statement, would not also be using such a measurement. The fact is, the number of Reservists is a policy issue[60] and a proper understanding requires examining minute details, however unpalatable that may be. It is thus of great concern to the Committee that the letter states: "the strength of the Army Reserve is to be expressed in the number of CLS-employed Reservists serving either on a full or part-time basis and, as such, encompasses Class A, B, B/A and C service (less those employed on DCDS authorized operations[61])."

Class A service means part-time soldiers' parading on weeknights and weekends. All other categories cover service on a full-time daily, monthly, or yearly basis. Of the latter some are specifically assigned duties directly in support of the Reserves (e.g., Class B/A) while some are serving on full-time duty in support of the Regular Army (e.g., Class B and C. See Annex H). By including all Reservists on full-time service in the count the CDS and DM have by a stroke of the pen lowered the bar for the attainment of the Minister's personnel growth target of 18,500 part-time soldiers (see Policy Statement of 6 October 2000 at Annex E). Soldiers serving on Class C duty were never historically included in the LFRR measurement of Army Reserve strengths.[62] In fact, according to a CLS Action Directive on LFRR as far back as 20 December 1996, only Class B/A positions were included in the Militia "paid ceiling." The long-term aim was to "have as many trained and effective Class A Reservists as possible, within allocated funding, to meet operational requirements."[63]

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[57] *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan*, September 2000, p. 8/10.

[58] Facsimile, Major J.R. Woodgate, SA2 VCDS, to Isabelle Dumas, MMC Secretariat, dated 10 December 2001.

[59] Compare with the statement of the Army Reserve role: "Within the Army, the Reserves (Militia) provide the framework for mobilization, the Army's connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces ["augmentation" referring to the provision of supplementary (depth) and complementary (breadth) capabilities]."

[60] And one of great concern to the CLS who earlier wrote, "our ability to implement the LFRR Phase 2 changes are now dependant on our ability to deliver on LFRR Phase 1 objectives. Predictably, the most important, measurable and visible objectives of the LFRR Strategic Plan are the consecutive increases in effective strength." Letter from CLS to ADM (HR-Mil), dated 3 May 2002.

[61] Such as Bosnia.

The fact is, if the present interpretation of the Minister's intention continues, there is no way the objective of 18,500 part-time soldiers will be met. This is clear from the highly revealing table below, which shows that Army Reserve strength as reported has only been obtained by the inclusion of significant numbers of Reserve soldiers who are employed full-time. Even then, the Army only attained its target growth of 15,500 personnel for LFRR Phase I in May 2003, two months after its own set deadline. In no series of months has the 15,500 level been sustained.

Reserve Army (Militia) Combined Class A and Class B Historical Strengths

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1998				15,243	14,810	12,782	10,706	9,962	13,343	14,552	14,528	13,499
1999	14,842	15,020	14,795	14,759	14,589	12,821	10,912	12,073	14,491	14,014	14,008	13,231
2000	14,196	14,424	14,359	14,075	14,077	12,147	10,661	11,576	13,910	13,460	13,451	12,137
2001	13,365	13,858	14,003	13,733	13,922	12,634	11,290	12,211	14,868	14,508	14,669	13,486
2002	14,723	14,988	14,805	15,036	14,797	13,139	11,863	12,526	15,488	15,425	15,337	13,784
2003	12,684	15,226	14,869	15,150	15,648	14,057	12,493	12,023	14,200[64]			

Figures provided by Director Managerial Accounting and Comptrollership (DMAC) from Revised Pay System for the Reserves (RPSR) and Director Reserves. See also Annex H, which confirms the Monitoring Committee contention in *Progress Report II* that DND has difficulty in determining the precise number of Militia personnel on strength at any one time. Counting cheques rather than soldiers also provides a "lagging" as opposed to "leading" indicator of personnel strength.

It is difficult to construe this as anything other than disappointing, given the Army's own set deadline to attain and sustain the 15,500 milestone by end-March 2003. And it appears even more unsatisfactory in the civil-military relations light of original Ministerial direction given in this area. The "intent" of the Minister's announced policy of 6 October 2000 was to rejuvenate the Army Reserve in communities across the country so that they would provide a stronger presence and framework for both mobilization and augmentation. This meant increasing the number of local part-time Reservists and "developing a citizen soldiery ready for the challenges of the 21st Century."[65] Clearly, the implementation of this policy called for parading more part-time citizen soldiers on unit armoury floors, that is, on Class A service on weeknights and weekends. To quote the CDS himself, "The Reserve Force is composed of members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service."[66] By current definition, full-time includes any Reservist working over 180 days, which service is often referred to as Class B/A. As this category was historically designed to support the part-time soldier, and offer opportunities for his or her professional development, there are no objections to including it within Army Reserve strength numbers.[67] The problem is with Class B not categorized as Class B/A[68] (see also Annex H).

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[62] When queried in this regard the Office of the CDS admitted that "This may have been an oversight." Email from Colonel Poulter, EA CDS, 8 July 2003.

[63] 1258-110/3290-2-8-2 (A/Comd) Action Directive – Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) dated 20 December 1996 signed by Major-General W.C. Leach, Acting Commander, Land Force Command.

[64] SORD 2003 stated, that "Until superseded by the announcement of LFRR Phase II funding availability, the Army Reserve will sustain itself at the end-Phase I strength of 15,500 Class A and B Reservists (LFWA – 3970, LFCA – 5080, SQFT – 3840, and LFAA – 2510).

In November 2002 there were 1,069 authorized Class B/A support positions within the Army Reserve Establishment that were fully manned and funded (the current figure is 1,075). More significantly, however, there were 3,025 Reservists on Class B in November 2002. Previously, the total Militia strength of 15,488 reported for September 2002 included a grand total of 3,507 Class B "call outs" (which general category encompassed Class B/A) and the 15,425 reported for October 2002 as many as 2,342 Class B "call outs." In other words, there were numerous Militia personnel serving on full-time Class B service, year after year, in support of the Regular force. The fact was that as the Regular Army contracted it began to call up more Class B's to fill vacant Regular positions, but it continued to pay them out of the Militia budget. There are no restrictions on CF units "hiring" Reservists on Class B temporary duty (see Annex H, paragraphs 5-7) and the Army Reserve Establishment "does not attempt to control the myriad Class B Temporary positions that come and go across the Army Reserve."[69] To many Reservists this widespread practice of using Militia personnel funds to fill Regular force positions with Class B full-time "call-outs" amounted to an improper reduction of monies available for the part-time Army Reserve. Strictly speaking, these call-outs should have been subtracted from any calculation measuring the progressive attainment of increasing part-time Militia Class A strength to 15,500. Such Class B costs should also have been absorbed by the Regular establishment as is done for Militia Class C call-outs on operational duty.[70] In this conclusion, the Committee is not alone, for a Ministerial commissioned study made a like determination in 1996. The same study estimated Militia pay costs as 36% for Class A, 39% for Class B, and 25% for Class B/A.[71] In rough terms, Militia monies expended on the estimated 2000 Class B positions in support of the Regular force take around $80 million out of a $190 million Militia pay budget. Such substantial funds are consequently unavailable to hire and train more Class A soldiers.

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[65] Government of Canada Policy Statement on LFRR 6 October 2000 (see Annex E).

[66] *A Time for Transformation: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2002-2003*, p. 60.

[67] Militia "stakeholders" involved in drafting the Strategic Plan accepted that for the purpose of the Plan, Army Reserve strength would be Class A plus Class B, but not Class C. This was because at that time there were very few Class B soldiers not employed in direct support of Militia units. They did not anticipate that the Regulars would shortly thereafter increasingly use Class B "call outs" to fill Regular positions. Both Class A and B (but only in support of the Militia) were considered reasonable charges to the Militia budget. Class C was in support of the Regulars and would thus be charged to their budget.

[68] The precise categories of Class B service, remunerated at 85% Regular pay, are: C2, Class B/TRE (CRT) – training greater than 12 days; T1 Class B/TRE (RES) – employment in support of Reserves (annotated "A" position); and T2, Class B/TRE (REG) or SRR (BP) – employment in support of the Regular Force. Category C1, Class A/STA – training greater than three days but less than or equal to 12 – once included as Class B is now considered Class A.

[69] DLRM Response to MMC Request #248.

Categories of Reserve Service

Reserve Service Category	Work Period	Estimated Cost to Militia Budget
Class A	Weeknights/weekends	36%
Class B (annotated A)	Full-time in support of Reserves (1075 authorized positions)	25%
Class B (temporary)	For Reserve course attendance (14 days plus) and in support of Regular force (months/years)	39%
Class C	Essentially full-time Regular Service	0

By adding *all* Class B to Class A figures in September 2002 the Army declared that it had met the 15,500 target for LFRR Phase I (and even then it was a dozen soldiers short). Yet, it may have only reached strength of 11,981 part-time Class A soldiers, which surely by any reasonable interpretation did not accord with the Minister's original "intent." Meanwhile, because it assumed the target of 15,500 had been attained, the Army terminated Reserve recruiting in the fall of 2002. This decision in turn jeopardized the ability of the Reserves to sustain existing numbers. Pay records continue to show, moreover, that combined Class A and B figures have often remained well below 15,500, from 14,869 in March 2003 (when the Phase I target of 15,500 was to have been reached) to 14,057 in June 2003, 12,493 in July 2003, and 12,023 in August. The Committee consequently doubts that the LFRR Phase II personnel target of 16,250 will be met by end-March 2004. The target of 17,000 set for end-March 2005 likewise appears problematical, even with all Class Bs counted.

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[70] Class C Reservist "call out" service is essentially full-time Regular service and is paid for out of Regular force funds. A transitional Class C service policy currently stipulates that Reservists employed on operations will be placed on Class C (including DCDS deployed operations, Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (MCDV) crews and local contingency operations) with service in non-operational positions normally being authorized as Class B.

[71] Jim Libbey and Michael Kelly, KPMG *Final Report: Review of the Methodology used to Attribute Costs to the Primary Reserve*, prepared for the Hon. D. M. Collenette, Minister of National Defence, 19 August 1996, p. 13. Class B figures are: November 2002 - 3,025; December 2002 - 2,850; January 2003 - 2,919; February 2003 - 3,070; March 2003 - 3,147; April 2003 - 3,957; May 2003 - 5,688; June 2003 - 9,067; and July 2003 - 10,298. Figures provided by NDHQ 25 August 2003.

Including all Class B full-time service categories in LFRR target figures is, of course, at variance with the original intent expressed in the Minister's policy announcement of 6 October. This is the more surprising as CF and Army staff and command training in staff colleges and training centres has consistently stressed the vital importance of understanding a commanders' intent. The idea is that once subordinates grasp this intent they are better able to use their initiative to carry out the necessary actions, and even exceed beyond expectations, in the attainment of the overall objective. In the case of Ministers Collenette and Eggleton calling for increasing the Militia to at least 18,500, it would be safe to say that they were not likely speaking of full-time service in the employ of the Regular Force. As the 1996 KPMG Final [audit] Report to Minister Collenette stated:

> *"Class A pay ... is mainly for time spent by the reservists that most Canadians probably think of when the Militia comes to mind: those who visit the armouries one or two evenings per week and one weekend per month from September to June, and attend two weeks of collective training in the summer."*[72]

What the Ministers were talking about was revitalizing the Army Reserve as a vital component of Canada's military capability.[73] And this meant strengthening the part-time citizen soldier "footprint" in communities throughout Canada, thereby reinforcing the framework for mobilization and augmentation.

Other worrisome aspects of the CDS/DM letter of 10 July 2003 were those dealing with the handling of unsustainable units and Militia attrition assumptions. In regard to the former, the letter directed the CLS to "propose force structure adjustments for Army Reserve units or elements that are clearly unsustainable due to demographics or location." Here a cautionary note should be sounded, for it is not always clear that demographics or location are the real culprits as compared to, say, excessively restrictive unit "pay ceilings," inefficient enrolment processes, and a general failure to promote part-time uniformed service as an honourable "career of choice" in its own right.[74] Who will determine what units are "unsustainable" should also be a matter of considerable concern, and not just for reasons of the "maintenance of heritage with a degree of dignity." Surely if the Army Reserve is to be a framework for mobilization and augmentation it should be expanded and built upon, not destroyed for short-term gain. As for basing recruiting and retention on the assumption that "the reduced level of Army Reserve attrition" will continue into the future, one can only observe that it would be folly to invest in any stock on the basis of a single year's market performance. Historically, Militia attrition has hovered around 30% and it would seem prudent to plan on this less optimistic assumption rather than on an all-time low.

Finally, there is the matter of "Resource Guidance" detailing the disbursement of funds to support LFRR Phase II. According to the CDS/DM 10 July letter, in FY 03-04 $9.2 million for

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[72] KPMG *Final Report: Review of the Methodology used to Attribute Costs to the Primary Reserve*, 19 August 1996, p. 13.

[73] This point was also strongly made by SCONDVA in May 2002 "Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces", *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs*, May 2002, pp. 43-46. See Annex I for extract of section dealing with "Restructuring of Army Reserves".

[74] It is to be hoped that directing ADM (PA) to support an "increased attraction campaign through focussed advertising" will promote Reserve service more than before, bearing in mind that attraction has not been the problem that enrolment continues to be.

Reserve pay and support costs plus $1 million recurring for Reserve distributed learning will be allocated to the CLS operating account. The CLS will also receive an additional $.9 million for costs associated with the 750 personnel increase (to be increased to $3.6 million recurring in FY 04-05). A further $5.3 million to be held in a Protected Reserve will be allocated in one time funding for each of FY 03-04 and FY 04-05 for costs related to the Clothe the Soldier project. For FY 04-05 "and in view of the need to further define new Reserve capabilities," $34 million recurring (to be released on completion of the CLS implementation plan) "will be established in a Protected Fund to address forecast Phase 2 costs." The question that arises here is why DND identified a $170 million annual recurring cost to enhance capabilities and increase Militia strength from 15, 500 to 18,500 in its annual budget submission in the fall of 2002.[75] If this was a more realistic and accurate cost of LFRR Phase II then further questions should be asked.

The Committee's concern about transparency and accountability applies equally to Fraser Recommendation #8. Although the three pages of "Annex E: State of the Reserve Force" in the Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003, *A Time for Transformation*, represents a 100% increase over the 1.5 pages entitled "Reserve initiatives" in the 2001-2002 Annual Report, *At a Crossroads*, they are still regrettably inadequate. If a lay person or Parliamentarian were to read Annex E, and other passing references to Reserves in the main text, he or she would not be any wiser as to the actual state of the Reserves in Canada, nor be able to render any informed decisions about them. With respect, it is recommended that an annex or section on the "State of the Reserves" include at bare minimum the following fact sheet information: the authorized Reserve establishment, broken down into sub-components; the actual number of Reservists in uniform on Class A, B, and C service by rank (explaining "pay ceilings", pay categories, and what the figures really mean); how many training days they are authorized; detail on their location and organization, to include functional units in Militia areas; equipment status; and the number of Reservists deployed abroad. The overall objective would be to provide sufficient facts and information to enable a Member of Parliament or taxpayer to gain a more complete picture of Canada's Reserve forces.

CONSULTATION AND MONITORING

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #9: Promise consultation with currently serving reserve authorities, including brigade and unit leadership, and other representatives of the broader reserve community, on how to implement these changes, and commit to a phased, prudent process of implementation that will include careful assessment of results and changes to the program as necessary. This should be achieved by simply resurrecting the Command

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[75] At that time the Reserve community was told the incremental costs to add 1,000 soldiers would be $84 million, and by February of 2003 the cost had ballooned to $125 million. In March it was determined that an additional $56 million would do the job to increase by 750, which figure, extrapolated, approximated the original estimate of $84 million for 1,000. Now the total committed funding for the 750 to be added in 2003 is only $17.6 million.

and Area Consultative Working Groups with the same membership. These seemed to work well until the proposal of April 1999 disturbed the trust that had begun to build between NDHQ and the Reserves community.

Fraser Recommendation #10: Monitoring of the implementation of Ministerial decisions arising both out of the SCRR and this report should continue.

Status

The Command and Area Consultative and Advisory Group process has been institutionalized and includes representation from Regular and Reserve land force command and staff, NDHQ, the Council of Honorary Colonels, and Reserves 2000. The Conference of Defence Associations also sends an observer. The Command Consultative Advisory Group met on 23 March 2003 and again on 5 October 2003.

The Monitoring Committee conducted ten consultations with Canadian Brigade Groups between November 2002 and October 2003.

Observations

Command and Area Consultative and Advisory Groups continue to be useful in promoting the revitalization of the Militia. The only consultations conducted outside the chain of command have been those convened by the Monitoring Committee. Such consultations have also allowed the Committee to see, as others have not, the real problems facing the Militia.

Relations between Reserves and Regulars are currently harmonious, which is a credit to Regular Army leadership and Reserve Army commitment. However, the relationship has to be constantly nurtured. In this regard, achieving the five-year objectives of LFRR Phase II is likely to be critical.

The Committee still remains concerned that while the recommendations of the *Fraser Report* are to serve as the Government's blueprint for LFRR, top CF and Departmental authorities have not generally acknowledged this. In fact, recent correspondence from the Office of the CDS refers to the LFRR Strategic Plan as "laying the groundwork for developing future policies," without completing the phrase: "laying the ground work for developing future policies *to fit the lives of our part-time citizen soldiers*."[76] The distinction is important, for the former construction gives the impression that strategy trumps policy, when it should be the other way round.

The bottom line is that the implementation of LFRR Phase II will continue to be a critical issue as the Militia community expects the Army Reserve to expand to at least 18,500 part-time soldiers while taking on increased unit missions, tasks, and capabilities. In light of personnel growth progress achieved to date, however, it is impossible not to conclude that despite significant efforts on the part of the Army, the corporate centre has not accepted Reserve revitalization as a strategic necessity for the well-being of Canada's armed forces.

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[76] Email from Colonel Poulter, EA CDS, dated 8 July 2003.

It is the considered opinion of this Committee that monitoring of some sort will continue to be necessary.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP

BACKGROUND

The Committee remains hopeful about the prospects of advancing Professional Development, Education and Leadership, but there are some past and continuing concerns that need to be addressed.

In *Interim Report – 1998* the Committee stressed the importance of a focused and effective education, training and development program as an engine of change. It called upon the senior leadership of the CF to participate actively in the "visioning" of the kind of officer needed in the future so that clear and timely guidance would be available for planning staffs, and to give vigorous support to the reform of the education, training and development system, including the necessary financial and staff resources. The Committee strongly believed that successful renewal depended first and foremost upon dynamic leadership to drive the necessary transition in attitude and culture within the defence team and instill it in future leaders.

In *Interim Report – 1999* the Committee nonetheless felt compelled to observe that, while local initiatives had been taken by individual environments and institutions, apart from broad statements of support "little or no direction was received from Ottawa on the strategy for change." In addition to its concern over the absence of a central plan, the Committee expressed serious reservations about "the culture of 'ticket punching' that ha[d] already infected elements of the officer corps" taking firmer hold. It also warned that the quest for higher education "must not be allowed to deteriorate into an environment where individuals are sponsored to pursue "trendy degrees." In the Committee's collective view, there was more than enough to learn about the practice of the profession of arms and the basic skills of critical evaluation and analysis that equipped officers to tackle any problems that might come along. In this respect, the

Committee insisted that "they must acquire the thinking skills that a liberal arts education affords as the basis for whatever technical learning they need also to acquire."[77]

In *Progress Report II* the Committee reiterated that the *1999 Final Report* had identified a need for more strategic guidance in the area of officer education. This need was driven by the policy decision of the MND in his March 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* that henceforth all CF officers would possess a university degree, except for those commissioned from the ranks. Reasoning that such a development should create a sea change in CF officer commissioning and advancement, the Committee restated its earlier contention that:

> "graduate education must become the norm for more senior officers. In particular officers in the 'fighting' element of the military's occupational classification system must be more strongly encouraged and supported to pursue advanced degrees, because these officers tend to occupy senior leadership positions. Policies must support that objective."[78]

The Committee further suggested that while the CF embarked on creating plans to achieve a degreed officer corps, there must be a clearly demonstrated commitment "that an educated officer has a military or operational value." To some officers at that time, of course, the "new culture" meant little more than learning to manage with fewer resources and developing managerial as well as military skills. The estimate of the Committee, on the other hand, was that CF culture had to "begin to include education as a military virtue and operational necessity, rather than an activity … [to] be accommodated if time and resources permit."

Throughout 2001 and 2002 the Committee conducted numerous consultations in its continuous monitoring of the implementation of government-approved recommendations related to CF professional development, education, and leadership. In repeated discussions with the MND it also stressed the importance of including among the educational opportunities available, the option of liberal arts as equally important to science, technology, and business administration. The Committee additionally provided numerous confidential comments to the MND on officer professional development, the Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM), and the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). The ELM, designed to improve the training and development of new entry officers, had been approved in early 1999. The CDA, established on 1 April 2002 and expected to achieve full operational capability by summer 2004, has the mission of championing lifelong learning and promoting the professional development of all members of the CF. It is charged with ensuring coherent and integrated CF education and professional development programs, maintaining academic rigour and accreditation for professional development, and facilitating CF personnel in the development of their intellectual potential. A revised draft Charter for the CDA has also been produced and the Committee was assured that the Commander of CDA is directly accountable to the CDS.

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[77] *Interim Report – 1999*, 3, pp. 41-45.

[78] *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Final Report – 1999*, p. 11.

In fulfilling its mission and objectives the CDA will integrate the strategies of *Officership 2020* and *NCM Corps 2020* into the CF professional development system. *Officership 2020*,[79] signed by the MND in May 2001, directed the development of three capstone CF manuals: *The Profession of Arms in Canada*; *The CF Leadership Manual*[80]; and a Joint and Combined Operations manual to be produced under the guidance of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. *Officership 2020* also charged ADM (HR-Mil) with the promulgation of an education policy that embraced philosophy, accreditation objectives, and the reaffirmation of a "degreed" officer corps, including graduate degrees for colonels and above. Since then, an over-arching education policy statement entitled *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* has been drafted and circulated for comment. The importance of this document is that it should provide a clear statement of purpose and vision of the kind of person the CF is trying to produce as a future officer and leader.

On 25 March 2003 during consultations with the CDS, ADM (HR-Mil), the Commander CDA, and the Principal of the Royal Military College (RMC), the Committee was assured that much of the concern it has expressed since 1998 is being addressed.

OBSERVATIONS

While the Committee acknowledged in *Progress Report II* that a "culture change in respect of the promotion of education within the CF appears to be taking place," it remains concerned about a potential tendency or inherent institutional nature to take the easy road in this regard. Indeed, the attention of Committee members was drawn to this reality by the unsolicited comments offered by Professor Desmond Morton on *Progress Report II*. Dr. Morton, no stranger to either the academic or military field, remarked that:

> *"As one of those who recommended to Mr. Young that Canada should have a "degreed officer corps," I have been struck by the ingenuity of Canadian universities in devising equivalencies in order to profit from the pressure on many good and ambitious officers to secure paper qualifications. What was intended in seeking a university graduation diploma was greater capacity for critical professional thinking and greater clarity in communicating ideas.*
>
> *You may wonder, as I do now, whether current post-secondary education actually contributes to either of these goals in and of itself."*[81]

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[79] *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: A Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation (Officership 2020) Strategic Guidance for the CF Officer Corps and the OPD [Officer Professional Development] System.*

[80] The CF Leadership Institute, set up in the summer of 2001 as a research institute intended to keep the CF abreast of latest developments in leadership theory, has since been charged with producing *The Profession of Arms in Canada* and *The CF Leadership Manual*.

[81] Letter to the Honourable John A. Fraser from Professor Desmond Morton, dated 9 July 2003.

There should be no short cuts to education, which, if it is to be given the credit it warrants, should also be appropriately weighted on promotion boards according to actual academic achievement. Intellectual capacity, in short, should count.

In a related vein, though the Committee expressed satisfaction with the statement in *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* that "members of the CF must acquire a balance of the humanities/social science, natural and technological sciences and leadership knowledge,"[82] it would have much preferred a stronger declaration in support of the merits of a broad liberal education. As in the rest of the draft document itself, the words did not "sing" as they surely should have in such an important directive.[83] The Committee also stands by its observation that greater emphasis in both the Policy and Charter documents could have been placed on the part Canadian civilian universities should play in the process of educating the Canadian officer and NCM corps.

In *Progress Report II* the Committee expressed its reservations about the academic quality of the Master of Defence Studies (MDS) degree offered on the Canadian Forces College (CFC) Command and Staff Course (CSC) under the aegis of the Royal Military College. The Committee reasonably presumed that the pursuit of advanced degrees would raise the intellectual level of the officer corps by encouraging substantial *study over and above what had previously been the norm* for most CF officers. Another major concern was that the Canadian officer might not as a result of an inferior academic program end up as well "armed," intellectually and academically, as his American counterpart. From all indications, it is much easier to attain an MDS than a Master's degree at an accredited US war or even staff college.[84] In any case, the serious quest for academic advancement in order to improve military performance might well lead to desirable adjustments in current career patterns. In any case, the serious quest for academic excellence in order to improve military performance can only be to the benefit of the CF.

It is fervently hoped that the CDA will indeed be able to champion lifelong learning and promote the professional development of all members of the CF, but the Committee cautions that success will require diligent leadership and confidence in the value of first-class scholarship.
The CFC located in Toronto is a CDA constituent and national institution dedicated to professional military education across the full spectrum of conflict with an emphasis on the

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[82] *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction (draft copy).*

[83] This can also be said of most "2020" documents, which also, perhaps purposefully, contain more incomprehensible sentences laced with "buzz" words than clearly expressed thoughts. *Strategy 2020* and *Officership 2020* are bad enough, but *NCM Corps 2020* seems the epitome of woolly thinking. As any reading of the clearly written and completely understandable Rowley Report will reveal, military writing at NDHQ has taken a terrible beating.

[84] A student at the US Naval War College (NWC), for example, is required to read 600 (mainly book) pages a week during a three-month purely academic block and take three full elective courses delivered by Ph.D. instructors in addition to the year-long core course. According to one Canadian accreditation study, NWC students also write some 59,000 words compared to but 21,000 total for a student taking both the Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course at the CFC. In comparison, a CSC student has to do but three things to get an MDS: first, be judged academically acceptable by RMC; second, maintain a B^- course average; and, finally, receive a passing grade from a Ph.D. qualified academic advisor for completion of a 12,000 to 14,000 word thesis project/research essay in lieu of a 4000-5000 word essay required of the non-MDS student.

operational and strategic levels. It has also made a practice of hiring retired generals and flag officers as Senior Directing Staff (SDS) for the Advanced Military Studies Course and National Security Studies Course. Although both course syllabi stress that SDS do little teaching, the actual role they play indicates otherwise. They not only act as mentors to syndicate members and monitor student progress, but provide important feedback and assessment as well. Better academically qualified Subject Matter Experts drawn from RMC, other universities, and CFC permanent staff appear to be relegated to the periphery and mainly used on an "as required" or "activity" basis. The SDS has the last word in seminar and is unquestionably the most central and constant figure in the education of a syndicate. As near as can be determined, this practice has come about largely because of the perception that Canadian officers of colonel rank and above are unwilling to be assessed by civilian academics or service personnel of lesser rank. If this is the case, of course, a cultural attitude adjustment will be required, for it flies in the face of reason and the reality that knowledge is power. The officer parachute candidate has always had to take orders from airborne corporals who know, just as the colonel fighter pilot has always been wise to defer to experts in the strategic studies field. Carried to its logical absurdity, such an attitude would preclude a senior officer from attending a civilian university or recognizing that B.H. Liddell Hart was indeed a "captain who taught generals."

The Committee has observed that the practice of hiring retired generals and flag officers as Senior Directing Staff (SDS) for the Advanced Military Studies Course and National Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto enables students to benefit from their long experience. At the same time, however, Senior Directing Staff should be chosen primarily from academically qualified serving officers.

Finally, there is the issue of Reserve Entry Training Plan (RETP) officer cadets at RMC receiving less than satisfactory support. This is the more surprising as the Report of the RMC Board of Governors' Study Group (Withers' Report) called for increasing the number of RETP candidates at RMC, revising RETP conditions of service, and employing qualified Reservists on staff.[85] The Committee has received troubling information that RETP candidates are no longer receiving the same medical and dental benefits as Regular candidates, but are not eligible for the Reserve dental plan because they are not categorized as being on Class A, B, or C service. They are also, allegedly, not allowed to take Phase IV infantry training between their third and fourth years. The Committee feels that this concern should be looked into, and, if appropriate, be rectified.

That the Army Reserve continues to suffer from the demise of the Reserve Officer (RESO) training plan would seem to confirm that the entire question of the university education of Reserve officers warrants further examination. Arguably, neither the nation nor DND ever fully recovered from the 1968 decision to eliminate the Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC) in universities across the country. The purpose of COTC had been to provide a flow of trained officers to Militia units. The decision to end COTC may to some extent have reflected what was happening in the United States, where anti-Vietnam War protests and demonstrations forced Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) off American campuses. Some of this sentiment spilled across the border, but the real reason for the Canadian decision was short-sightedness on the part of the Army itself. As many COTC graduates did not go on to join Reserve units, the program began to be looked upon as a waste of money. It was on these grounds that the Suttie Committee[86] recommended the termination of COTC. Thus, for a paltry saving, the army secured its further isolation from civilian society and any support from that quarter. Killing COTC ensured that significant numbers of any future civilian leadership elite would have neither military experience nor exposure to the defence field. In the eyes of some, this was one of the most important contributing factors in the erosion of public support for Canadian defence spending at the *fin de siècle.* [87]

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[85] Report of the RMC Board of Governors' Study Group (Withers' Report), dated 30 April 1998.

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[86] The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia) June 1964 signed by E.R. Suttie (Chairman), and Brigadiers J.P. Carriere, D.G. Cunningham, E.G. Eakins, F.T. Jenner, I.S. Johnson, B.J. Legge, V de B. Oland, and P. Triquet.

[87] See Granatstein, *Army*, p. 351.

ANNEX A – BACKGROUNDER "HIGHLIGHTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CHANGE INITIATIVES"



National Defence Défense nationale

BACKGROUNDER DOCUMENTATION

BG-97.027

October 14, 1997

HIGHLIGHTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CHANGE INITIATIVES

The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) have had a comprehensive change program in place for some time. The intent is to ensure that the organization is able to deliver its missions in the most effective way possible, within the budgetary constraints. DND and the CF are working hard and are making significant progress.

DND and the CF have a very heavy agenda of change, which can be categorized under the following broad areas.

Training, education, and leadership

Canadian Forces personnel must be well-prepared to carry out their missions. In addition to mission-specific training given before an actual deployment for an operational mission, there is a requirement to ensure that the professional development for officers and non-commissioned members reflects the new operational environment. The changes underway include:

- beginning in 1997, a university degree becomes a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, with an exception to be made for those commissioned from the ranks;
- basic training is extended from eight to 10 weeks so that new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions, and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent;
- the curriculum of the Land Command and Staff College is revised so that knowledge of operations at the tactical level and the understanding of the military profession, including army heritage and ethos, as well as ethics and decision-making, is strengthened;
- the creation of formal boards to select individuals for command and senior-leadership positions; and
- the development of a clear criteria for the assessment of our personnel.

Canada

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Supporting our people and their families

CF members and their families struggle with the same day-to-day problems and stresses as all Canadians. As members of the CF, they also have a unique set of burdens—frequent family moves with all of their disruptive side effects, extended absences on training and operations, and the ultimate liability of losing life and limb. The CF shows how much it values its members and their families with support programs that meet their contemporary needs, as well as the needs of their families. Changes include:

- addressing the gap between Canadian Forces salaries and those of the public service, starting with pay increases announced in April 1996 and April 1997;
- modifying the pay and benefits package for reservists so that they receive 85% parity with regular-force pay, a reserve force retirement allowance, vacation and specialist pay, and revised incentive pay categories;
- ensuring that there is closer co-ordination with Veterans Affairs Canada and the Royal Canadian Legion to ensure a continuum of care for members who have been released from the Canadian Forces for medical reasons and who may be eligible for disability benefits;
- ensuring military personnel injured while in special-duty areas (such as on UN missions) are given a priority for employment in the public service; and
- creating the CF Housing Agency to provide better service to our members.

The Minister has asked the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to resume their review of the social and economic challenges facing members of the Canadian Forces and to make recommendations on the type of support and compensation that should be provided to meet the needs of our military personnel and their families.

Operational readiness and military planning

DND and the CF have introduced initiatives that enhance the ability of the Canadian Forces to be operationally ready, and that strengthen the military planning process. These initiatives include:

- taking a number of steps to better prepare the Canadian Forces for missions, including the publication of formal guidelines on all aspects of deployments to ensure that all commanders of Canadian Forces operations are fully aware of responsibilities, authorities, and procedures for conducting deployments;
- strengthening the process for confirming a unit's operational readiness, which now culminates in a formal declaration of readiness from the appropriate environmental commander to the Chief of the Defence Staff;
- holding, beginning this fall, at National Defence Headquarters a major annual staff exercise in directing mission planning and in developing appropriate plans and courses of action;

- ensuring that rigorous post-deployment analyses are conducted. We have established lessons-learned cells at National Defence Headquarters and at the Land Forces Command and Staff College to quickly determine all the lessons learned from recent operations, and to recommend changes in doctrine, training, and equipment;
- revising instructions to provide National Defence Headquarters with standard procedures for the planning and conduct of our operations that will be compatible with the new Canadian Forces operations manual and the CF planning process—furthermore, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff has drafted instructions for contingent commanders deployed on operations, and the national training plan now provides standard instructions for testing units preparing for deployments on CF operations; and
- reviewing current National Defence Operations Centre procedures with a view to establishing this operations centre as the central information-tracking agency—this process will be facilitated by the implementation of the Joint Command and Control Information System.

Restructuring the reserves

The new operational environment requires the Canadian Forces to respond quickly as contingencies arise and, in several instances, sustain these operations for long periods of time. The reserves, as part of the total-force concept, are an integral component of our ability to respond quickly. To meet this challenge, we have worked to improve the operational effectiveness of the reserves through a variety of measures, including:

- increasing the size of the militia from 16,000 to 18,500 personnel, with the flexibility to grow to 20,500;
- restructuring the militia by moving from 14 geographically based districts to nine brigade groups, with the aim of creating a more cohesive army structure with less infrastructure and overhead;
- equipping the naval reserve with new maritime coastal defence vessels; and
- increasing the strength of the air reserve from 1,700 to about 3,000 personnel, with the flexibility to go as high as 5,000—among other things, members of the air reserve will operate some of the new Griffon helicopters.

Reflecting Canadian values

DND and the CF are working to ensure that their policies and behaviour reflects Canadian society's norms and expectations by:

- ensuring the organization has a place for all Canadians, regardless of sex, religion, or cultural background;
- introducing in 1993 a zero-tolerance policy for harassment;

- requiring all DND and CF members to take the new Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) training course;
- establishing a system of harassment counsellors at every CF unit to permit reporting and follow-up activity, independent of the immediate chain of command if necessary, on cases of alleged harassment; and
- adopting the Defence Ethics Program, a values-based program designed to better equip personnel to meet the ethical challenges they face in their day-to-day activities.

Responding to fiscal realities

Canadians want the best Canadian Forces at a price they can afford. Like all Canadians, DND and the CF had to find ways to do the job at less cost by being creative, innovative, and by making hard business decisions. The Canadian Forces will have an optimum force structure with appropriate training, equipment, and operational command-and-control structures to be able to effectively fulfill any mission assigned.

By 1998-99, the defence budget will have been reduced by a full 23%, to $9.2 billion from more than $12 billion in 1994. In response to these major budget reductions, DND and the CF have embarked on an ambitious plan to get better value for the taxpayer dollar. Initiatives include:

- by 1999, reducing by 50% the resources devoted to a national headquarters structure with the navy, army, and air force commanders integrated into a single strategic headquarters;
- reducing the infrastructure from 52 to 26 establishments;
- adopting a new approach to equipment acquisition, which includes buying high-tech equipment off the shelf—for example, 'just in time' delivery of maintenance spares by the private sector for major equipment such as the CH-146 Griffon helicopter, the A-310 Airbus, and the maritime coastal defence vessels;
- developing new forms of partnership with industry, such as the Primary Flight Training and associated support and maintenance activities contracted out at Portage La Prairie, Manitoba—this has allowed personnel to be reduced from 700 to approximately 200; and
- modernizing our business practices, such as reducing our inventory holdings by relying more on industry for support—for example, under the consolidated clothing contract, awarded in 1996, the prime contractor manufacturer provides design support, manages inventory, takes orders, warehouses, and distributes all Canadian Forces non-operational clothing.

ANNEX B – MINISTER'S MONITORING COMMITTEE'S 1997 TERMS OF REFERENCE



National Defence   Défense nationale

BACKGROUNDER DOCUMENTATION

BG-97.029

October 14, 1997

THE MINISTER'S MONITORING COMMITTEE ON CHANGE

The Minister of National Defence has established a committee of prominent Canadians to monitor the change initiatives, the process of implementation for these changes, and to evaluate their effectiveness at the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) on such issues as the military justice system; values and ethics; leadership; the command and rank structure; operational missions; terms and conditions of service; the national headquarters; and relations with the Canadian public. Their findings, observations, and recommendations will be reported directly to the Minister of National Defence semi-annually, and will be made available to Canadians.

Terms of reference

The Minister's Monitoring Committee will:

- receive reports on the implementation of the recommendations contained in:
  - ⇒ the Defence Minister's March 25, 1997, *Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces*;
  - ⇒ the *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services*;
  - ⇒ the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia; and
  - ⇒ other change initiatives across the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces;
- have access to all documentation the Committee considers relevant to its mandate;
- visit any CF site the committee considers relevant to its mandate;
- observe and document the rate of progress, experiences, and conditions under which change is being implemented at DND and the CF; and
- report to the Minister of National Defence its findings and observations at regular intervals, and present semi-annual written reports with recommendations.

Canada

For information (613) 996-2353/54
After hours (613) 996-7811
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Pour renseignements (613) 996-2354/53
Après les heures de travail (613) 996-7811
Site internet http://www.dnd.ca

ANNEX C – BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF THE ARMY RESERVE (MILITIA)

The decline of the Canadian Militia constitutes a sad chapter in the national and military history of Canada. In 1947-48 the Regular army paraded roughly 13,985 soldiers and the Militia some 33,704 within an authorized Reserve ceiling of 43,000. By 1949-50 Regular strength had increased to just under 20,000 and the Militia to 38,500. In 1952 the Militia fielded 3,908 officers and 9,865 soldiers at summer camp. The growing Soviet threat had meanwhile forced the government, in December 1950, to triple the size of the defence budget, from $403 million in 1950-51 to $1.45 billion in 1951-52.[88] To meet its Korean commitment, however, the government opted to retain the Regular army for defence of Canada operations, while recruiting Militiamen and civilians, including demobilized World War II veterans, to form a completely new Canadian Army Special Force to fight in Korea. This force, organized as the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade, was commanded by a distinguished war veteran and former militiaman, Brigadier J.M. Rockingham.

In recruiting the 27th Brigade slated for service with NATO, the Canadian Army again turned to the Militia. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, believed in the power of the Militia to find men if they could continue to be affiliated with their units and, accordingly, established six regionally diverse composite battalions from fifteen existing militia regiments, each providing two companies. In the event of major war, he reasoned, each of these companies could be expanded into a battalion, thereby providing the basis for a field force of two divisions.[89] In the meantime, this arrangement provided enough troops for two brigades, one forward deployed in Germany and one in Canada ready to reinforce as necessary. By naming a Major-General Reserves to sit alongside his Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, and Quartermaster-General on Army Council, Simonds took another important step toward the integration of reserve and regular forces within a highly proficient force. Owing to administrative difficulties arising from different terms of service among Korean, NATO, and home brigade soldiers, however, all active duty units were made regular. In 1952 for the first time in Canadian history Regulars outnumbered Reservists.

The rapid peacetime expansion of the forces from 1951, in which year 6.6 per cent of GNP was devoted to defence, also saw the strength of the RCAF surpass that of the Regular army in 1955. This rather unique Canadian development unquestionably reflected the great emphasis placed on the aerial deterrence of war in the era of "massive retaliation" proclaimed by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 1954. In a period where growing fear of sudden nuclear attack appeared to increase the need for "forces in being," the value of a reserve army Militia was questioned. It was consequently re-oriented to produce an entirely new capability, that of conducting national survival operations. How this development came about is worth recollection as it was one from which the Militia never recovered.

In June 1954 the MND, Brooke Claxton, commissioned a senior officer board headed by Major-General Howard Kennedy to examine and report upon the organization, training, and administration of the

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[88] J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University Press, 2002), pp., 316, 320-21.

[89] Ibid., p. 337. The line units of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group consisted of three composite Militia infantry battalions (drawn from the 15 Militia infantry regiments), a composite Militia artillery regiment (composed of personnel from six Militia regiments), a composite Militia engineer field squadron (two Militia field squadrons and a Militia engineer regiment), and a composite Militia Field ambulance (two Militia units). The regular Army provided a tank squadron which was actually a composite Militia-regular force sub-unit.

Canadian Army reserve force. A key recommendation of the board was that the role of the reorganized reserve force, henceforth to be called the Canadian Army (Militia)[90], was to provide a partially trained and equipped force as the nucleus of units to be mobilized and brought up to strength in case of emergency. By the end of 1954, however, Major-General F.F. Worthington, Civil Defence Coordinator under the Department of National Health and Welfare, was calling for the Militia to be used in national survival search and rescue operations in the event of nuclear attack. Simonds, worried that such a specialized role would turn the Militia into a safe haven for draft dodgers, responded that armed forces maintained and trained primarily for warfighting could always offer assistance to the civil defence authority. Meanwhile, although the reinvigorated Militia experienced a marked revival in summer camp training between 1955 and 1957, all such training ceased thereafter, ostensibly to free up money for the purchase of equipment for the Regular force.

In 1958 during the so-called "golden age" of deterrent thought that accentuated "forces in being," defence minister George Pearkes confirmed that the primary role of the Militia would henceforth be to restore order and conduct search and rescue re-entry operations into target areas in the event of a nuclear attack on Canada. The following year responsibility for most civil defence functions, apart from humanitarian tasks, reverted to the DND from National Health and Welfare, which in 1951 had relieved the former department of this burden. The result was that the army at large inherited the civil defence role. By the spring of 1960 the Regular army fielded 22 mobile support columns, backed up by 44 mixed columns of Regular and Militia troops, for what were now officially termed national survival operations. But whereas the Regular force continued to conduct conventional field training, survival training remained the first priority of the Militia, which had also had its training days reduced from 60 to 45 per year. Indeed, some militia artillery units complained that they were unable to produce a troop of guns capable of firing. Only at the end of 1963, when the government slashed authorized militia strength from around 51,000 to 32,000, did the emphasis accorded national survival begin to subside. In 1964 a Ministerial committee headed by Brigadier E.R. Suttie listed Militia roles in descending order of priority as: bringing the Regular field force up to war establishment in time of need; providing trained reinforcements for overseas formations; maintaining internal security; and assisting the Regular force in national survival operations.

As the advent of NATO's 1967 doctrine of "flexible response" clearly showed, however, the requirement for large-scale conventional forces had not diminished in the nuclear era. In fact, studies in the 1950s had indicated that while fewer troops might be required at any given time to man defences, more would be needed in actual fighting to replace the greater number of casualties expected in a nuclear war. Avoiding the rush to nuclear war by extending the conventional phase as called for by "flexible response," of course, made greater strategic sense notwithstanding the fact that this also required substantial increases in the number of ground troops. By any reasonable logic, clashes between large mobilized armies, as unpalatable as the thought might be, were much preferable to the alternative of general nuclear war waged on entire societies across oceans and continents.

Unfortunately, the army "footprint" across Canada had already begun to disappear by 1964, especially in rural areas and small towns where units and armouries were shut down. From 1965 onwards the Militia's role also began to change to one of augmentation, that is, providing not formed units, but officers, specialists, and soldiers on an individual basis to fill personnel vacancies in the Regular force. As of 31 March 1970 Militia strength was 19,343.[91] The strength of the Canadian Regular services, meanwhile, continued to erode from a peak of roughly 126,474 in 1962. The army strength of 49,760 in the next year was projected to fall to 46,264 in 1965 and 40,192 in 1968. In 1969 the MND announced that Canada's military forces were to be reduced by 20% to around 80,000 and the Reserves to 19,000. Significantly, the 1987 White Paper, the first since 1971, recommended a fourfold increase in Reserve strength as part of a general NATO build-up. As it turned out, this White Paper was shortly overtaken by events unleashed by *glasnost* and *perestroika*.[92] The signing of the Charter of Europe at Paris on 21 November 1990 officially signaled the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the search for peace "dividends." In 1993 the new government of Jean Chrétien announced that the CF regular strength would be reduced from 79,799 to 60, 513 by 1998. Between 1993 and 1998 the government slashed defence spending by 23%.[93]

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[90] With the Regular force designated Canadian Army (Regular).

[91] Granatstein, *Army*, pp. 351-352.

By 1995 the Militia had been reduced to 133 units in 125 Canadian cities and towns. With an authorized strength of 19,597, it barely mustered 18,347 effectives. Ironically, however, while the Militia suffered from declining numbers owing to neglect and other jobs offering better pay, it increasingly came to be called upon to fill individual vacancies within the shrinking Regular force.

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[92] Granatstein, *Army*, 379, 388.
[93] Grsanatstein, *Army*, 382, 388.

ANNEX D – MMC'S 30 MARCH LETTER TO MND

March 30, 2000

The Honourable Art Eggleton
Minister of National Defence
National Defence Headquarters
10 1 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON K I A 0K2

Dear Minister:

Last fall, you asked me to provide you with advice on how to resolve the impasse in the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) process. I agreed to do so with the concurrence of my colleagues D. Bevis Dewar and David Bercuson. The Monitoring Committee had examined this area as part of its mandate. Throughout 1998 and 1999 we reported to you our concerns that the Department and the CF had not succeeded in implementing government direction for restructuring the Reserves.

The government direction that I refer to resulted from the 1994 White Paper; from recommendations made by the Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves; and subsequently, from decisions made by a former Minister regarding force levels and consultation. At this critical juncture in your efforts to revitalize the Reserves, it is important to recall both the strategic environment within which government direction was given, and those decisions that were to serve as the basis for restructuring activities.

Background

The **1994 White Paper** was produced in response to the challenges posed by the post-Cold War security environment. That environment was characterized as being unpredictable and potentially very dangerous, especially in light of possible ethnic and intra-state conflicts that might have other-wise been reduced in risk or priority by the umbrella of the NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff that marked the Cold War. That uncertainty, coupled with the wide spectrum of conflict and peace support operations potentially faced by the Canadian Forces, led the Government to conclude that Canada would be best served by the **maintenance of "multi-purpose combat capable" forces** to confront the new strategic environment. The 1994 White Paper also outlined a **new mobilization concept** for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces and proposed that a **'no cost' plan for national mobilization** be drawn-up.

That strategic environment has not changed. Yet, DND and the CF have insisted that decisions made by the Government to implement **SCRR recommendations are anachronistic because of the new strategic framework.** We do not agree. The SCRR Commissioners do not agree. The Reserve community does not agree. **This fundamental difference of opinion has polarized NDHQ and the Reserve community.** Indeed, before delving into what DND, the CF, the Reserves community or the Monitoring Committee consider the future of the Reserves to be, it may be informative to consider what has and has not been accomplished from the original government direction.

The Special Commission made 41 recommendations of which 36 were accepted by the Government. In the Monitoring Committee's reports, we reported on the varying degrees to which these government decisions were implemented. Aside from what we have identified as **success in the areas of Cadets, Canadian Rangers** and **some quality of life measures** the Committee was **disappointed that decisions were either abandoned or carried out by the Department in a manner not reflective of the original intent.** In our final report, we reported that:

> ***SCRR recommendations accepted by the Minister of National Defence were based on these basic premises held by the Commissioners. Since the Commissioners released their report, the Militia was to have benefited by an increase in personnel of 7, 000, which would have boosted their ranks to at least 18,500 soldiers. That has not happened In addition, although the initial Chief of the Land Staff directive on LFRR directed that "mobilization capability is the fundamental reason for the existence of the Land Force Reserves", it is not mobilization, but augmentation, that has gripped planning concepts over the past two years. No national mobilization plan exists. A lack of clarity over the Militia's missions and roles has persisted, and this has affected considerations of force structure, personnel policies and enabling legislation. This has cast a shadow over the process. Because Militia strength has fallen far below the mandated 18,500 (and even below the 14,500 given as a guideline to the SCRR Commissioners), training has been cut, various SCRR recommendations have been abandoned and a lack of communication between the regular and Reserve force communities persists. Consultations between the Army and the Reserve community, also directed by the Minister, have broken down. This has caused an impasse in restructuring deliberations, and the Minister has since deferred decisions on restructuring proposals being prepared by the Army.***

Our Review To Date - Symptomatic Problems, Diagnosis and Recommendations

Since our last report, we have undertaken further study of the myriad problems related to Reserve restructuring. We are considering operational requirements in light of recent history, current operations and the tasks the CF will likely be called upon by the Government to execute in the future. The future security environment is complex, and the impact of technology on many of the CF's operations will no doubt be significant. Other tasks such as holding ground in peace support operations or war-fighting might be more personnel intensive. **Maintaining a judicious balance between technology and personnel requirements has been, and will continue to be, one of the biggest challenges to defence policy-makers and military planners.**

Such strategic thinking is vital to deliberations on force structure both for the Regular and the Reserve forces. The Department and the CF have produced several documents recently that reflect institutional strategy (i.e. *Strategy* 2020, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff s *Force Structure Guidance: "Rethinking the Total Force ", Mobilization Planning Framework).* In addition, **the Army is implementing a new Reserve Funding Model and a new Army Reserve Establishment on 1 April.** The Army Commander issued **a directive concerning the creation of new capabilities within the Army Reserves** on March 2nd. The Army has stated that these activities are not LFRR. Yet, the new funding model cuts Reserve pay by approximately $30 million. **The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff has reported to me that he has "made available an additional $30 million for the Army Reserve Programme** beginning in FY 2001/02. **These funds will be used to provide equipment and training to units undertaking new roles and tasks."**

Since you have made no decision regarding Reserve restructure, it is puzzling that new roles and tasks are being considered for implementation on 1 April. We are still not confident about what the above activities really mean, but there clearly is a strategy to have restructuring activities commence by 1 April despite the fact that there is no consensus.

I will elaborate further on these matters in a **full-length report to be delivered to you later this Spring.**

The Diagnosis

Following the consultations which we conducted in all four regions, my colleagues and I have agreed that it is crucial that you be provided with our initial diagnosis of why Reserve restructuring has not progressed either according to Government direction or due reference to the Reservists' point of view. I also include my advice to you on how the current impasse can be solved in order to satisfy Departmental and CF operational requirements, mobilization planning which is being sought by many in the Reserve community and the current structural problems that impede the ability of Reserve units to carry out the basic functions of unit viability i.e. recruitment, training and retention.

For some time, persistent and deep-rooted problems affecting recruitment, training and retention in the Reserves have been left unresolved. There exists, therefore, **a lack of trust within the Reserve community,** honourary and serving alike, **that the Regular force can deliver on any promises made to invigorate the Reserves. Without consultation between the Regular and Reserve communities, no vigorous and meaningful debate on the role of the Reserves, or enabling policies that would support whatever roles are assigned, is possible.** The Committee has commented on this matter in previous reports and further elaboration is not required now. **What is required is a solution to the impasse.**

As for 'operationalizing' the Reserves into current regular force requirements such as is called for in the VCDS' 'alignment' document, it is important to keep at the forefront of the restructuring process the premise that **Reserve service is not akin to that of a regular, professional soldier. Reservists are simply not 'rapidly deployable',** a theme of *Strategy 2020*. Furthermore, Reservists are attracted to the military for any number of reasons, some of which are simple employment, adventure, service to country, interest in a world exposed to them by a local unit. They remain in the Reserves, however, for the same reasons, but also for fun, camaraderie and a sense of purpose. The critical elements of unit viability, regardless of its operational assignment, are recruitment, training and retention of troops. Because these have all suffered in recent years, it is questionable that current command and control mechanisms as they relate to the Militia are sufficient to usher in a re-roled, re-tooled and revitalized Militia. Therefore, **both the perception and reality of two solitudes, Regular and Reserve, persists.**

Without a significant change on how the LFRR process is being carried out, Militia restructuring is not likely to be successfully achieved. There needs first of all to be a good degree of agreement among the Regular Army, the Militia, the Reserve community and the leadership in NDHQ on the objectives of restructuring. This should include an understanding by all these stakeholders of the exigencies that have led the Department and the CF to describe what they need from the Reserves and the changes in roles and structures for the Militia that they are proposing as a consequence. There is a good measure of openness to change in the Reserve community if it is shown to be necessary and achievable, and if it will be supported by the necessary resources.

At the same time, actions should be taken to provide reassurance that the chronic problems affecting recruiting, training and retention will be fixed. These problems will be more fully developed in the follow-up report. Let me just mention here, that recruiting arrangements insufficiently sensitive to differing local conditions. The long and frustrating enrollment process, training arrangements and schedules unsuited to part-time Militia members, and a lack of acceptance of equivalent civilian training for skills qualification have all contributed to the problems of maintaining viable Reserve units. Clear signs that these things will be fixed, along with clear explanations about why changes in roles and structures need to be made will, I believe, do much to build the trust and confidence among Army stakeholders on which a cooperative restructuring process can be based.

The Recommendations

We have concluded that **the key to successful restructure and, indeed, to a sound Reserve force in the long-term, is trust and a commitment to include the Reserves at the front-end of defence planning.** In order to **re-establish a framework within which trust and inclusion can be built,** I propose the following:

1. **Steps should be taken and announced to fix chronic problems in the way the Reserves system is administered.**
    - **Recruiting: - more flexibility and authority be devolved to local Reserve authorities to design advertising to suit local conditions and needs, and to appeal to local target groups.**
    - **Enrolment: - simplify and shorten the enrolment process. Permit conditional enrolment.**
    - **Training: - establish standards to be achieved for qualification levels, and hold local Commanders responsible for administering them. Permit civilian equivalency to be accepted in place of DND courses where possible. Allow more training at unit level and support it with training aids and equipment (including computer-based training). Where centralized training is essential, it should be scheduled in alignment with Reservists availability; courses once set must not be cancelled.**
    - **Pay: - remove remaining irritants in the pay process.**

2. **Acknowledge the legitimacy of Stage 4 mobilization as a part of the planning process, and the need for the Reserves structure to be able to support it. Even if detailed Stage 4 plans are not drawn up, this acknowledgement will conform to the 1994 White Paper and SCRR and assure Reservists they have a role beyond augmentation for current operations.**

3. **Acknowledge that NDHQ (i.e. the Regular Force) understands the different nature of Reserve service (part-time, voluntary, limited commitment) and will design roles, standards and training regimes that take it into account.**

4. **Outline proposed roles for the Reserves in general terms, including some introduction of non-traditional roles. Explain in common-sense terms why these changes are necessary under present and foreseeable conditions. Give assurance that most combat units will be retained even if some changes will be needed to ensure they are of viable size (e.g. "tactical groupings" of some units while retaining their traditional insignia). Consider new terms of engagement for Reservists that may be needed to attract persons with developed skills in the civilian economy (e.g. civilian-military cooperation, psychological operations, vehicle maintenance).**

5. **Promise consultation with currently serving Reserve authorities on how to implement these changes, and commit to a phased, prudent process of implementation that will include careful assessment of results and changes to the program as necessary.**

6. **Find a way of giving reliable guarantees that the funding and equipment will be forthcoming on a continuing basis to support this program. It is important there be no "tricks" in this commitment, which is bound to be scrutinized very closely.**

7. **That a Level One position be established in the Department and the CF to act as a leader of change in carrying out the recommendations above, to keep the Minister and the CDS advised on progress, and generally to represent the needs, concerns and interests of the Reserves at the highest levels in the Department and the CF.**

These measures could go a long way in restoring the trust of the Reserve community in the ability of NDHQ to deal with Reserve matters. A signal that Reserve issues are being dealt with at the top of the CF and DND hierarchy could also **alleviate suspicion of new roles that may be given to the Militia.** If such action is not taken soon to remedy problems that already inhibit the success of Reserve units, the process could very well be doomed.

Later this Spring, I will provide you with a more detailed account of our consultations and deliberations. I will also suggest further specific steps that you can take to ensure the long term sustainability of any new roles and structures you may approve for the Reserves. As a Committee, we will, of course, continue to monitor activities related to the Reserves in addition to Leadership, Professional Development and Education.

In our consultations, **I emphasized to those who appeared before us that the objective of this exercise is to help the Canadian Forces meet their obligations to the people of Canada.** I firmly believe that this initiative, taken now, will do just that.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed By

Hon. John A. Fraser
Chairman

ANNEX E – POLICY STATEMENT

October 2000

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA POLICY STATEMENT
LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE (LFRR)

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and express my appreciation for the many individuals and organizations who have worked so hard to get us to the point where we can move forward in the LFRR process. The late Chief Justice Brian Dickson, Dr Jack Granatstein and LGen Charles Belzile (ret'd) began the current process in 1995 with the Special Commission on Reserve Restructure. The Defence Team, particularly the Land Staff, worked thereafter for many years to evaluate the Army Reserve in order to implement the recommendations of the SCRR. The knowledge and experience gained in that exercise have been of invaluable assistance to those doing recent work on the policy and institutional parameters for reserve restructure. The Hon. John A. Fraser and the members of the Minister's Monitoring Committee, D. Bevis Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson, have monitored progress on reserve restructure. At my request, they have also provided me with advice on how to deal with the impasse reached last year in consultations between the Army and the reserve community. LGen Mike Jeffery, also at my request, consulted widely in search of common ground among the stakeholders that would provide us with the ability to launch LFRR. These individuals, along with Departmental and CF staff, have wrestled this very complex problem of reserve restructure to the ground. Having reached common ground among stakeholders, I am pleased to re-affirm current Government policy and begin implementation of LFRR.

The Army Reserve is a vital component of Canada's military capability. Indeed, the Defence Mission requires the cooperation of both the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces. Located in communities throughout Canada, the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the *raison d'ètre* of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a "footprint" in communities across the country. Its significant social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.

However, Army Reservists also help us to augment our Regular high readiness forces when committed to operations. Since the end of the Cold War, our reliance on these augmentees has increased due to the high tempo of our operational activity. We aim now to have Reservists provide up to 20% of the personnel for these deployments. The Army Reserves are even more prominent in our defence against natural disasters and local emergencies, such as the Saguenay and Red River floods and the Ice Storm of 1998.

The Fraser Report and LGen Jeffery's Strategic Plan for LFRR are the key ingredients to the success of this process. The recommendations of the Fraser Report will serve as the Government's blueprint for LFRR, and LGen Jeffery's Plan will be the first step in their implementation. This strategic plan provides for fixing some of the problems plaguing the Militia identified in the Fraser Report. It will lay the groundwork for developing future policies to fit the lives of our part-time citizen soldiers. We need them more now than at any time since the Second World War. They provide the framework for expansion should we require mobilization of forces; for individual and unit augmentation on peace support operations; and, to represent the military footprint in communities across the country. The Strategic Plan, combined with some additional actions I am taking, will ensure that the CF Reserves will continue to be both operationally sound, while contributing to the development of citizenship and to local emergency preparedness.

These actions are taken to clarify public policy as it relates to the Army Reserves and to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of LFRR. Specifically, they include:

- Increasing the number of part-time Army Reservists to at least 18,500 by the end of fiscal year 2005/06;
- Further consideration of national mobilization planning;
- The appointment of a senior official to manage LFRR;
- The appointment of the Hon. John A. Fraser and MGen Reginald Lewis (ret'd) to monitor LFRR;
- Clarify the authority and role of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets.

These measures demonstrate our commitment to an open and transparent process that will facilitate the participation of the broader reserves community, and the Canadian public, in developing a citizen soldiery ready for the challenges of the 21st century.

Restructure will proceed, and succeed, only with co-operation among the key stakeholders. We have therefore taken a prudent, cautious approach to reserve restructure. As a national institution and a valuable strategic resource serving communities throughout the country, the Militia is synonymous with Canada's proud military heritage. This legacy will remain and be protected as restructuring moves forward. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, reserve restructure will continue to include the advice and engagement of key stakeholders. These decisions, along with my recent announcement of the expansion of the Canadian Ranger and Junior Canadian Ranger programs, demonstrate the Government's support for our part-time Reservists, and confirms that the CF's presence will continue to be felt across the country.

ANNEX F – LFRR: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

(Excerpted from *In the Service of the Nation*, May 19, 2000, pp. 15-22.)

1. The 1992 Auditor-General's Report urged improvements in Canada's reserve force.

2. The hearings that preceded the 1994 *White Paper* brought forth a number of options for Canada's military structure to respond to the post Cold War world. One high profile action group, Canada 21 Council, recommended the re-orientation of the CF away from heavy combat capability to lighter constabulary roles, proposing that Canada "choose to abstain from any international operations that include the possibility of attacks by heavy armoured formations, heavy artillery, or modern airpower."[40]

3. The 1994 *White Paper* confirmed in policy the requirement for the CF to deliver "combat capable, multi-purpose" capability, including a rejuvenated Reserves, with a force structure based on 23,000 Reserves by 1999, and a national mobilization plan based on the four-stage mobilization framework laid out in the *White Paper*. The *White Paper* states that "… while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready "no cost" plans for "national mobilization." This plan was to be the basis for reserve restructuring. In reference to the Reserves, the White paper also visits the possibility of "assigning more service support roles - such as medical, logistics, communications and transport functions - to the Reserves."

4. 5 April 1995: Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves established.

5. 30 October 1995: SCRR submits report to Minister. From the Executive Summary:

> *In any restructuring of the reserves, care must be taken to prepare for all eventualities. The Commissioners believe that, while the mobilization concept offered in the 1994 White Paper on defence is appropriate, the priorities given to its four phases fail to recognize that the fundamental role of the Reserve Force is to provide the mobilization base for war. Such a role should be paramount in planning, and a mobilization plan should be completed with dispatch…. The Commissioners conclude that the peacetime Militia must be organized and trained to provide augmentation for the regulars and to be capable of expansion to meet mobilization needs. The mobilization plan for the Army, therefore, should be based on the formation of a corps. While much of this structure would be notional at present, a corps provides an effective framework for force development.*

6. 7 May 1996: DND's Chief, Force Development stated before SCONDVA, alongside the Minister of National Defence, that "In terms of tasking for the reserve, we envisage that each reserve unit in Canada, as a part of the mobilization planning process, will be given specific tasks that will relate to the four stages of mobilization." The MND, during the same session, gave the government's action plan to carry out the recommendations of the SCRR (and others…). He also, however, stated the following:

> *First of all, let me address the concerns voiced by many with respect to the primary reserve force strength of 23,000, as set out in the white paper. We understand this figure simply will not be enough to meet operational requirements. The paid ceiling of the primary reserves will therefore be increased from the planned reduction figure of 23,000,*

> *to a level that could, with increased efficiencies, allow for an actual primary reserve strength of around 30,000. The militia will be the beneficiary of this increase as its paid ceiling will rise from 14,500, the original figure with which the special commission had to work. The militia will be organized into brigades, the exact number to be determined after future study by land force planners and, again, consultations with the reserve community. All along in this piece, Madam Chair, the reserve community will be active participants and advisers and work with the forces.*

7. 10 June 1996: Initial VCDS Action Directive D4/96 of 10 June 1996 provided the following: MND Direction: (a) Increase the strength of the Primary Reserve from planned reduction figure of 23,000 to around 30,000. The Militia would be the "beneficiary" of this 7,000 increase.

8. 19 September 1996: LFRR Business Case Sub-Process: para. 4. "The final reorganization of Land Force Reserve units will be determined by the LFRR process based on unit evaluations and a final structure approved by the Minister." Also, in Annex A of this document: 5. Staffing guidelines (for restructure process): "Decisions must be made as a result of the consultative process." In same annex, # 7. "Transparency: All actions associated with the LFRR must be and seen to be as open as possible. It is imperative that Reservists, Honouraries and members of the broad reserve community be directly involved in all aspects of the process."

9. 15 November 1996: Commander's Intent establishes Consultative Working Groups at the direction of MND.

10. 21 November 1996: MND testified before SCONDVA, stating that force totals for the Militia would be increased to 18,500 to 20,500. He accepts the 36 SCRR recommendations, including a national mobilization plan, which would be the basis of restructure (corps).

11. 20 December 1996: CLS Action Directive - Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) states, among other things, that the "mobilization capability is the fundamental reason for the existence of the Land Force Reserves. The Directive states that restructure will be carried out based on a "paid ceiling" of 18,500. It is stated in para 27 that "In order to support the LFRR process, funding will remain constant at the 18,500 paid ceiling level until FY 1999/2000. During the evaluation period monies allocated to Areas for Reserve pay and personnel related O&M must be used for that purpose and may not be sub allocated for other purposes without the authority of Commander LFC." In Annex A to this document, it is stated that…"no combat function should be generated exclusively from the Militia structure" March 1997: MND Report to the Prime Minister directs force totals of 60,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves.

Yet, certain changes in direction can be detected that were neither sanctioned by the Government nor opened up for broad discussion. Some of the more significant of these decisions that had an impact on the restructuring process are as follows:

12. October 1997: CLS announces FY 98/99 Special Resource Measures. Included is a one time $16.9 million reduction of Militia budget. However, CLS states that the Army Primary Reserve paid ceiling remains at 18,500 and that class A training days will remain at 65 annually. He also states that he will review impact of the cut at the local level so that the impact on units is minimized and uniformly applied so as not to affect viability assessments adversely. "The Reserve Advisor will be reviewing this situation so we can clearly identify the localized impact to offer all possible assurances that this situation will not put the current evaluation process out of balance."

13. 30 October 1997: Army Bulletin message from the CLS: 18,500 will remain in place despite cuts.

14. November 1997: LFRR Total Force Task Force: Refined the concept of Total Force, developing and defining "characteristics of Reg and Res components". This is incorporated into the first publication of the Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance in the summer of 1998.

15. 7 August 1998: Minister's Monitoring Committee requests information on how budget cut has affected units. Initial letter from the CLS suggests that cuts have had affect but more analysis needed.

16. November 1998: Proposed Mobilization Framework circulated to Environmental Chiefs.

17. November 1998: MMC 1998 Interim Report:

> *It has been four years since the 1994 White Paper established the development of these plans as Government policy, and two years since the Minister accepted the SCRR recommendations that mobilization planning must be a top priority of the Department. The Monitoring Committee is not convinced that mobilization planning has received sufficient priority. The Committee does note, however, that some work was done on the economic impact of national mobilization for Exercise DEFENCE PLANNER, held recently at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Further, the Reserve Advisor to the Chief of the Land Staff is presently engaged actively in formulating proposals for a mobilization plan.*
>
> *The absence of a plan creates uncertainty for the Reserves. The Reserves are, by virtue of Government policy, the basis for national mobilization, or Stage 4. In practice, however, the Department has paid attention to their augmentation role almost exclusively. A recent DND publication entitled Canada's Defence Team in Action, states simply that "the militia augments and sustains the Regular Force". The document notes that militia members are trained to serve alongside regulars, in addition to maintaining a link to their communities, but fails to mention the Militia's primary role: to be the basis of national mobilization. As it stands, the Department has provided no details of the Reserves' role in either Stages 3 or 4. The SCRR recommended that the role of the Reserves be defined for Stages 3 and 4 to reassure the Militia, Air and Naval Reserves that the "community-based unit system that has served this country well in the past will be expected to do so again in the future." The Monitoring Committee notes that Reservists have not, as yet, been reassured, but remains hopeful that this will be remedied.*

18. 28 January 1999: Record of Discussion – Command Consultative Working Group (CCWG) 3/98 – Held in NDHQ Ottawa 22-23 October 1998, states that "The Asst Res Adv provided an update on the LFRR process and the importance of this meeting of the CCWG. The CLS then led a discussion on the synchronization of the LFRR process and the Departmental business planning process."

19. 4 February 1999: CLS Planning Directive issued that includes a timeline for LFRR implementation. SWG to report in mid-April, and MND approval in principal to be sought in mid-May 1999.

20. 25 February 1999: CCWG approves LFRR structure process, which essentially directs the SWG to arrive at structure options based on the amount of money made avail by the Army ($160 million), based on operation requirements, tenets and assumptions, and establishments.

21. 19 March 1999: Mobilization Planning Framework established as Action Directive by the VCDS to the Environments to work up their own mobilization frameworks. No detailed allocation of units to assigned roles or tasks is provided.

22. 10 April 1999: Assistant Reserve Advisor to the CLS, presentation to Structural Working Group: "Unit evaluations only provide data for structuring decisions."

23. 10-12 April 1999: Structural Working Group produces proposal based on the tenets, assumptions and "operational requirements" provided by a Land Staff Working Group. Heavy emphasis on support roles. Correspondence between the CLS and *Reserves 2000* outlines the impasse in the consultative process.

24. 15-16 May 1999: Army Council meets to discuss options for restructure. CLS Reserve Advisor in attendance and only reserve officer. They looked at 'options' based on five factors: budget of $160 million for FY 2000/2001; force balance between combat, combat support and combat service support branches; national geography; "emerging requirement" to force generate for "National Level Units"; the need to respond effectively to "domestic emergencies." Army Council came up with a proposal which would be funded at 85% of ceiling, or 11,752 Class A Reservists (part-time), 888 Class A, 933 Class B and 895 Regular Force. The Army Council states that "if realistic attendance rates were applied, this model would include a total of 15,701 Class A personnel, which would be an increase in the real effective strength of the Militia from current levels."

25. July 1999: MMC Interim Report is made public, stating that:

> *In its first Interim Report, the Monitoring Committee expressed concern that contingent commanders had little motivation to include formed Militia elements in augmentation roles. The Committee is in receipt of no evidence that this situation has changed, and is disappointed that no efforts appear to be in the works to encourage change. The Militia would no doubt be boosted both in spirits and status within the Army community if formed platoons and sections were included in levels one and two mobilization, at the very least, and given ample warning and resources to prepare for deployment on a continuing and rotational basis. Such a planning and deployment regime would enhance reserve leadership and training, in addition to exposing Militia units to some of the problems involved in mobilization planning and operational readiness likely in stages three and four of mobilization. Until such a commitment has been made by the Army Commander, the Committee can not help but disagree with the view that this recommendation has been implemented.*
>
> *The Reserves have three fundamental roles within the Canadian Forces: to serve as the basis of national mobilization; to augment the Regular Force; and to act as the military's link to the community. These roles are not mutually exclusive. Maintaining a link to the community, for example, facilitates the ability of the Reserves to prepare for their ultimate purpose of national mobilization by recruiting, training and maintaining a level of operational readiness. Exposure to the military informs Canadians, which is a requirement for public support of the military. Units, sub units, sub-sub units and individuals who are equipped, motivated and trained for national mobilization are also the most able to move into augmentation roles.*
>
> *While the three roles of the reserves may not be separable, it must be noted that, without proper emphasis on their national mobilization role, the Army reserves in particular will continue to be at the mercy of Regular Force priorities, and the*

> *operational base from which they would expand will continue to decline. The SCRR recommended the drafting and implementation of a mobilization plan, based on a corps and divisional structure, as a means to put an end to that regression. The Department's choice not to draft such a plan, preferring instead to devise a rather sparse framework of vague intentions to guide mobilization, is therefore inadequate and disappointing. The recommendation has not been fulfilled, and the Reserves have no more of a defined role in the stages of mobilization than was in place before the framework was drafted. Indeed, there are no detailed assignments of formed Militia units whatsoever; as a consequence, the Mobilization Framework contributes little to the aforementioned recommendation concerning the deployment of formed Militia units on peacekeeping operations.*
>
> *The Monitoring Committee is therefore puzzled why the Department has decided not to embrace the opportunity to engage itself, the CF and other government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the development of a comprehensive national mobilization plan. The Department's contention that such planning can only be done when a situation has arisen is also puzzling. The purpose of planning is to identify likely 'situations' and to devise methods, processes and, most importantly, force structures, to respond to them. Such planning is invaluable not only to the development of intellectual rigour in the CF, but also to the Department's ability generally to forecast commitments, measure necessary resources and communicate Canada's military requirements to the Canadian Government and public.*
>
> *As it stands, the Monitoring Committee is unable to accept the Department's insistence that these recommendations are implemented, and urges the Department to reconsider its hesitancy to devise a national mobilization plan.*

26. February 2000: MMC Final Report summarizes the state of progress on original Government direction:

> *SCRR recommendations accepted by the Minister of National Defence were based on these basic premises held by the Commissioners. Since the Commissioners released their report, the Militia was to have benefited by an increase in personnel of 7,000, which would have boosted their ranks to at least 18,500 soldiers. That has not happened. In addition, although the initial Chief of the Land Staff directive on LFRR directed that "mobilization capability is the fundamental reason for the existence of the Land Force Reserves", it is not mobilization, but augmentation, that has gripped planning concepts over the past two years. No national mobilization plan exists. A lack of clarity over the Militia's missions and roles has persisted, and this has affected considerations of force structure, personnel policies and enabling legislation. This has cast a shadow over the process. Because Militia strength has fallen far below the mandated 18,500 (and even below the 14,500 given as a guideline to the SCRR Commissioners), training has been cut, various SCRR recommendations have been abandoned and a lack of communication between the regular and reserve force communities persists. Consultations between the Army and the reserve community, also directed by the Minister, have broken down. This has caused an impasse in restructuring deliberations, and the Minister has since deferred decisions on restructuring proposals being prepared by the Army.*

27. 30 March 2000: John Fraser's letter to MND suggesting seven recommendations that can help to get the reserve restructure process back on track:

> *Since our last report, we have undertaken further study of the myriad problems related to reserve restructuring. We are considering operational requirements in light of recent history. Current operations and the tasks the CF will likely be called upon by the government to execute in the future. The future security environment is complex, and the impact of technology on many of the CF's operations will no doubt be significant. Other tasks such as holding ground in peace support operations or war-fighting might be more personnel intensive. Maintaining a judicious balance between technology and personnel requirements has been, and will continue to be, one of the biggest challenges to defence policy-makers and military planners.*
>
> *Such strategic thinking is vital to deliberations on force structure both for the Regular and the Reserve forces. The Department and the CF have produced several documents recently that reflect institutional strategy (i.e. Strategy 2020, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff's Force Structure Guidance: "Rethinking the Total Force", Joint Mobilization Doctrine). In addition, the Army is implementing a new Reserve Funding Model and a new Army Reserve Establishment on 1 April. The Army Commander issued a directive concerning the creation of new capabilities within the Army Reserves on March 2nd. The Army has stated that these activities are not LFRR. Yet, the new funding model cuts reserve pay by approximately $30 million. The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff has reported to me that he has "made available an additional $30 million for the Army Reserve Programme beginning in FY 2001/02. These funds will be used to provide equipment and training to units undertaking new roles and tasks."*
>
> *Since you have made no decision regarding reserve restructure, it is puzzling that new roles and tasks are being considered for implementation on 1 April. We are still not confident about what the above activities really mean, but there clearly is a strategy to have restructuring activities commence by 1 April despite the fact that there is no consensus.*

28. 1 April 2000: New Army Reserves Establishments and the new Funding Model have been implemented, but we are still very unclear on the details or implications of these changes.

Concurrently with the events noted above, corporate work within NDHQ has been ongoing which appears to be developing a "strategic direction" for the Reserves. This is embodied in the following documents and processes:

- DND/CF Mobilization Planning Framework, developed between November 1998 and March 1999, which determined that Regular and Reserve components should produce complementary, not competitive, capabilities;
- The Military Occupational Structure Review II, carried out between October 1998 and May 1999, revealed gaps in combat support and combat service support trades required for deployment of the Vanguard and Main Contingency Force (Stages 1 and 2 of mobilization). The MOS review identified the Reserves as the generator of these capabilities;
- The National Level Units Working Group, which ran parallel to the MOS Review II, concluded that MCF National Level Units will include 30% Reserve manning;
- The LFRR Structure Working Group, which met from 10-12 April 1999 identified a need in the Army for more combat support and combat service support and less combat arms capability;
- The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Force Structure Guidance, *Rethinking the Total Force*, published in November 1999, lays out a case for aligning reserve capabilities with the operational requirements currently faced by the Canadian Forces. This document argues that Canada's allies are following the same force development principles, which are aimed at eliminating

"anachronistic" structures that the CF can no longer afford. This document identifies "non-traditional" capabilities for the Reserves, mainly in the areas of combat support and combat service support, which would be more relevant to current operations than the panoply of combat arms units that do not contribute to the CF's "core capabilities." Significantly, the VCDS document outlines a "Reserve Mission", which is proposed as follows:

> *The Reserves will, as an essential part of the order of battle, (1) provide individual and formed unit augmentation, at specified states of readiness, for operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to enable the Canadian Forces to mount and sustain operations; (2) build and maintain links between the Canadian Forces and the local communities; and (3) expand as directed to achieve national mobilization objectives.*[41]

- Chief of the Land Staff Intent issued on 2 March 2000 puts forth the case for new capabilities to be found in the Army Reserve. This document states that this process is required as part of the normal force development process, and therefore it is not part of LFRR.

(Since *In the Service of the Nation*, May 19, 2000)

29. 19 May 2000: Publication of *In the Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, A Report to the Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Art Eggleton.

30. September 2000: Publication of the *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan* prefaced by a DM and CDS Message.

31. 6 October 2000: Government of Canada Policy Statement on LFRR (see Annex E for full statement).

32. January 2001: MMC First Quarterly Report on LFRR.

33. January 2001: Project Management Office (PMO) LFRR set up.

34. 15 March 2001: MMC Calgary Consultation.

35. 19 April 2001: MMC Toronto Consultation.

36. 11 May 2001: MMC Second Quarterly Report on LFRR.

37. 20-21 September 2001: MMC Gagetown Consultation.

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[40] Canada 21 Council, Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty First Century (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1994), p. 64.

[41] VCDS Force Structure Guidance, *Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century*, p.16.

38. 18 October 2001: MMC Montreal Consultation.

39. November 2001: Project Manager for PMO/LFRR named.

40. December 2001: Roles, Missions, and Tasks letter issued by PMO/LFRR.

41. 10 January 2002: MMC Meeting with CDS and ADM (HR-Mil) to discuss CDA.

42. February 2002: Progress Report I on LFRR.

43. 11 June 2002: Army Reserve Role statement approved by CDS.

44. 30 November 2002: MMC Ottawa Consultation.

45. 8-9 February 2003: MMC Toronto and London Consultations.

46. 17-24 February 2003: MMC visit to Composite Reserve Infantry Company on Operation "Palladium" (Bosnia) Rotation 11.

47. 31 March 2003: LFRR Phase I completion target date (15,500 Militia).

48. 3 April 2003: The Minister of National Defence announced the start of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) Phase II as per the Government Policy Statement of 6 October 2000. LFRR Phase II will provide funding for an immediate increase of 750 Army Reservists in fiscal year 2003/2004 and another 750 in 2004/2005. The overall goal, within constraints on resources, remains to increase the Army Reserve (Militia) to 18,500, and additional monies will be set aside to address the equipment needs associated with the new capabilities of the Army Reserve. On 13 May 2003 the Minister re-emphasized that "LFRR is a critical project, and I am determined that Phase 2 will preserve the Army Reserve as a national institution and transform its operational potential to meet Canada's needs in the 21st Century."

49. 11-12 April 2003: MMC Winnipeg and Calgary Consultations.

50. June 2003: *Progress Report II* on LFRR and Professional Development, Education and Leadership.

51. 21-22 June 2003: MMC Quebec and Montreal Consultations.

52. 13-14 September 2003: MMC Moncton and Halifax Consultations.

53. 25 October 2003: MMC Vancouver Consultation.

54. 5 November 2003: MMC *Final Report – 2003*.

55. 31 March 2006: LFRR Phase II completion target date (18,500 Militia).

ANNEX G – IMPLEMENTATION OF LFRR PHASE II (DM/CDS LETTER)



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IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE PHASE 2

References: A.LFRR Strategic Plan October 2000
B. DM/CLS Approval Letter for CLS FY 03-04 Business Plan, April 2003

BACKGROUND

1. In October 2000, the Minister announced a two-phased approach to revitalize the Army Reserve under the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) initiative. Phase 1 of this undertaking was focused on stabilizing the Army Reserve and raising its strength to 15,500. The target completion date for Phase 1 was the end of March 2003. The past two years have seen the growth of the Army Reserve strength to the target level of 15,500 persons, an increase in the support provided to operations by the Army Reserve, the completion of role definition and considerable progress with regards to the assignment of missions and tasks in accordance with Army mobilization planning frameworks.

2. On 03 April 2003, the Minister announced that the Phase 1 stabilization and growth objectives had been met, and the Department was proceeding towards the Phase 2 goals through an increase in Army Reserve strength of 750 persons in each of FY 03-04 and 04-05. This represents an increase of 1,500 persons over the Phase 1 levels and represents a midway point to the achievement of the overall Phase 2 goal of 18,500 Army Reservists.

AIM

3. This letter will provide departmental guidance in support of the implementation of this next increment in the achievement of the LFRR Phase 2 goals. In so doing it serves four functions:

a. identification of our expectations of the LFRR project to include performance benchmarks, the successful completion of which will be a prerequisite for further Army Reserve growth;

b. identification of our expectations of various L1s with respect to the implementation of this first step towards the LFRR Phase 2 goals. In this regard, it must be noted that, while CLS is the lead for this initiative, its successful execution will require support across the organization;

②
DLSP
We need to produce a CLS directive to implement LFRR II. Initiate work.

ACLS
25/07.

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

c. allocation of the additional resources required to achieve the personnel increases; and

d. identification of the mechanisms through which CLS is to identify the resources associated with capability enhancements

LFRR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

4. Strategic Objectives. While certain conditions have changed since the publication of the LFRR Strategic Plan, this plan remains the foundation for this revitalization initiative and, in general terms, its thrust lines remain those that will be pursued as the personnel increase is achieved. This plan identified two Strategic Objectives:

- Strategic Objective 1 – An effective and credible Army Reserve
- Strategic Objective 2 – An aligned and relevant Army

5. Focus on Change. While LFRR Phase 1 was focussed on stabilizing and testing new capabilities, Phase 2 will focus on change and growth. LFRR is about enhancing the Army's strategic capacity and capability while supporting Army transformation. Within the context of the Army Strategy, both the Regular and the Reserve components will go through significant change, commencing in 2003, with the intent to streamline and improve force generation. For the Army Reserve, this will represent a significant increase in its force generation responsibilities, both in terms of depth, by providing reinforcement, and in breadth, by providing unique capabilities not available in the Regular component (such as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Psychological Operations or Security Operations). Focussed asymmetric growth and change will be undertaken.

6. New Capabilities. Phase 2 will introduce new and enhanced capabilities to better support operations and to deal with asymmetric threats. These actions are aligned with the Army Strategy and include, *inter alia*, the following:

a. shift the Reserve Armour units from Direct-Fire role to Reconnaissance, commencing in 2003 (includes timely retirement of the COUGAR AVGP fleet);

b. as outlined in a separate instruction published by CLS, refocus the training of selected units in Own Forces and Critical Infrastructure Protection (Security Operations);

c. expansion of the CIMIC capability, to be completed by 2005;

d. establishment of a Psychological Operations capability, to be initiated in 2003; and

e. establishment of a Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Defence capability, to be initiated in 2003.

7. Alignment with Transformation. The LFRR process must occur within the context of the transformation of the CF and, in particular, result in alignment between the Regular and Reserve components of the Army. The integration of this initiative into departmental planning processes and its coherence with other capability initiatives will be a key to its success.

8. Performance Metrics. While LFRR Phase 2 is not a "head count" exercise but rather one of capacity and capability enhancement, one of the performance metrics that is likely to be used, particularly by external stakeholders, will be the Army Reserve strength. To ensure a common understanding of this metric, it should be noted that the strength of the Army Reserve is to be expressed in the number of CLS-employed Reservists serving either on a full or part time basis and, as such, encompasses Class A, B, B/A and C service (less those employed on DCDS authorized operations). It is also acknowledged that, should it be decided that the Medical Reserves be transferred to ADM(HR-Mil), the LFRR targets must be adjusted to reflect this organizational change. The following areas will be those upon which performance will be judged:

a. achievement of Reserve Force personnel strength levels;

b. achievement of new capability goals;

c. effective handling of unsustainable units; and

d. improvements in the manning of mission elements and reductions in overhead.

DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT

9. The increase in Army Reserve personnel will require support from across various L1 organizations. While not exclusive, the following outlines some of the support required:

a. the VCDS, in conjunction with CLS and DCDS staffs, is to identify the target capability levels associated with the CIMIC, Psychological Operations and Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Defence initiatives. This work is to be completed by late 2003. This will form the basis upon which CLS will move forward, following the establishment of the initial capability levels in 2003;



b. the VCDS is to ensure that the strategic capability investment plan currently under development includes those priority elements associated with LFRR Phase 2 and as prioritized by CLS. The timely delivery of the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled (Command and Reconnaissance) variant fits within this definition. In conjunction with CLS staff, the VCDS will also identify potential resourcing solutions to support further Army Reserve personnel increases, which would eventually lead to the achievement of the 18,500 person objective;

c. while the reduced level of Army Reserve attrition will lessen the requirement, it is understood that this increase will necessarily raise the recruiting and basic training requirement. ADM(HR-Mil) effort will be required to achieve the new personnel levels, both in terms of recruiting effort and support trades training activities;

d. as a follow-on from efforts in FY 02-03, ADM(PA) is to support the increased attraction campaign through focussed advertising. This effort is to be integrated into the overall recruiting advertising campaign as generated by ADM(PA) and ADM(HR-Mil); and

e. ADM(Mat) support to this endeavour will include, where necessary, managing the support to in-service equipments being held by the Army Reserve and responding to adjustments in existing capital projects.

RESOURCE GUIDANCE

10. The following resource allocations and guidance are applicable in FY 03-04 and 04-05 and are supplementary to those contained in reference B:

a. an additional $9.2M in one-time funding will be allocated to the CLS operating account Vote 1 in FY 03-04 to address Reserve Pay, local operating costs, support costs at unit and supporting base level. For FY 04-05, and in view of the need to further define new Reserve capabilities, $34.0M recurring will be established in a Protected Reserve to address the forecast Phase 2 costs. These monies will be released on completion of the CLS implementation plan;

b. $1M recurring will be allocated to the CLS operating account, commencing in FY 03-04, to assist in the development of Reserve-oriented distributed learning solutions;

c. an additional $0.9M will be allocated to the CLS apportionment of National Procurement in FY 03-04, specifically to address the forecast costs associated with the 750 personnel increase. This will be increased to $3.6M recurring in FY 04-05. Should the demand be

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

greater than this CLS generated forecast, it is to be managed from within the CLS NP apportionment;

d. an additional $5.3M in one-time funding in each of FY 03-04 and 04-05 has been estimated as being required to address the incremental costs associated with the Clothe the Soldier project. These monies will be held in a Protected Reserve, pending CLS and ADM(Mat) confirmation of the requirement and identification of account breakdown (NP and capital, recurring and non-recurring) to the VCDS. The VCDS is authorized to release these funds on receipt of the account breakdown;

e. for FY 03-04, $1.2M will be assigned to the corporate account established to manage statutory costs. The expected increase in statutory requirements of $4.8M in FY 04-05 will be addressed through the Annual Reference Level Update (ARLU) process;

f. it is understood that, as the planning in support of new capabilities within the Army Reserve progresses, there may be a requirement for additional Miscellaneous Requirement and Non-Strategic Capital funds. CLS, working in conjunction with ADM(Mat), is to identify FY 03-04 requirements to the VCDS no later than 30 Nov 03. Monies protected for that purpose will, if not drawn upon by that date, be returned to the General Reserve;

g. CLS is to identify any increases to other existing capital projects resulting from an end-state Army Reserve population of 18,500 and address these increases through the Project Management Board and the normal project amendment process. The VCDS will factor these prioritized changes into the Strategic Capabilities Initiative Plan and within the allocations identified within Defence Plan 2003. In this regard, it is expected that, to the degree possible, increases will be mitigated through sound equipment management techniques applied to both the Regular and Reserve elements of the Land Force;

h. to the degree possible, costs related to recruiting additional Army Reserve personnel are to be absorbed within existing allocations. Should this not be possible, ADM(HR-Mil) is to identify the incremental requirement to the VCDS. In view of the increase in FY 03-04 funds earmarked specifically for recruiting advertising, such costs are to be managed from within existing allocations and there will no additional funds provided for advertising; and

i. the majority of the additional training costs associated with this increase will be borne by CLS and this has been addressed in the Operation and Maintenance allocation identified above. It is understood that there may be additional costs incurred by ADM(HR-Mil) for the conduct of support

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trades training in the Canadian Forces Support Training Group. In view of the relatively minor nature of these costs, ADM(HR-Mil) is to identify any additional resource demand in the FY 03-04 Quarterly Review process.

11. Infrastructure. It is understood that the revitalization of the Army Reserve is also linked to the development, over the longer term, of suitable accommodation solutions. CLS, with the assistance of ADM(IE), is to examine innovative solutions that best support the end-state outcomes of the LFRR process. These solutions are to be integrated into the Department's overall infrastructure planning effort and should include consideration of partnering/sharing of facilities and maximum use of common facilities. In this regard, it is expected that greater infrastructure coherence between the Navy, Army and Air Force Reserve Force and between the Regular and Reserve Force will be achieved.

12. Capital Equipment. As stated in paragraph 10 g, the capital equipment requirements associated with the LFRR initiative are to be integrated into the development of the SCIP. In some cases, this will result in increases to the numbers or types of equipments currently forecast for acquisitions (the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled, the Medium Logistic Vehicle Wheeled replacement, etc); in other cases, particularly with regard to the development of Army Reserve capabilities, it may result in new projects. The early identification of capital projects is key to ensuring that the personnel growth results in tangible increases in capability and capacity. These projects must be coherent with Departmental objectives, consistent with the Army fielding strategy, and aligned with the end-state of the entire Army, not solely the Reserve component.

13. Regular Force Support Personnel. As an element of developing the end-state force structures of the Army Reserve to be achieved within the LFRR Phase 2 timeline, CLS is to identify the requirement, if any, for additional Regular Force support personnel. To the degree feasible, additional increases are to be addressed from within existing CLS structures. The LFRR Phase 2 capability focus should be on increasing the capabilities and capacities of mission elements while streamlining the requirement for full-time support. We are prepared to examine additional force structure increases, when directly related to the provision of new capabilities.

14. Force Structure Adjustments. The 2003 federal budget aimed to provide a sustainable CF, enabling Defence to transform where possible. The sustainability goal and the requirement to make internal re-allocations also apply to the LFRR project and, in this respect, CLS is to propose force structure adjustments for Army Reserve units or elements that are clearly unsustainable due to demographics or location. This proposal must consider the maintenance of heritage with a degree of dignity.



15. Progress Review. As identified in the FY 03-04 Business Plan approval letter, the CLS program will be reviewed in FY 04-05. Progress made towards LFRR Phase 2 goals will form a part of this overall review. Future decisions on LFRR will reflect the results of this review and the overall progress in implementing change.

CONCLUSION

16. The additional FY 03-04 increase in the number of Army Reserve personnel represents a significant step forward in the attainment of the LFRR Phase 2 goals. Its successful achievement will require a focussed effort on the part of many organizations. Paramount in this initiative is the understanding that LFRR Phase 2 is about change and increases in capability and capacity; it is not simply more of the same.

R.R. Henault
General
Chief of the Defence Staff

Margaret Bloodworth
Deputy Minister

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ANNEX H: ARMY RESERVE PERSONNEL NUMBERS AND AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT

Army Reserve Personnel Numbers and Areas of Employment

Ref: MMCC Query #245 12 Aug 03

General

1. The calculation of Army Reserve fulltime personnel strengths is a very complex and subjective task. Many commonly accepted practices of Army Reserve personnel employment frustrate attempts to arrive at finite employment numbers. For example, Army Reservists can serve fulltime on any one of three categories of service: Class B Temporary, Class B Annotated A (Annual), or Class C. Complicating matters is the continual transition of thousands of Army Reservists between anyone of these three categories and Class A part time service.

2. All Army Reserve soldiers employed fulltime have their service governed by individually tailored "contracts" that dictate the exact terms of service, the beginning and end dates, the pay level and type, and other benefits such as cost-move entitlements. This generates a situation where each fulltime Reservist serves under a customized set of conditions.

3. Since the inception of the Land Force Reserve Restructure project, the calculation of Army Reserve strengths has taken on a new importance. This increased focus has served to identify a requirement within the Army Reserve for a much more efficient and modern method of calculating soldier strength numbers. Currently, the only automated method of calculating personnel strengths relies upon the Revised Pay System for the Reserves (RPSR) database. This system was designed as a "pay calculator/allocator" only and was not designed to field Human Resource (HR) queries. While RPSR has proven tremendously successfully in calculating and allotting Reserve soldier pay and alleviating historic pay system difficulties, it has very limited capacity as an HR system. Until the Human Resources Management System (HRMS) is fully functional and proven across the Army Reserve, however, RPSR will remain the sole source of automated Army Reserve strength data.

4. To maximise the accuracy of HR reports drawn from RPSR, the Army Reserve uses a query designed to count the number of Class A, Class B Temporary, and Class B Annotated A Reservists who have worked in a given calendar month, listed by their Unit Identification Code (UIC). This query also provides a standardised foundation for the calculation of unit and formation personnel growth from year to year, and month to month.

Army Reserve Class B Temporary Service

5. One of the principle tenets of the Army Reserve is the provision of trained personnel to augment virtually any aspect of the Canadian Forces. This tenet provides a standing "labour pool" of talented personnel ready for volunteer service fulltime for short-term tasks, or long-term duty. Army Reservist serve fulltime almost everywhere that their Regular Force counterparts do. In fact, manning shortfalls and the operational tempo has led the Regular Force to rely on the Reserves to provide skilled personnel at numbers higher than ever before. In keeping with the principle of providing soldiers for fulltime duty, there are no restrictions on CF units "hiring" Reservists on Class B Temporary duty. Quite literally, units with available funding and a specific requirement may issue employment offers and employ (with chain of command concurrence) Reservists for periods of 14 days to several months.

6. Class B Temporary service is also the condition under which thousands of Army Reservist attend formal training courses every year, as instructors or students. This training accounts for the tremendous rise in Class B numbers during the summer period (see Annex A).

7. Class B Temporary service, whether part of a training scheme or as temporary fulltime assistance to a myriad of CF establishments, is not regularly differentiated within RPSR. Most soldiers on Class B Temporary duty will return to their home units in a short time, and their RPSR pay records remain administered by these home units. In effect, there is currently no foolproof way to electronically determine the number and/or location of soldiers on Class B Temporary employment, and as granularity increases down from national strengths, to Land Force Area strengths, to unit strengths, accuracy diminishes.

Army Reserve Class B Annotated Annual Service

8. Army Reserve permanent fulltime positions are governed by the Army Reserve Establishment (ARE). This establishment provides a listing of some 1075 positions dictated by unit and rank, and directs that the applicable funding be allocated to these units for fulltime soldier salaries. The terms of service for these permanent positions may be issued up to a period of three years, and can include a wide garnut of personnel benefits, including cost-moves and Post-Living Differential (PLD).

9. Changes to the permanent fulltime establishment are subject to a lengthy consultative review by national Army Reserve leadership, and are ultimately issued under the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS). Unfortunately, as with all Army Reserve fulltime employment, there currently exists no electronic method to differentiate between the strength numbers of these authorized permanent positions and those soldiers on temporary fulltime duty (Annex A).

Army Reserve Class C Service

10. Army Reservists serving on Class C terms of service are primarily administered by the Regular Force. As such, these soldiers do not appear as active files under RPSR until they revert to Class B, Class B Annotated A, or Class A service. Until recently, some Army units and formations employed Reservists on Class C within administrative positions in Canada. As of April 1, 2003, CLS directed that Class C contracts to Army Reservists will be issued only in support of operations. With that direction, Army Reservists serving in non-operational Class C positions will revert to Class B Temporary position at the termination of their current contracts. It is important to note that, while precise data is not available, a comparison of total Class C numbers with those Class Cs registered as on operations overseas indicates that non-operational Class C employment of Army Reservists within Canada was never widespread, and was centred primarily within NDHQ. A summary of Class C Army Reserve employment is included at Annex B.

Summary

11. Accurate determination of Army Reserve strengths and places of employment is problematic at best, and the result of any data obtained can often be misleading or misinterpreted. For example, data for August 2002 would show that over 10,000 Army Reservists were on fulltime duty. This would appear to be an extraordinary figure without a commensurate explanation that August is the height of the Reserve training season and the vast majority of these soldiers were part of a training programme. To avoid such confusion, total Reserve strength figures quoted by the Land Staff often exclude the summer training months.

12. Army staffs are working diligently to establish a viable methodology for the automatic collection of Army Reserve HR data. Knowing when, where, and for how long Reserve soldiers are employed is an essential element of Reserve force management. The funding sources used to employ these soldiers are an essential element of overall Army force management. As data becomes more refined, the Land Staff will post the latest Army Reserve strengths on Army Online, available through any intranet connection: http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/CLS/143000440003984/Default.asp

Annex A – Army Reserve Class A, B, BA Strengths – FY 02-03

Annex B – Army Reserve Class C Strengths – FY 02-03

ANNEX A

Class A, B, B/A Strengths

Unit	Apr-02	May-02	Jun-02	Jul-02	Aug-02	Sep-02	Oct-02	Nov-02	Dec-02	Jan-03	Feb-03	Mar-03	Apr-03
Area Support Unit Kinsgton	15	18	18	26	23	22	15	13	12	14	17	14	17
CFB ASU Shilo	5	28	30	58	65	2	1	1	1		1	1	1
Area Support Group Edmonton	21	42	59	57	76	58	52	53	53	52	50	49	49
Centre d'instruction du SQFT	22	30	31	41	37	24	24	24	23	24	26	23	28
SRR LFC		1		1	1	1		1	1			1	
Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre - Primary Reserve List	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	2
Land Force Central Area Primary Reserve List	3	2	2	3	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
Land Force Western Area Primary Reserve List	4	4	2	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	3
Headquarters Land Force Command Primary Reserve List	23	19	22	22	21	22	22	20	17	18	19	21	26
CLFCSC	52	53	53	37	22	35	30	30	31	29	30	31	31
CTC Gagetown								20	19	19	18	18	19
Militia Training Centre Wainwright	16	25	88	203	161	25	31	29	31	25	27	26	21
Headquarters Land Force Western Area	33	40	40	46	46	39	40	41	40	41	39	38	37
33 Field Engineer Sqn	49	40	29	35	39	47	43	40	40	42	35	39	40
Militia Training Centre Gagetown	42	83	129	205	120	65	59	33	36	35	38	40	41
Militia Training Centre Aldershot	10	11	28	62	50	14	13	12	13	13	12	13	14
Ceremonial Guard	7	122	206	216	167	17	9	7	6	5	5	8	16
Alberta District Headquarters	1	1	1		1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1
British Columbia District HQ	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Quartier général Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre	66	65	65	69	66	65	64	81	91	86	90	90	82
Headquarters Land Force Atlantic Area	37	39	44	57	45	41	40	49	48	50	52	56	48
6 Intelligence Coy	37	32	30	19	24	29	27	27	27	28	28	32	35
2 Intelligence Coy	25	28	24	21	20	32	34	35	29	32	34	31	32
4e Cie du renseignement	18	22	14	16	18	22	19	26	19	31	27	30	27
3 Intelligence Coy	31	33	33	31	34	38	36	37	37	40	39	40	40
2 Intelligence Pl	15	15	13	7	11	21	19	19	18	18	19	17	19
Headquarters Land Force Central Area	38	42	39	42	44	40	46	53	51	55	58	60	76
Militia Training Centre Meaford	11	12	15	44	42	9	7	7	7	6	6	5	5
Det Calgary 15 Medical Coy	35	36	28	29	30	42	40	42	40	43	44	43	45
4 AD Regt	63	62	66	56	54	62	60	57	49	60	62	59	57

PEI Band	21	20	18	4	15	22	23	22	22	23	22	21	21
Nova Scotia Band	20	20	12	1	3	21	22	21	20	19	20	20	19
RNfld Regt Band	27	26	26	22	18	25	24	26	24	23	25	26	25
La Musique du 34e Groupe-brigade du Canada	32	33	23	24	23	33	31	28	26	32	31	32	33
Musique Sherbrooke	22	24	24	18	26	28	27	26	27	26	26	27	27
La Musique, Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke	15	17	3	5	12	17	16	16	16	6	16	16	16
HQ 31 CBG	53	59	66	66	66	68	67	61	64	63	56	55	60
Headquarters 32 Canadian Brigade Group			6	5	4	5	6	6	9	11	18	27	38
HQ 33 CBG	32	35	46	36	41	34	34	39	40	38	35	38	39
Quartier général du 34e Groupe-brigade du Canada	57	58	65	60	57	55	67	68	70	65	64	63	68
Quartier général du 35e Groupe-brigade du Canada	35	37	38	39	65	36	38	39	40	40	41	40	37
HQ 36 CBG	31	35	33	29	39	31	34	32	31	31	30	29	27
HQ 37 CBG	21	21	20	19	19	20	21	21	21	19	21	22	24
HQ 38 CBG	75	91	109	224	181	77	80	80	83	82	93	99	95
HQ 39 CBG	47	47	56	80	80	49	48	48	49	44	42	43	38
Headquarters 41 Canadian Brigade Group	77	87	89	81	83	78	73	77	73	74	71	71	71
2 CRPG					1	1	8	9	11	12	12	12	46
3 CRPG	13	12	14	14	9	14	17	46	16	31	56	20	32
ASU Northern Ontario	5	5	5	7	10	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6
The Algonquin Regt	41	46	43	36	45	42	42	38	38	48	46	44	42
The Governor General's Horse Guards	149	145	144	105	126	164	161	149	122	142	142	140	135
8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)	141	137	81	107	110	139	133	128	117	145	152	149	144
The Grey and Simcoe Foresters	60	63	61	51	48	53	50	53	49	48	48	46	47
31st Field Engineer Regt (The Elgins)	75	76	75	54	68	80	73	77	67	73	78	76	75
The Ontario Regt (RCAC)	154	151	148	103	131	169	173	165	138	164	165	156	159
The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)	171	171	165	104	146	158	169	158	146	159	165	158	152
Sherbrooke Hussars	98	91	81	80	90	86	96	99	98	93	96	86	95
12e Régiment Blindé du Canada (Milice)	88	109	95	105	109	118	105	107	102	96	100	106	112
1 Hussars	74	83	79	92	90	78	74	77	50	76	110	107	109
The Prince Edward Island Regt (RCAC)	90	86	82	78	84	90	88	83	82	78	78	81	84
The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montréal)	82	83	62	63	71	85	81	81	78	83	81	70	81

The British Columbia Regt (Duke of Connaught's Own) (RCAC)	91	87	61	52	67	94	92	94	85	89	89	84	84
The South Alberta Light Horse	55	50	48	40	43	56	56	57	52	54	53	56	54
The Saskatchewan Dragoons	94	91	71	24	47	83	75	80	72	79	77	75	73
The King's Own Calgary Regt (RCAC)	87	74	26	29	46	101	101	100	91	97	97	89	96
The British Columbia Dragoons	96	96	22	19	26	104	101	97	88	96	95	90	92
The Fort Garry Horse	89	72	73	35	35	87	86	75	73	82	79	80	77
Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC)	87	87	74	67	77	100	98	97	84	94	89	90	97
The Windsor Regt (RCAC)	103	97	97	71	73	107	103	107	99	108	108	107	106
1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field Artillery Regt RCA	65	61	45	51	44	51	54	59	49	58	53	58	80
3rd Field Artillery Regt RCA	100	100	94	14	85	100	97	101	96	101	97	95	92
6e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne - ARC	79	89	82	77	87	97	89	103	98	89	97	93	93
7 Toronto Artillery Regt RCA	97	98	106	107	106	117	113	106	101	107	103	104	100
10th Field Artillery Regt RCA	46	31	30	13	5	38	41	42	39	39	36	35	35
11th Field Artillery Regt RCA	91	87	89	80	82	93	92	88	68	88	89	87	88
84th Independent Field Artillery Bty RCA	27	29	22	21	22	27	27	24	19	24	23	23	3
15th Field Artillery Regt RCA	78	77	55	74	51	83	88	88	77	81	82	83	78
20th Field Artillery Regt RCA	48	43	34	27	26	44	43	46	42	45	45	47	47
26th Field Artillery Regt RCA	68	68	51	45	45	58	60	61	57	60	58	61	57
30th Field Artillery Regt RCA	92	91	64	66	69	83	88	85	78	83	83	83	86
49th (SSM) Field Artillery Regt RCA	110	118	111	118	115	123	121	117	102	110	107	107	104
56th Field Artillery Regt RCA	75	69	68	44	37	49	53	51	42	64	64	66	67
62e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne - ARC	114	112	99	106	116	112	121	129	119	110	121	108	104
2e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne - ARC	70	67	53	58	57	69	74	72	68	61	57	55	67
2 Field Engineer Regt	114	112	114	88	88	127	122	120	96	118	117	115	107
3e Régiment de Génie	76	71	72	58	63	83	96	98	93	87	87	60	86
45 Field Engineer Sqn	83	79	77	63	70	75	73	76	73	76	73	75	77
B Sqn, The South Alberta Light Horse	80	81	76	52	55	76	71	70	61	65	67	67	65
6 Field Engineer Sqn	56	53	32	44	42	71	67	65	52	67	51	53	43
44 Field Engineer Sqn	54	41	18	15	33	37	46	44	41	41	37	36	37
8 Field Engineer Regt	60	39	10	14	27	62	65	56	37	51	43	42	43
3 Field Engineer Sqn	60	58	55	44	54	65	65	65	64	66	68	67	65
9e Escadron de Génie	87	85	73	77	75	73	64	63	70	70	71	69	69
10e Escadron de Génie	88	92	82	81	79	99	101	98	98	97	88	94	86

56 Field Engineer Sqn	91	84	63	70	62	85	88	90	85	86	87	88	87
Governor General's Foot Guards	141	125	117	81	96	173	174	168	166	171	166	156	159
The Canadian Grenadier Guards	103	66	57	62	94	132	129	116	80	51	63	79	93
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada	172	171	174	107	127	158	167	172	145	169	179	164	163
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regt) of Canada	79	79	67	65	79	93	99	107	101	99	97	109	104
Les Voltigeurs de Québec	171	196	167	171	190	202	188	194	184	180	179	188	206
The Royal Regiment of Canada	171	168	154	125	135	179	178	176	159	183	181	181	174
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regt)	109	113	80	83	79	104	112	115	99	116	115	112	107
The Princess of Wales Own Regt	80	77	84	75	80	101	101	100	103	103	104	103	101
The Hastings and Prince Edward Regt	71	83	88	118	115	71	74	69	64	67	73	70	70
The Lincoln and Welland Regt	153	153	150	105	124	160	159	158	129	157	156	147	158
4th Bn, The Royal Canadian Regt	167	155	150	124	115	159	168	174	151	167	169	157	151
The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada	101	102	110	53	55	86	85	96	87	93	109	104	104
The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regt)	215	210	206	138	146	194	193	190	166	191	186	177	176
The Brockville Rifles	62	69	69	54	52	78	73	71	63	72	69	73	73
1 Air Defence Regt (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish) RCA	58	64	64	71	60	53	56	61	48	45	56	58	57
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders	69	68	69	63	61	68	69	67	63	64	65	62	66
Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent	78	77	88	153	138	91	85	90	87	74	82	89	90
Le Régiment de la Chaudière	95	109	138	126	128	142	129	134	114	126	136	142	132
4e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment (Châteauguay)	96	92	83	87	90	110	121	124	100	114	104	95	115
6e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment	86	87	92	92	87	93	98	104	91	102	99	101	102
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal	124	121	108	104	104	123	120	118	110	121	118	110	119
The Princess Louise Fusiliers	134	131	131	113	130	146	165	157	146	154	153	155	149
1 Bn, The Royal New Brunswick Regt	123	121	119	87	103	124	129	132	123	137	135	130	126
2 Bn, The Royal New Brunswick Regt	124	122	121	104	96	116	102	94	90	120	118	119	123
The West Nova Scotia Regt	92	95	67	76	84	96	103	103	98	100	100	100	96
A Coy, 1Bn, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North)	58	58	27	37	39	53	51	47	44	48	45	49	5[illegible]
2 Bn, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (Cape Breton)	111	102	102	96	100	109	105	101	90	105	106	102	110
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve	122	126	93	97	116	136	141	153	144	140	132	121	134
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa	111	104	88	87	89	115	126	116	78	107	111	112	117

The Royal Winnipeg Rifles	112	92	75	32	38	86	76	75	76	81	77	76	76
The Essex and Kent Scottish Regt	129	125	85	71	83	145	141	137	118	131	132	124	125
48th Highlanders of Canada	140	140	131	80	94	144	142	142	122	136	130	128	117
Le Régiment du Saguenay	143	157	140	154	144	156	152	140	143	150	151	136	143
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's)	159	167	153	113	113	171	179	172	135	156	175	173	181
The Lake Superior Scottish Regt	74	68	62	32	44	61	59	55	50	54	57	59	55
The North Saskatchewan Regt	71	65	53	34	50	64	62	63	61	62	60	58	58
The Royal Regina Rifles	55	33	34	8	13	46	44	45	36	43	39	37	41
The Loyal Edmonton Regt (4 PPCLI)	140	95	86	79	91	128	122	111	105	113	109	105	109
The Rocky Mountain Rangers	79	71	49	51	68	80	78	78	65	73	79	76	74
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada	85	65	60	31	37	87	83	79	77	81	83	78	83
The Calgary Highlanders	136	101	68	105	112	151	139	127	111	119	119	121	123
Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke	112	124	101	96	105	127	126	157	145	138	144	142	133
The Royal Westminster Regt	154	143	89	84	96	143	142	142	120	139	140	133	130
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada	102	95	64	60	59	107	102	102	78	104	110	103	106
The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)	159	136	69	78	83	167	160	163	152	155	150	147	147
The Royal Montreal Regiment	108	109	84	76	87	102	106	106	92	97	76	59	84
2nd Bn, Irish Regiment of Canada	93	84	74	69	67	85	87	83	82	87	83	79	79
The Toronto Scottish Regt	113	119	107	74	83	129	124	117	112	126	124	120	125
1 Bn, The Royal Newfoundland Regt	127	126	126	99	97	119	121	116	102	102	109	111	112
18 (Thunder Bay) Service Bn	48	45	36	16	24	46	46	46	42	42	42	41	43
35 (Sydney) Medical Coy	64	63	63	58	60	62	63	62	56	65	66	68	66
55e Cie Médicale (Québec)	91	98	87	79	84	107	104	99	97	87	90	90	94
52e Cie Médicale (Sherbrooke)	103	107	84	77	102	106	116	113	103	108	109	107	98
23 (Hamilton) Medical Coy	73	76	70	53	48	75	77	77	66	68	73	65	67
17 (Winnipeg) Medical Coy	47	42	26	10	11	44	42	37	32	35	36	36	38
15 (Edmonton) Medical Coy	66	66	50	47	40	60	63	63	54	61	60	61	60
26 Svc Bn Maint Coy	38	40	40	28	26	40	40	43	43	45	44	45	46
26 (North Bay) Service Bn	32	34	27	34	34	33	35	36	35	32	30	28	34
12 (Vancouver) Service Bn	94	92	72	57	60	93	102	101	94	98	97	95	85
14 (Calgary) Service Bn	95	84	71	61	75	95	89	88	83	82	82	79	85
15 (Edmonton) Service Bn	95	82	49	37	39	78	79	78	71	73	74	73	69
16 (Saskatchewan) Service Bn	51	44	44	26	21	51	53	50	46	44	44	44	45
17 (Winnipeg) Service Bn	58	52	50	14	33	57	56	55	52	59	63	58	60
22 (London) Service Bn	89	88	48	60	62	89	82	84	69	90	87	89	88

23 (Hamilton) Service Bn	85	84	82	68	63	88	85	86	72	89	89	84	79
25 (Toronto) Service Bn	138	141	139	112	119	150	146	140	129	144	147	141	133
28 (Ottawa) Service Bn	94	90	85	61	71	93	98	99	93	101	96	95	104
51e Bon des Services (Montréal)	165	157	144	151	148	171	187	200	184	190	189	181	169
55e Bon des Services (Québec)	175	176	161	167	192	208	205	211	197	199	194	186	210
33 (Halifax) Service Bn	96	81	68	55	58	91	89	84	78	83	81	78	81
116th Independant Field Artillery Bty RCA	30	20	19	6	5	32	31	33	26	28	30	25	28
LFAA MP COY	33	37	36	28	32	38	42	44	38	41	42	41	42
11 (Victoria) Service Bn	59	61	38	45	48	61	60	61	57	58	59	55	57
18th Air Defence Regt RCA	69	58	46	34	40	66	67	57	49	50	50	49	50
B Coy, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regt	72	64	55	9	19	67	69	73	69	69	73	71	69
11 (Victoria) Medical Coy	42	38	25	23	29	48	44	45	40	46	44	44	47
12 (Vancouver) Medical Coy	44	35	34	40	33	58	57	58	52	60	55	56	60
16 (Regina) Medical Coy	30	25	20	14	16	35	35	34	30	36	35	33	29
18 (Thunder Bay) Medical Coy	32	29	23	16	23	29	27	28	28	29	29	29	26
25 (Toronto) Medical Coy	91	83	58	67	74	103	102	99	87	97	99	100	99
51e Cie Médicale (Montréal)	62	66	45	50	58	70	73	72	67	67	70	64	66
A Coy, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regt	29	27	23	3	4	34	34	34	33	33	34	33	32
B Coy, The Algonquin Regt	29	26	19	7	9	22	22	21	23	25	23	24	24
B Coy, The Grey and Simcoe Forresters	67	65	56	21	33	72	73	68	60	67	65	63	60
C Sqn, 1 Hussars	51	49	45	27	28	47	46	40	34	37	3	1	
A Sqn, British Columbia Dragoons	8	8	1			7	8	8	7	7	8	8	8
58e Batterie antiaérienne, 6e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne, ARC	40	33	30	32	27	57	54	52	49	50	48	47	52
11 Bty, 11th Field Artillery Regt RCA	42	40	35	11	13	40	39	36	28	40	41	42	40
5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery Regt	108	80	53	70	63	90	89	86	74	71	76	80	78
78 Bty, 20th Field Artillery Regt RCA	50	55	44	34	35	63	60	56	53	58	55	62	61
13 Bty, 26 Field Artillery Regiment	6	6	3	2	2	5	6	6	6	6	3	3	3
69 Bty, 56th Field Artillery Regt RCA	26	26	25	22	25	33	31	30	14	29	26	26	25
10 Bty, 56th Field Artillery Regt RCA	33	31	23	16	16	25	26	22	12	24	22	24	18
B Coy, The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada	49	45	36	8	18	47	47	49	35	46	44	43	42
Cie A, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent	53	42	10	4	18	49	46	47	45	40	45	49	44

Cie C, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent	54	37	15	11	22	53	50	52	43	37	36	45	38
A Coy, 1Bn, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment	61	61	61	38	45	63	64	61	70	70	70	71	71
D Coy, 1 Bn, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North)	70	68	22	40	50	58	58	57	50	55	55	54	50
B Coy, 1 Bn, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North)	54	53	27	39	40	50	49	48	46	50	50	51	51
1 Bn, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North)	15	15	11	14	13	13	13	12	12	11	13	14	13
B Coy, The North Saskatchewan Regt	30	26	20	18	19	24	21	24	22	23	22	24	24
B Coy C Scot R	8	5	1			5	7	7	7	7	6	6	7
2 Bn, The Royal Newfoundland Regt	125	122	110	98	93	115	105	98	86	121	127	128	131
Windsor Band	21	20	22	10	19	21	21	21	21	21	22	20	21
Headquarters 32 Canadian Brigade Group	33	34	33	30	32	31	31	30	28	27	21	14	1
21 (Windsor) Service Battalion	59	59	55	37	37	60	56	56	51	58	59	55	53
35 (Sydney) Service Battalion	114	116	113	102	101	118	117	114	103	119	119	117	122
36 (Newfoundland) Service Battalion	84	69	46	19	22	85	85	91	87	81	77	83	87
31 (Saint John) Service Battalion	103	111	105	84	81	108	109	108	98	106	107	105	109
28 (Ottawa) Medical Company	61	61	45	42	44	70	79	81	74	74	76	76	83
33 (Halifax) Medical Platoon	34	30	24	8	13	32	30	29	29	33	36	36	39
1 Bn Nova Scotia Highlanders (North) Band	11	11	10	11	10	11	12	12	11	11	14	14	14
The Band of the 3rd Field Artillery Regt	19	19	11	15	18	19	17	18	19	16	19	18	18
La Musique, Les Voltigeurs de Québec	32	31	28	20	30	29	30	30	28	30	30	30	4
La Musique du 62e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne, ARC	24	21	22	16	15	23	23	23	18	25	23	21	22
La Musique, Le Régiment du Saguenay	18	17	5	5	10	18	17	17	16	17	17	11	18
Band of the Governor General's Horse Guards	11	14	16	6	13	17	17	16	15	17	17	16	17
Band of the Royal Regiment of Canada	22	23	23	18	19	22	23	23	21	24	24	24	24
48th Highlanders Band	26	25	19	13	20	25	25	26	28	29	27	26	29
Toronto Scottish Regiment Band	1	1	1				1	1		1	1	1	1
The Highland Fusiliers of Canada Band	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Band	16	17	17	16	17	18	19	18	18	17	17	17	17

The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada Band	14	14	9	1	9	11	11	12	9	11	11	9	11
The Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards	26	23	15	10	4	30	27	28	28	31	29	27	27
The Brockville Rifles Band	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1		
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa Band	9	8	7	5	7	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	3
The Band of the 49th Field Artillery Regt RCA	11	11	9	11	10	8	7	10	7	8	7	7	9
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles Band	30	28	21	15	19	29	28	27	28	26	27	27	28
The Band of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The North Saskatchewan Regt Band	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	5
The Loyal Edmonton Regt (4 PPCLI) Band	30	30	30	31	19	32	33	32	29	30	31	31	30
The King's Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC) Band	16	17	14	12	8	15	17	19	18	18	18	17	18
15 Field Regiment Band	48	48	47	44	28	50	52	53	50	53	53	55	52
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada Band	11	10	8		1	12	10	11	9	11	10	10	9
The Band of The 5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery Regt, RCA	7	17	16	14	15	22	21	23	19	13	19	25	24
C Scot R Band	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2
Totals	**15037**	**14801**	**13151**	**11871**	**12534**	**15507**	**15457**	**15416**	**13988**	**15003**	**15056**	**14772**	**14942**

ANNEX B

Class C Service	Apr-02	May-02	Jun-02	Jul-02	Aug-02	Sep-02	Oct-02	Nov-02	Dec-02	Jan-03	Feb-03	Mar-03	Apr-03
LFAA	22	23	21	22	23	25	64	64	65	77	78	79	80
SQFT	463	303	270	262	256	256	253	184	20	16	21	23	22
LFCA	34	37	50	40	39	47	84	84	85	76	78	72	74
LFWA	266	307	414	251	262	262	301	321	324	311	410	410	410
LFDTS	3	3	3	1	0		1	2	3	0	3	3	3
LS	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	17	17	17
Total	**806**	**691**	**776**	**594**	**598**	**608**	**721**	**672**	**514**	**497**	**607**	**604**	**606**

ANNEX I – EXTRACT FROM SCONDVA ON RESERVES

E. Restructuring of Army Reserves

The efforts by ground forces and other elements of the military to adjust to the new realities of the combat environment also imply a transformation of their reserve forces. Modern ground forces, even those of powerful states like the U.S., count on reserves to provide a pool of trained troops who are not full-time members of the military, but who can easily integrate with units preparing for deployments because of an apprehended or real crisis at home or abroad. Canada's Reserve Force is an important element of Canada's military capabilities. The Army Reserve is by far the biggest element of the Reserve Force with about 15,326 personnel in November 2001 out of a total of 27,851.[50] Indeed, a number of Reservists have served overseas during peacekeeping operations. As Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie, among others, has noted many times, Reservists were just as effective and as dedicated as Regular Force personnel during such operations.

However, armies must transform themselves in order to meet the challenges of the 21st Century and their reserve forces must be part of this evolution. Since Canada's Army intends to transform itself into what it calls the "Army of Tomorrow" during this decade in order to become an "Army of the Future" in the next decade, the Army Reserve must also adapt itself to the new operational context.

On October 6, 2000, the Minister of National Defence announced the revitalization and restructuring of the Army Reserve. He indicated that the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) would be guided by the recommendations of the 1999 report by the Honourable John A. Fraser and the Strategic Plan for LFRR drafted by the Chief of the Land Staff. He also announced measures designed to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of the restructure. These include an increase in Army Reserve strength to about 18,500 by the end of the 2005-2006 fiscal year; further consideration of national mobilization planning; the appointment of the Hon. John A. Fraser and Major-General (Retired) Reginald Lewis to monitor the process; and, the appointment of a LFRR project manager.

On the same occasion, Lieutenant-General Jeffery stated the three fundamental tenets of his strategic plan. The first is the improvement of the operational capability of the Army Reserve in step with the changes being made within the Army as a whole. The second tenet is what he described as respect for the institution, in other words the "acknowledgement of the values and acceptance of the purpose of the Army reserve within a unified army." The third tenet was described as stewardship where all stakeholders (i.e., Regulars, Reservists, and others) are consulted. Lieutenant-General Jeffery reassured the Reserve community that they will continue to have a voice and a key role in the restructuring process.

Lieutenant-General Jeffery also explained that the restructure would be done in two phases. Phase 1, between 2000 and 2003, is supposed to restore the "health and trust" of the Army Reserve by, among other things, improving recruitment and raising its strength to 15,500 by 2002. Meanwhile, during Phase 1 of the LFRR, the blueprint for the "Army of Tomorrow" is supposed to be developed before it transforms itself into the "Army of the Future" after 2011. Thus, in Phase 2 of the LFRR, slated to begin in 2003-2004, the alignment of the Army Reserve with the "new" Army is supposed to take place.

However, concerns have been expressed about the Department's commitment to Phase 2 since funding for it is uncertain. The February 2002 Report on Land Force Reserve Restructure of the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee (chaired by John A. Fraser) states on page 2 that while resources were allocated to Phase 1, the policy statement of October 6, 2000 "does not offer unqualified commitment to carrying through with expansion of the Army Reserves in Phase 2." Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Jeffery stated at a recent Conference of Defence Associations meeting that the Army is short of resources while carrying out its many commitments. When he appeared before the Committee to discuss the restructuring, he stated clearly that he "cannot take any more money out of the regular force to put into the reserves. I'm already walking a tightrope."[51] In the absence of a clear financial commitment by the Department to Phase 2 of the restructuring, the whole future of the process becomes uncertain.

This uncertainty causes us great concern not only because it risks delaying the restructuring process, but also because the Land Reserve is in great need of revitalization and restructuring and should not be left in limbo again. When the restructuring was announced in October 2000, considerable emphasis was put on rebuilding trust between the Reserves and the Regular Force. As part of that commitment, a lot of importance was attached to providing information to the interested parties on the progress being made during the restructuring process. Given the often tense relationship between the Reserves and the Regular Force noted in the past, such measures are to be commended. However, the job of building trust between the two camps is by no means over and the last thing everyone needs at this point is a long delay in undertaking Phase 2.

Reservists have been promised more attention and more equipment many times before only to see the anticipated resources disappear into thin air or end up elsewhere. If the situation occurs again with the restructuring announced only two years ago, the sceptics will once more be proven right and both the Army Reserve and the Army will suffer. Some witnesses and, indeed, some members of the Committee have expressed concerns about the state of some Army Reserve units across the country. They are by no means reassured that when an emergency occurs, whether in Canada or overseas, these units will provide all the personnel which are expected to be available. In short, the revitalization of the Reserves must go ahead as quickly as possible otherwise the situation within the Army Reserve will continue to deteriorate. We therefore recommend that:

> **RECOMMENDATION 12**
> **The Department of National Defence make a commitment as quickly as possible to fund Phase 2 of the Land Force Reserve Restructure project so that the revitalization and restructuring of the Army Reserve can proceed as currently planned.**

While the restructuring of the Army Reserve is crucial, the Naval Reserve and the Air Reserve should not be neglected even though they are small in numbers compared to the Army Reserve. The Naval Reserve plays an important role within the Navy, both on foreign deployments and especially in the protection of Canada's coastal waters since most of the crewmembers aboard the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels are Reservists. By the same token, members of the Air Reserve fill key positions within the Air Force. Some pilots are Reservists, but some of the support units vital for Air Force deployments at home and abroad also depend heavily on members of the Air Reserve. Members of the Communications Reserve also make an important contribution to the readiness of the Forces. Another important element of the Reserve Force, especially for operations in Canada's North, is the Rangers. The Committee trusts that along with the Army Reserve, the other elements of the Reserve Force will be revitalized so that the Forces can maintain a high level of readiness.

One measure that can help ensure that the Reserves can make an effective contribution to readiness is job protection for Reservists called up for duty during major emergencies such as an international conflict. Although such call-ups seldom occur and hopefully will remain so, job protection in such circumstances would encourage Reservists to respond to such call-ups without worrying about the effects of their absence on their employment. It would help reassure commanders and military planners that a large number of Reservists would report for duty in emergency situations, thereby ensuring a high level of readiness among the units called to action. Job protection for Reservists in major emergency situations was one of the proposed amendments to the *National Defence Act* included in *Bill C-42* introduced in the wake of the events of September 11th and in the revised bill, *Bill C-55*, tabled in April 2002. The Committee strongly supports job protection for Reservists in major emergencies and continued efforts by the Department and notably the Canadian Forces Liaison Council to encourage employers to give time off to Reservists for military exercises and training courses. We therefore recommend that:

> **RECOMMENDATION 13**
> **The *National Defence Act* be amended as quickly as possible to provide job protection to Reservists called-up for duty during major emergencies such as conflicts and that efforts be maintained, notably by the Canadian Forces Liaison Council, to encourage employers to give Reservists time off for military exercises with job protection.**

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[50] Canada, National Defence, Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee, *Report on Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR)*, February 2002. (The Naval Reserve had 3,730 personnel, the Air Force Reserve 2,172, the Communications Reserve 2,010, and the Rangers 3,483.)

[51] Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery, *Proceedings*, March 19, 2002.

(*Facing Our Responsibilities The state of readiness of the Canadian Forces*, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, May 2002, pp. 43-46.)

ANNEX J – MMC CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES

The Minister's Monitoring Committee pursued its information gathering in several ways including discrete research and interviews. For its mandate, pertaining to LFRR, the Committee also used consultation as a valuable source of insight, ideas and verification. Our consultations on the Army's structure in Canada have taken place in the four Areas: Land Force Western Area, Land Force Central Area, *Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre* and Land Force Atlantic Area.

This was the schedule of consultations with the ten Canadian Brigade Groups in the years 2002 and 2003.

- Ottawa, November 30, 2002 - 33 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Toronto, February 8, 2003 - 32 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- London, February 9, 2003 - 31 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Winnipeg, April 11, 2003 - 38 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Calgary, April 12, 2003 - 41 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Quebec, June 21, 2003 - 35 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Montreal, June 22, 2003 - 34 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Moncton, September 13, 2003 - 37 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Halifax, September 14, 2003 - 36 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Vancouver, October 25, 2003 - 39 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.

Visit our Website at www.frasercom.ca to learn more about the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee consultation activities.

List of Participants

NAME	*ORGANIZATION*
LCol Addicot	CO, 35 Service Battalion
LCol Mario Albert	COS, 34 CBG
CWO Allison	RSM, West Nova Scotia Regiment
LCol Alteen	CO, 2 Nova Scotia Highlanders
CWO Andrews	RSM, 1 Field Regiment
Major Martin Barette	CO, 52^{e} Compagnie médicale
Major Marc Beauchemin	CO, 58^{e} Batterie d'artillerie antiaérienne
LCol Al Beck	CO, The Rocky Mountain Rangers
BGen Denis Belleau	Deputy Commander, Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre

LCol Bell	CO, 2 Royal New Brunswick Regiment
Dr. David Bercuson	Member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee
LCol Alain Boisvert	CO, 62^{e} Régiment d'artillerie de campagne
MWO M. Bouchard	A/CWO, 51 Ambulance de Campagne
CWO Brackley	36 CBG Chief Warrant Officer
LCol Normand Brault	CO, 6^{e} Régiment d'artillerie de campagne
LCol Elizabeth Brown	CO, 12 (Vancouver) Service Battalion
Col Bruce	Commander, 36 CBG
Col Tom Burns	Commander, 39 CBG
LCol Camsell	CO, 36 Service Battalion
CWO Christensen	Area RSM, LFAA
LCol Cole	CO, 31 Service Battalion
LCol Corry	COS, 36 CBG
BGen G. Côté	Commander, Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre
LCol Jean-François Côté	CO, Le Régiment de Chaudière
LCol Denis Cyr	CO, The British Columbia Dragoons
LCol Gilles D'Amours	CO, 35 CBG School
LCol J. Paul Dangerfield	Chief of Staff, 39 CBG
CWO DelPinto	Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
Col Michel Demers	Commander, 35 CBG
Mr. Bev Dewar	Member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee
LCol François Dion	CO, Les Voltigeurs de Québec
LCol Donaldson	CO, 33 Service Battalion
LCol Joe Donnelly	CO, 11 (Victoria) Service Battalion
LCol Doyle	CO, 45 Field Engineer Squadron
LCol Dean Drysdale	CO, 15 Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery
Maj Marcel Duguay	G3 - SQFT
Col Y. Duhamel	Commander, 34 CBG
LCol Duke	CO, 8 Canadian Hussars
CWO Dunbar	RSM, 1 Nova Scotia Highlanders
CWO Dupuis	6 Royal 22^{e} Régiment
Dr. Jack English	Director of Research, Minister's Monitoring Committee
LCol Louis Fortin	CO, Le Régiment du Saguenay
LCol Gérald Fraser	CO, 55^{e} Bataillon des services du Canada (Québec)
Hon. John A. Fraser	Chairman of the Minister's Monitoring Committee

MWO Fraser	RSM, 35 Medical Company
Maj S. Fredette	A/CO, 4 Royal 22^{e} Régiment
LCol Foote	CO, 3 Field Regiment
LCol Bryan Gagne	CO, The B.C. Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own)
Maj Giacomini	CO, 35 Medical Company
LCol J. Giguère	CO, Régiment de Hull
CWO Glen	RSM, 35 Service Battalion
CWO Gohier	3 Régiment du Génie
LCol D. Gouge	CO, 3 Régiment du Génie
LCol Grant	CO, 1 Nova Scotia Highlanders
BGen (Ret'd) Sheila Hellstrom	Member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee
LCol Henley	CO, 1 Field Regiment
LCol Hynes	ACOS Adm, LFAA
CWO R. Jourdain	34 CBG
Maj Kiley	CO, 3 Intelligence Company
LCol Gratien Lamontagne	CO, 12^{e} Régiment blindé du Canada (Milice)
RSM Landry	37 CBG Bde RSM
LCol Paul Langlais	CO, Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke
LCol Lavoie	CO, Air Defence Regiment
CWO Leblanc	51^{e} Bataillon des services
MGen (Ret'd) Reg Lewis	Member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee
Col J. Logan	Commander, 37 CBG
LCol Dave Low	CO, 12 Vancouver Medical Company
MWO Luker	RSM, 35 Field Ambulance
LCol MacCallum	COS, 37 CBG
LCol MacCulloch	New CO, 45 Field Engineer Squadron (21 Sept. 03)
Maj J.D. MacDonald	1 Royal Newfoundland Regiment
MWO MacDonald	RSM, 45 Field Engineer Squadron
LCol MacGillivray	CO, 1 Royal New Brunswick Regiment
Capt Machin	CO, 56 Field Engineer Squadron
LCol Alain Martineau	DCO, The Sherbrooke Hussars
Maj Jon Maxon	CO, 6 Field Engineer Squadron
LCol Blair McGregor	CO, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
CWO McIntyre	The Royal Montreal Regiment

LCol McKinnon	CO, Prince Edward Island Regiment
LCol Meisner	G5/CO, LFAA
LCol H. Moise	CO, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
Maj M. Moreau	CO, 9^{e} Escadron du Génie
Maj Moser	CO, 30 Military Police Platoon
LCol R. Nadeau	CO, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve
CWO Pageau	Le Régiment de Maisonneuve
Maj Paul Paone	CO, 11 (Victoria) Medical Company
Col Parsons	ACOS, LFAA
Col (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin	Facilitator, Minister's Monitoring Committee
LCol Pollock	Deputy Commander, 37 CBG
LCol J. Potter	CO, The Black Watch
LCol Aline Préfontaine	CO, 55^{e} Compagnie médicale
LCol J-L. Renaud	CO, 51^{e} Ambulance de Campagne
LCol M. Richard	6 Royal 22^{e} Régiment
LCol Glen Richmond	CO, The Royal Westminster Regiment
BGen Ring	Deputy Commander, LFAA
LCol Didier Rioux	Deputy Commander, 35 CBG
LCol Roberts	CO, 33 Medical Company
BGen Romses	Commander, LFAA
Capt L. Rosa	O Admin Pers, 34 CBG
LCol Dave Ross	CO, 5 Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery
CWO Rushton	RSM, 33 Service Battalion
LCol Warren Sanderson	CO, The Sherbrooke Hussars
MWO Sherran	RSM, Prince Edward Island Regiment
LCol Shipley	CO, 2 Royal Newfoundland Regiment
LCol J. St-Arnaud	CO, The Canadian Grenadier Guards
LCol Stonier	CO, West Nova Scotia Regiment
MWO Swanson	CSM, 33 Medical Company
LCol Stéphane Tardif	CO, Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent
LCol Alain Têtu	COS, 35 CBG
Major Denis Thebeau	CO, 10^{e} Escadron du Génie
LCol Thomas	Deputy Commander, 36 CBG
CWO Vallee	RSM, 2 Nova Scotia Highlanders

LCol Weatherbee	CO, Princess Louise Fusiliers
Maj W. (Bill) Wenman	CO, 44 Field Engineer Squadron
CWO White	RSM, Princess Louise Fusiliers
LCol Stan Willow	CO, The Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)

ANNEX K – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM (HR-Mil)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military)
ADM (PA)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs)
ASAC	Advanced Small Arms Course
ASR	Army Support Review
ARFET	Army Reserve Field Equipment Table
BG	Battle Group
BGen	Brigadier-General
BTS	Battle Task Standards
CADPAT	Canadian Disruptive Pattern
CBG	Canadian Brigade Group
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CCAG	Command Consultative Advisory Group
CCWG	Command Consultative Working Group
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CFLC	Canadian Forces Liaison Council
CF	Canadian Forces
CFRG	Canadian Forces Recruiting Group
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CLS	Chief of the Land Staff
Comd	Commander
COTC	Canadian Officer Training Corps
CPR	Cardio-pulmonary Rescuscitation
CRC	Composite Reserve Company
CRIC	Composite Reserve Infantry Company
CSC	Command and Staff Course
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTL	Critical Topic List

DAG/AAG	Departure Assistance Group/Arrival Assistance Group
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DLOC	Deployment Level of Capability
DLRM	Director Land Reserve Management
DM	Deputy Minister
DMAC	Director Managerial Accounting and Comptrollership
DMHRR	Director Military Human Resource Requirements
DND	Department of National Defence
EA	Executive Assistant
ELM	Enhanced Leadership Model
ELOC	Essential Level of Capability
FY	Fiscal Year
HQ	Headquarter
IBTS/MLOC	Individual Battle Task Standards/Minimum Level of Capability
JAG	Judge Advocate General
LAV	Light Armoured Vehicle
LFAA	Land Force Atlantic Area
LFC	Land Force Command
LFCA	Land Force Central Area
LFCPFS	Land Force Command Physical Fitness Standards
LFRR	Land Force Reserve Restructure
LFWA	Land Force Western Area
LOC	Level of Capability
MCDV	Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel
MCF	Main Contingency Force
MDS	Master of Defence Studies
MGen	Major-General
MMC	Minister's Monitoring Committee
MNB (NW)	Multi-National Brigade (North-West)
MND	Minister of National Defence
MOS	Military Occupation Structure
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCM	Non-Commissioned Member
NDA	*National Defence Act*
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarter
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWC	Naval War College
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OCIPEP	Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness
OP	Operation
OPD	Officer Professional Development
PMO	Project Management Office
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PXR	Post-Exercise Report
QS	Qualification Standards
R22eR	*Royal 22*^{e} *Régiment*
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RESO	Reserve Entry Scheme Officer
RETP	Reserve Entry Training Plan
RFEP	Reserve Force Employment Project
RMAT	Roles, Missions and Tasks
RMC	Royal Military College
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
ROTO	Rotation
RPSR	Revised Pay System for the Reserves
SCONDVA	Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
SCRR	Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves
SDS	Senior Directing Staff
SORD	Strategic Operation and Resource Direction
SQFT	Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre
SR	(single) Supplementary Reserve
Supp Res	Supplementary Reserve
SWG	Structural Working Group

TCCCS	Tactical Command and Control Communications System
TO and E	Table of Organization and Equipment
USAR	United States Army Reserve
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

ANNEX L – BIOGRAPHIES

THE HONOURABLE JOHN A. FRASER

CHAIRMAN

John Allen Fraser, P.C., O.C., O.B.C., C.D., Q.C., was born December 15, 1931, in Japan and raised and educated in British Columbia. He was called to the Bar in 1954 and practised law until his election to the House of Commons in 1972. He was re-elected in 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1988. In opposition he served as critic on Environment, Labour, Post Office, Solicitor General and Fisheries matters. He was Minister of Environment and Postmaster General (1979-80), and then Minister of Fisheries (1984-85).

In 1986, Mr. Fraser became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot by Members of Parliament. He served as Speaker until February 1994. His accomplishments as Speaker include the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Parliamentary Cooperation Program; the creation of the House of Commons Public Information Office; and the establishment of the House of Commons environmental program, Greening the Hill. In 1986, he established a House of Commons Task Force on the Disabled and Handicapped to ensure access and employment opportunities on Parliament Hill for the disadvantaged. He also commissioned the recent publication, *The House of Commons at Work.*

Over the years, Mr. Fraser has had a continuing interest in resource matters including fisheries and forestry and has demonstrated a profound commitment to environmental causes both as a lawyer and a parliamentarian. He has received a variety of national awards for his valuable contributions and tireless efforts in the area of sustainable development. In addition to these many awards, he has been active with a number of boards and foundations, and was awarded an honorary professorship from the Beijing Medical University (China) in 1992.

In 1994, Mr. Fraser was appointed Canada's Ambassador for the Environment, a position held until September, 1998. In 1995, in recognition of his many contributions to Canada, he was awarded the Order of Canada. He is also a member of the Order of British Columbia and holds the Canadian Forces Decoration. He continues to be active in environmental protection and resource conservation and was appointed Chair of the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council in September 1998.

Mr. Fraser has been associated with the Canadian Forces since 1950, when he first enlisted as a private soldier with the West Coast Signal Regiment. After two years with Canadian Officer Training Corps, he was commissioned as an infantry officer and posted to Germany in 1953 with the First Canadian Highland Battalion of the 27th Brigade. From 1954 to 1962, he served as an officer in both the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment. Mr. Fraser was appointed Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, in 1994 and is currently the Regiment's Honorary Colonel.

In October 1997, Mr. Fraser was appointed a member of the National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. He is currently Chair.

DR. DAVID J. BERCUSON

MEMBER

David Bercuson was born in Montreal in August, 1945. He attended Sir George Williams University, graduating in June 1966 with Honours in History and winning the Lieutenant-Governor's Silver Medal for the highest standing in history. Bercuson pursued graduate studies at the University of Toronto, earning an MA in history in 1967 and a Ph.D. in 1971.

Dr. Bercuson has published widely in academic and popular publications on a wide range of topics. He specializes in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history. He has written, coauthored, or edited over 25 popular and academic books and does political commentary for CBC and CTV television. He has written regular columns for the *Globe & Mail*, the *Financial Post* and other newspapers.

In 1988 Bercuson was elected to the Royal Society of Canada and in May, 1989, he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at The University of Calgary. Since January 1997 he has been Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

His book, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, won the Wilfred Eggleston Award for nonfiction at the Alberta Book Awards in May 1997. Another recent book, *Deadly Seas: The Story of the St. Croix, U305 and the Battle of the Atlantic*, coauthored with Dr. Holger Herwig, was on the *Maclean's* Bestseller list for several weeks. His most recent books *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* was published in September, 1999 and *The Patricias* was published in May 2001. His new book, *Bismarck!*, co-authored with Holger Herwig, was published in New York and Toronto in the fall of 2001.

Dr. Bercuson was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence on the Future of the Canadian Forces from January to April 1997.

MR. D. BEVIS DEWAR

MEMBER

Bevis Dewar was born in Kenmore, Ontario in August 1932. He studied at Queen's University where he obtained an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in history, economics and political science in 1953, following which he pursued postgraduate studies in Canadian history also at Queen's. While at university, Mr. Dewar served in the University Naval Training Division at Kingston, Halifax and Esquimalt.

In 1954, he joined the Public Service of Canada and was appointed to the Cabinet Secretariat in the Privy Council Office where he was secretary to Cabinet committees dealing with matters of interdepartmental liaison and policy development, mainly regarding external affairs and defence.

In 1963, he became a program analyst in the Treasury Board Secretariat. His duties consisted of program and expenditure budget analysis and of presenting recommendations dealing with defence production, industrial development, foreign affairs and defence. In 1968, he was named Assistant Secretary of the Program Branch at the Treasury Board Secretariat, responsible for analyzing and making recommendations on expenditure budgets of all federal departments. The following year he became Deputy Secretary of the same Branch.

Mr. Dewar was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada in September 1973. From September, 1975 to August 1979, he served as Assistant Secretary for the Government Branch of Science and Technology Canada, responsible for the International Division, the Government Projects Division, and the Project Review and Assessment Division.

In August 1979, Mr. Dewar was appointed Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) in the Privy Council Office. He was responsible for secretariats on economic policy, government operations, foreign affairs and defence, native and social affairs, communications, emergency planning, labour relations, and legislation and House planning. From November 1982 to May 1989, Mr. Dewar served as Deputy Minister of National Defence. He was appointed Associate Secretary of the Cabinet and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council in May 1989. In October, 1990, he was named Principal of the Canadian Centre for Management Development.

Mr. Dewar retired from public service in August 1992.

BRIGADIER GENERAL (RET'D) SHEILA A. HELLSTROM

MEMBER

Brigadier-General Hellstrom is a native of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. She graduated from Lunenburg County Academy in 1953 and attended Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick where she earned a Bachelor of Science degree in biology and chemistry. While at Mount Allison, she enrolled as a flight cadet in the Royal Canadian Air Force University Reserve Training Plan. She received her commission in 1956 and transferred to the Regular Force in the personnel administration branch.

Brigadier-General Hellstrom's career included administrative appointments at military establishments in Gimli, Winnipeg and Rivers, Manitoba, Senneterre and Montreal, Quebec, North Bay and Toronto, Ontario as well as Baden-Soellingen Germany and Metz France. At National Defence headquarters Ottawa, she served as Director Women Personnel and acting Director General Conditions of Service.

In 1987 she became the first woman in the Canadian Forces to achieve general officer rank and was appointed Director General Personnel Careers Officers. At the same time, she served as Chair of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, a group of senior officers from the NATO nations concerned with the effective utilization of women in the armed forces of the Alliance.

Brigadier-General Hellstrom is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff College, Toronto and of the National Defence College in Kingston. In 1989, she received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Mount Allison University.

Now retired from the Canadian Forces, Brigadier-General Hellstrom resides in Ottawa where she is former chair of the Board of Governors of the Ottawa Division Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, and a member of a number of defence-related organizations. She has also served on the Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces and the Ottawa Police Services Board's Advisory Committee on Race Relations and Employment Equity.

MAJOR GENERAL (RET'D) REGINALD W. LEWIS

MEMBER

Major General Reginald W. Lewis, C.M., C.M.M., C.D., was born in London, England and was raised and educated in the United Kingdom. He became a Certified General Accountant in 1962 and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries and Administrators in 1965. General Lewis is the immediate past Chairman of the Honourary Colonels' Council of Canada. In October 2000, General Lewis was named a member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces phase III which focuses on the monitoring of Land Force Reserve Restructure.

General Lewis' military career began when he joined his school's Cadet Corps. He joined the British Army in 1948 and served in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps in the U.K., Egypt, Turkey, Greece and Eritrea. In 1954 he came to Canada and joined the militia and subsequently commanded the Toronto Service Battalion, Toronto Militia District, Central Militia Area – the largest command in the Reserves – before being appointed Special Project Officer Reserves, NDHQ. Thereafter, he was made Chief of Reserves. Relinquishing the appointment of CRes in 1988, he became the International President of the Interallied Confederation of Reserves Officers of NATO (CIOR), an organization based at NATO H.Q. in Brussels, representing 800,000 Reserve Officers of the Alliance. Subsequent to the Presidency of CIOR he was appointed the Honourary Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Canada.

Over the years, General Lewis has continued to have an active involvement in civilian matters. Among his many accomplishments, he has been President of the Parking Authority of Toronto, Chairman and CEO of the Toronto Economic Development Corporation, and Chairman of Defence Construction Canada Ltd. Recently, he was appointed a Director of Parc Downsview Park, Inc. and he has served as a judge of the Citizenship Court.

General Lewis has also been extensively involved in community and military associations throughout his career. A member of the Board of Trade of Toronto, he is the Chair of its Military Affairs Committee. He has been Chairman of the Toronto and Region Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations as well as President of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Association and of the Canadian Forces Logistics Association.

General Lewis has received numerous orders and decorations throughout his career. Included among them are the Canadian Forces Decoration (three clasps) (CD); the Commemorative Plaque, City of Amsterdam; Member, Order of Canada (CM), Commander Order of Military Merit (CMM), and Commander, Order of St. John (CStJ).

SECRETARIAT

Dr. Jack English, Director of Research
Dennis Brook, Informatics Manager
Isabelle Dumas, Coordinator of Research and Information Services
Anne Hooper, Librarian and Research Assistant
Dory MacLellan, Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Suzanne Schryer-Belair, Director of Administration and Finance
Louise Vallée, Administrative Assistant